defendant from presenting defense in California

2024(People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684 .) “The principle applies, however, only to ‘relevant and material’ evidence.” (Ibid.) Moreover, “[a]s a general matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to 16 present a defense.’ [Citations.] Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 , 1102–1103

2022And I think that prejudices the jury, rights]; see also People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 143 [“ ‘ “[A]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a . . . defendant’s constitutional rights.” ’ ”]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 [no constitutional violation where a trial court does not preclude a defendant from presenting a defense, but only rejects some evidence concerning the defense].) 21 it misleads the jury on that issue and it creates an unfairness where she’s raising issues that I can’t respond to.” The prosecutor responde

2026(See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 , 717 [under prejudice standard for state law errors, defendant bears burden of persuasion on issue of prejudice], citing People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 169 .8) As set forth below, it is not reasonably probable that it affected 8 Errors in applying state evidentiary law are subject to the prejudice test enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), which requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial, except in rare cases in which the error prevented a de

2026(See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 , 717 [under prejudice standard for state law errors, defendant bears burden of persuasion on issue of prejudice], citing People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 169 .8) As set forth below, it is not reasonably probable that it affected 8 Errors in applying state evidentiary law are subject to the prejudice test enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), which requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial, except in rare cases in which the error prevented a de

2023As a general rule, “the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.” (Id. at p. 999.) When a trial court’s rulings have precluded a defendant from presenting a defense in violation of th

2016(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 (Cunningham).) Any error here was harmless under both the state and federal standards.

2026(See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 , 717 [under prejudice standard for state law errors, defendant bears burden of persuasion on issue of prejudice], citing People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 169 .8) As set forth below, it is not reasonably probable that it affected 8 Errors in applying state evidentiary law are subject to the prejudice test enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), which requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial, except in rare cases in which the error prevented a de

2025(Id. at pp. 875-878; see also People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 526 (Pompa-Ortiz) [denial of the right to a public preliminary hearing could be raised by section 995 motion to dismiss].) 7 The nonstatutory motion to dismiss was the appropriate vehicle to raise defendant’s claim that Fairchild’s perjury at the preliminary hearing deprived defendant of substantial rights by preventing him from presenting an affirmative defense when defense counsel was unable to meaningfully cross-examine Fairchild.

2023(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].)11 11 A violation of the confrontation clause would trigger the application of the Chapman standard, but, as we have determined ante, Duangputra has not in fact presented a confrontation clause claim.

2023(People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 326 [“In Gay, the trial court instructed the jury on lingering doubt, but precluded the defendant from presenting that defense; in the present case, the trial court allowed defendants to present and argue their lingering doubt defenses, but refused to specifically instruct on lingering doubt.

2022And I think that prejudices the jury, rights]; see also People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 143 [“ ‘ “[A]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a . . . defendant’s constitutional rights.” ’ ”]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 [no constitutional violation where a trial court does not preclude a defendant from presenting a defense, but only rejects some evidence concerning the defense].) 21 it misleads the jury on that issue and it creates an unfairness where she’s raising issues that I can’t respond to.” The prosecutor responde

2016(See, e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 161-162 [crime scene reconstruction involves “examining the totality of the physical evidence”; expert’s testimony about the sequence and location of crimes based on physical evidence including blood stains and bodily fluids was admissible].) The Haag treatise on shooting incident reconstruction, referenced in the trial court, contemplates a much narrower analysis.