clear statutory exception in California

10 California opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Yamada Brothers v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR REL. BD.green calctapp · 1979 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . , supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 121, 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 .) For example, judicial review of non-final orders of the Board has been allowed by writ of mandate where there was a clear statutory violation by the Board resulting in a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the ALRA and the ordinary legal remedy was inadequate. 2018Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . , supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 121, 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 .) For example, judicial review of non-final orders of the Board has been allowed by writ of mandate where there was a clear statutory violation by the Board resulting in a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the ALRA and the ordinary legal remedy was inadequate.	2	2
Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen cal · 1978 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B. 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B.	2	2
In Re HGgreen calctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014(H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) The court also did not consider disposition or hold a disposition hearing under the California Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(2). 2014(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(2); In re A.O., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) If the petition was filed to remove the minor from a relative caretaker, the only factual finding necessary is set forth in the statute: that the minor's placement was "not appropriate in view of the criteria in Section 361.3."9 (§ 387, subd. (b).) This standard was added because "the existing law did 'not provide a clear statutory standard for removal of children from a relative foster care provider.' " (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1 , 14, fn. 9 (H.G.).) In H.G., this court reversed jurisdictional and	1	1
In Re AOgreen calctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(2); In re A.O., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) If the petition was filed to remove the minor from a relative caretaker, the only factual finding necessary is set forth in the statute: that the minor's placement was "not appropriate in view of the criteria in Section 361.3."9 (§ 387, subd. (b).) This standard was added because "the existing law did 'not provide a clear statutory standard for removal of children from a relative foster care provider.' " (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1 , 14, fn. 9 (H.G.).) In H.G., this court reversed jurisdictional and	1	1
Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.green calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007(See Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 46 ( Hudgins) [employer "cannot avoid a finding that its ... policy is unlawful simply by asserting that the deduction is just a step in its calculation of commission income"].) Here, as in Quillian , this method of computing compensation contravenes the clear statutory rule the Legislature has adopted against such burden shifting. [5] That the compensation plan may not upset employee expectations concerning payment, as the majority argues, is not determinative; employee expectations are but one of the 2007(See Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 46 ( Hudgins) [employer "cannot avoid a finding that its ... policy is unlawful simply by asserting that the deduction is just a step in its calculation of commission income"].) Here, as in Quillian , this method of computing compensation contravenes the clear statutory rule the Legislature has adopted against such burden shifting. [5] That the compensation plan may not upset employee expectations concerning payment, as the majority argues, is not determinative; employee expectations are but one of the	1	1
Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11green scotus · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 2 sentences 1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec 1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board green calctapp · 1979 2 sentences 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B. 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B.	2	2018–2018
Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Court green calctapp · 1996 2 sentences 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B. 2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365 , 380-382, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502-1503, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ; see also, 1219 Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd . (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551 , 556-557, 147 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 580 P.2d 665 .) 103 B.	2	2018–2018
Luna v. Carleson green calctapp · 1975 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
Ball v. County of Los Angeles green calctapp · 1978 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
Tripp v. Swoap green cal · 1976 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, "While it is true 227 that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]" ( Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal. A 1982*In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc. green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, "While it is true 227 that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]" ( Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal. A 1982*In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
K. G. Moore, Inc. v. Anderson green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, "While it is true 227 that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]" ( Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal. A 1982*In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of Financial Institutions of Indiana green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1982In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, "While it is true 227 that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]" ( Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal. A 1982*In disapproving of Luna v. Carleson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 670 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 711 ], the Tripp court stated emphatically, “While it is true that governmental entities traditionally have been immune from liability for interest, Civil Code section 3287 as amended in 1959 provides a clear statutory exception to the general rule, and this exception has been consistently recognized by this court as imposing liability for interest on such entities. [Citations.]” (Tripp v. Swoap, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, 683-684 .) The City of Los Angeles relies upon Ball v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 312	2	1982–1982
Perez v. Torres green calctapp · 2012 1 sentence 2021We “cannot ignore the . . . statute to achieve a more desirable result.” (Perez, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 , italics omitted.) Finally, MLG asserts Rabineau should be equitably estopped from challenging the validity of judgment.	1	2021–2021
Boeken v. Philip Morris USA Inc. green calctapp · 2013 1 sentence 2021Instead, stare decisis and common tenants of statutory construction direct us to adhere to the clear statutory requirement of an acceptance provision “without regards to what occurred in this particular case or the tactics of a party.” (Boeken, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004 ).	1	2021–2021
Fairfax v. Lords green calctapp · 2006 1 sentence 2012“The effect of [the defendant’s] expert designation was to delay his own list of ‘expected’ witnesses until after he had seen the list put forth by [the plaintiff], [The defendant] does not deny that this was his express intent, and instead argues it is only ‘prudent’ for a defendant to do so.” (Fairfax v. Lords, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026 .) The court held the defendant’s argument was “simply inconsistent with the clear statutory requirement of a ‘simultaneous’ exchange.” (Ibid.) This is not the situation here.	1	2012–2012
Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16 green scotus · 1970 2 sentences 1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec 1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec	1	1979–1979
Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco green ca6 · 1962 2 sentences 1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality ( Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir.1962) 310 F.2d 632, 635 ) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive ( Squillacote v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir.1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)). 1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).	1	1979–1979
George Squillacote v. International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Local 344 green ca7 · 1977 2 sentences 1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality ( Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir.1962) 310 F.2d 632, 635 ) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive ( Squillacote v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir.1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)). 1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).	1	1979–1979
Sanders v. City of Los Angeles green cal · 1970 2 sentences 1976(E.g., Sanders v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 262 ; Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.2d 355, 364 .) Second, the court was of the view that in the face of the provision in section 10962 for attorney’s fees and costs, the Legislature’s failure to include interest was not an inadvertence. 1976(E.g., Sanders v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 262 ; Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.2d 355, 364 .) Second, the court was of the view that in the face of the provision in section 10962 for attorney's fees and costs, the Legislature's failure to include interest was not an inadvertence.	1	1976–1976
Benson v. City of Los Angeles green cal · 1963 2 sentences 1976(E.g., Sanders v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 262 ; Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.2d 355, 364 .) Second, the court was of the view that in the face of the provision in section 10962 for attorney’s fees and costs, the Legislature’s failure to include interest was not an inadvertence. 1976(E.g., Sanders v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 262 ; Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.2d 355, 364 .) Second, the court was of the view that in the face of the provision in section 10962 for attorney's fees and costs, the Legislature's failure to include interest was not an inadvertence.	1	1976–1976

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Civil Code § 3287 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WI 25 (1988–2025) CA 10 (1976–2021) MA 7 (1994–2020) NY 4 (1981–2024) TX 4 (1973–2023) WA 4 (2011–2019) NC 3 (2006–2016) GA 3 (2015–2017) NH 3 (1992–2004) VA 2 (2015–2020) OK 2 (1976–1999) MI 2 (1999–1999) MS 2 (2006–2024) TN 2 (2015–2024) MN 2 (1996–2014) PA 2 (1971–2004) IN 2 (1981–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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