disproportionality claim in California

2025(Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 66, 69 [two consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences imposed for two thefts of items worth less than $155 is not cruel or unusual].) These cases demonstrate the very narrowness of the Eighth Amendment’s disproportionality rule.

2016(Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 30 ; Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 .) In Ewing, the court affirmed a sentence of 25 years to life for felony grand theft, while in Andrade, the court affirmed a sentence of two consecutive 25-years-to-life terms for petty theft with a prior, using the disproportionality test.

2015(Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 ; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 .) Under the federal constitution, “[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. [Citation.] ‘[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 60 .) In

2013(In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 .) In analyzing a disproportionality claim under the state Constitution, we examine (1) "the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society" (id. at p. 425), (2) the sentence compared to the sentences for more serious offenses in California (id. at p. 426), and (3) the sentence compared to sentences for the same offense in other states (id. at p. 427; see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479 ).

2024I, § 17, italics added) bar sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime (the federal parlance) or “so disproportionate . . . that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 ; Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996-997 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 721 .) Applying this disproportionality principle, our Supreme Court held in People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 , 429 that a death sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate for a homicide committed by

2001The United States Supreme Court has held that in non-capital cases the disproportionality test has exceedingly rare application under the federal constitution. ( Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 .) It is undoubtedly with this in mind that the parties have directed their arguments to the California Constitution and the California Supreme Court opinion in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 . *93 The power to define crimes and prescribe punishments is a legislative function.

2021(See e.g., In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 530 [25 years to life for failure to update sex offender registration was not cruel and unusual]; People v. Romero, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [25 years to life for felony petty theft of stealing magazine]; People v. Barrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 541, 555 [25 years to life for check forgery].) Defendant contends his sentence is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to the punishment he would have received in other jurisdictions for the same offenses.

2021For this reason, the second prong of the disproportionality analysis “is inapposite to three strikes sentencing because it is a defendant’s ‘recidivism in combination with current crimes that places him under the three strikes law.’” (People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 ; see also People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 356 [affirming sentence of 25 years to life for repeat offender whose current offenses were for drug possession and receiving stolen property].) Defendant’s sentence is not more extreme than the many third-strike sentences for nonviolent crimes California cou

2021(See e.g., In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 530 [25 years to life for failure to update sex offender registration was not cruel and unusual]; People v. Romero, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [25 years to life for felony petty theft of stealing magazine]; People v. Barrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 541, 555 [25 years to life for check forgery].) Defendant contends his sentence is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to the punishment he would have received in other jurisdictions for the same offenses.

2021(See e.g., In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 530 [25 years to life for failure to update sex offender registration was not cruel and unusual]; People v. Romero, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [25 years to life for felony petty theft of stealing magazine]; People v. Barrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 541, 555 [25 years to life for check forgery].) Defendant contends his sentence is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to the punishment he would have received in other jurisdictions for the same offenses.

2013(People v. Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 715 [25 years to life sentence for a nonviolent drug offense is constitutional].) Although we find Jackson's sentence was not disproportionate based on his current offenses and criminal history, we nevertheless consider the other disproportionality factors.

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud

1996(E.g., People v. Young (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 171, 179 [ 278 Cal. Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 338 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Arwood (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 167, 173 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 ]; People v. Tirado (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 341, 348 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 156, 158 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 158 ].) Reasoning that improperly presented appellate issues could return in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such courts chose to dispose of the issues on their merits in the apparent belief that the "interest of jud