10 California opinions name it 3 courts 2002–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2015See [ Graham, supra,] . . . 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (‘For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone’).” (Miller, at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 421 ].) Following Graham and Miller, the California Supreme Court held a 110-year-to- life sentence imposed for three counts of attempted murder committed as a minor constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 2014See [ Graham, supra,] . . . 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (‘For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone’).” (Miller, at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 421 ].) Following Graham and Miller, the California Supreme Court held a 110-year-to- life sentence imposed for three counts of attempted murder committed as a minor constituted cruel and unusual punishment. | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2015On this evidence, and given the People’s concession (even though it was based on a calculation error), we conclude that defendant’s sentence did not give him a meaningful opportunity for release from prison within his expected lifetime, and thus his sentence is subject to the decisions we discuss herein. 15 culpability.” ( Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 116 , [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 12 ].) The Miller court recognized it “imposed a categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment. 2015On this evidence, and given the People’s concession (even though it was based on a calculation error), we conclude that defendant’s sentence did not give him a meaningful opportunity for release from prison within his expected lifetime, and thus his sentence is subject to the decisions we discuss herein. 15 culpability.” ( Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 116 , [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 12 ].) The Miller court recognized it “imposed a categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kinggreen1 sentence2002(See People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410 , 1412-1413 ; People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729 , 733-735 ; see also People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882 , 885 ; People v. Gutierrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1571 , 1573 ; People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 , 527 .) We need not address this conflict between the latter cases and Wills since we conclude that a participant in a section 1203.016 program is "in actual custody" for purposes of subdivision (f). 5 Given the limited purpose of subdivision (f) as described in footnote 4 above, we do not construe the term "actual" to mean | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Antwon R.
green
2 sentences2026(See In re Antwon R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 353 .) Instead, we may modify the dispositional order. 8 DISPOSITION The dispositional order is modified to reflect that S.F. is entitled to 953 days’ credit for precommitment custody. 2021(See In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 353 .) In this case, the parties agree that the trial court erred in failing to grant appellants additional custody credits when they were resentenced, and they concur on the number of presentence custody credits that should have been granted: Wooten is entitled to 67 additional days of custody credits, and Collins is entitled to 102 additional days of custody credits. | 3 | 2015–2026 |
Eddings v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2015On this evidence, and given the People’s concession (even though it was based on a calculation error), we conclude that defendant’s sentence did not give him a meaningful opportunity for release from prison within his expected lifetime, and thus his sentence is subject to the decisions we discuss herein. 15 culpability.” ( Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 116 , [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 12 ].) The Miller court recognized it “imposed a categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment. 2014On this evidence, and given the People’s concession (even though it was based on a calculation error), we conclude that defendant’s sentence did not give him a meaningful opportunity for release from prison within his expected lifetime, and thus his sentence is subject to the decisions we discuss herein. 15 culpability.” ( Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 116 , [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 12 ].) The Miller court recognized it “imposed a categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Weber v. Langholz
green
1 sentence2025With regard to the purported discrepancy in totals between the Seeley billing records and the Seeley declaration, we again reiterate that the trial court was permitted to “make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.” (Weber, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587 .) Notably, Malinowski presented this same calculation error argument in her reconsideration motion, which the court denied, suggesting the court did not base the award on the preci | 1 | 2025–2025 |
deSaulles v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula
green
1 sentence2025Thus, while there was a “ ‘monetary recovery’ ” to the trust of approximately $21,000, it did not resolve or terminate the lawsuit, nor did appellants “achieve[] some litigation success through settlement of the case.” (DeSaulles, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1153 .) On the contrary, appellants failed to prove each of their claims, and respondents obtained judgment in their favor “ ‘on all causes of action and in every respect.’ ” We conclude the trial court did not err in deeming Brent to be a prevailing party and in awarding his costs as a matter of right under Civil Code section 1032. 57 b. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations
green
2 sentences2018(Stats. 2012, ch. 820, § 2.) 10 In this respect, it is worth noting that the court made a minor calculation error in its hypothetical, applying an overtime pay rate of $3.12 instead of $13.12 when calculating the total overtime pay for seven hours of overtime. ( Id . at p. 248, 211 Cal.Rptr. 792 ["The time and a half rate would be $13.12...."]; id . at p. 249, 211 Cal.Rptr. 792 ["[T]he employee would be entitled to ... 7 hours at time and one-half or a total of $21.84 in overtime"; note: $21.84 is seven times $3.12, not seven times $13.12].) That minor calculation error suggests that the court 2018(Stats. 2012, ch. 820, § 2.) 10 In this respect, it is worth noting that the court made a minor calculation error in its hypothetical, applying an overtime pay rate of $3.12 instead of $13.12 when calculating the total overtime pay for seven hours of overtime. ( Id . at p. 248, 211 Cal.Rptr. 792 ["The time and a half rate would be $13.12...."]; id . at p. 249, 211 Cal.Rptr. 792 ["[T]he employee would be entitled to ... 7 hours at time and one-half or a total of $21.84 in overtime"; note: $21.84 is seven times $3.12, not seven times $13.12].) That minor calculation error suggests that the court | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Jack
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Jack (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 913, 916-917 .) The correct numbers are 231 days of custody credits plus 230 days of section 4019 conduct credits, for a total of 461 days. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Bravo
green
1 sentence2002(See People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410 , 1412-1413 ; People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729 , 733-735 ; see also People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882 , 885 ; People v. Gutierrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1571 , 1573 ; People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 , 527 .) We need not address this conflict between the latter cases and Wills since we conclude that a participant in a section 1203.016 program is "in actual custody" for purposes of subdivision (f). 5 Given the limited purpose of subdivision (f) as described in footnote 4 above, we do not construe the term "actual" to mean | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Gutierrez
green
1 sentence2002(See People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410 , 1412-1413 ; People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729 , 733-735 ; see also People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882 , 885 ; People v. Gutierrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1571 , 1573 ; People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 , 527 .) We need not address this conflict between the latter cases and Wills since we conclude that a participant in a section 1203.016 program is "in actual custody" for purposes of subdivision (f). 5 Given the limited purpose of subdivision (f) as described in footnote 4 above, we do not construe the term "actual" to mean | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2002(See People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410 , 1412-1413 ; People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729 , 733-735 ; see also People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882 , 885 ; People v. Gutierrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1571 , 1573 ; People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 , 527 .) We need not address this conflict between the latter cases and Wills since we conclude that a participant in a section 1203.016 program is "in actual custody" for purposes of subdivision (f). 5 Given the limited purpose of subdivision (f) as described in footnote 4 above, we do not construe the term "actual" to mean | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Browning
green
1 sentence2002(See People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410 , 1412-1413 ; People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729 , 733-735 ; see also People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882 , 885 ; People v. Gutierrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1571 , 1573 ; People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 , 527 .) We need not address this conflict between the latter cases and Wills since we conclude that a participant in a section 1203.016 program is "in actual custody" for purposes of subdivision (f). 5 Given the limited purpose of subdivision (f) as described in footnote 4 above, we do not construe the term "actual" to mean | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.