Cole claim in California

2019(See Franklin, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209, discussing Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 .) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Hammonds’ motion for mandatory dismissal pursuant to section 583.360, and instead granting Cole’s motion for voluntary dismissal.

2019(See Franklin, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 , discussing Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 , 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 .) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Hammonds' motion for mandatory dismissal pursuant to section 583.360, and instead granting Cole's motion for voluntary dismissal.

2019(See Franklin, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 , discussing Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 , 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 .) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Hammonds' motion for mandatory dismissal pursuant to section 583.360, and instead granting Cole's motion for voluntary dismissal.

2019(See Franklin, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 , discussing Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 , 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 .) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Hammonds' motion for mandatory dismissal pursuant to section 583.360, and instead granting Cole's motion for voluntary dismissal.

2013(Corona, at pp. 591–595.) Moreover, Corona concluded the Cole analysis “makes no sense when applied to a group pummeling.” (Corona, at p. 594.) “[W]hen a defendant participates in a group beating 9. and when it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted which injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury enhancement if his conduct was of a nature that it could have caused the great bodily injury suffered.” (Ibid.) The holding in Corona was affirmed by our Supreme Court in People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri).

2013(Corona, at pp. 591–595.) Moreover, Corona concluded the Cole analysis “makes no sense when applied to a group pummeling.” (Corona, at p. 594.) “[W]hen a defendant participates in a group beating 9. and when it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted which injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury enhancement if his conduct was of a nature that it could have caused the great bodily injury suffered.” (Ibid.) The holding in Corona was affirmed by our Supreme Court in People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri).

2022To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified a possible issue that was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether the trial court erred in denying Cole’s motion to vacate his conviction for possessing marijuana in state prison.

2001The court concluded these costs "necessarily and impermissibly deter[ ] teachers from exercising their due process right to a hearing" (id. at p. 357, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 ), bolstering its reasoning with a reference to Cole : "The invalidity of a provision requiring dismissed public teachers to pay for the public cost of the administrative law judge is apparent when we consider decisions holding that even private employees who have agreed to private arbitration of statutory wrongful termination claims cannot be compelled to pay half the cost of the arbitrator." (Id. at pp. 354-35

2001The court concluded these costs "necessarily and impermissibly deter[ ] teachers from exercising their due process right to a hearing" (id. at p. 357, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 ), bolstering its reasoning with a reference to Cole : "The invalidity of a provision requiring dismissed public teachers to pay for the public cost of the administrative law judge is apparent when we consider decisions holding that even private employees who have agreed to private arbitration of statutory wrongful termination claims cannot be compelled to pay half the cost of the arbitrator." (Id. at pp. 354-35

1999(Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 572 .) Since the Cole defendant did not strike his victim, he did not “personally inflict” injury as required by the enhancement statute.

1996(Id., at p. 1442.) The court concluded that the trial court had erred by giving instructions by which the jury might have accepted Cole’s claim that he had only “momentarily handled the cocaine for purposes of disposal or abandonment” yet felt compelled to convict him because “the drugs were in his constructive possession in the safe for more than ‘brief moments. . . .’” (Id., at p. 1445.) The revised instruction, renamed “Possession-Not Unlawful,” deleted reference to “momentary possession” and added a paragraph stating, “Length of time of possession is one of the factors that may be consider

1996(Id., at p. 1442.) The court concluded that the trial court had erred by giving instructions by which the jury might have accepted Cole’s claim that he had only “momentarily handled the cocaine for purposes of disposal or abandonment” yet felt compelled to convict him because “the drugs were in his constructive possession in the safe for more than ‘brief moments. . . .’” (Id., at p. 1445.) The revised instruction, renamed “Possession-Not Unlawful,” deleted reference to “momentary possession” and added a paragraph stating, “Length of time of possession is one of the factors that may be consider

1991(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 160-161.)” (Semore v. Pool, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104 .) *668 Thus, we are convinced the majority of courts, 15 including the Renteria court, have abandoned Renteria's “physical versus emotional harm” test and instead adopted the Cole test, which was reaffirmed in Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 .

1991(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 160-161.)” (Semore v. Pool, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104 .) *668 Thus, we are convinced the majority of courts, 15 including the Renteria court, have abandoned Renteria's “physical versus emotional harm” test and instead adopted the Cole test, which was reaffirmed in Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 .

1991(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 160-161.)” (Semore v. Pool, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104 .) *668 Thus, we are convinced the majority of courts, 15 including the Renteria court, have abandoned Renteria's “physical versus emotional harm” test and instead adopted the Cole test, which was reaffirmed in Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 .

1991(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 160-161.)” (Semore v. Pool, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104 .) *668 Thus, we are convinced the majority of courts, 15 including the Renteria court, have abandoned Renteria's “physical versus emotional harm” test and instead adopted the Cole test, which was reaffirmed in Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 .