inquiry into waiver in California

2025A “ ‘defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.’ ” (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365 .) During the pendency of this case Calderon represented himself for fifteen months, executed a written waiver of counsel form, waived his speedy trial rights, filed two motions citing legal authorities, argued the motions before the court, and conducted direct and cross-examinations of witnesses at a motion to suppress hearing. “[W]hen criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver

2025A “ ‘defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.’ ” (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365 .) During the pendency of this case Calderon represented himself for fifteen months, executed a written waiver of counsel form, waived his speedy trial rights, filed two motions citing legal authorities, argued the motions before the court, and conducted direct and cross-examinations of witnesses at a motion to suppress hearing. “[W]hen criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver

2025A “ ‘defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.’ ” (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365 .) During the pendency of this case Calderon represented himself for fifteen months, executed a written waiver of counsel form, waived his speedy trial rights, filed two motions citing legal authorities, argued the motions before the court, and conducted direct and cross-examinations of witnesses at a motion to suppress hearing. “[W]hen criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver

2025Daniels stressed that “when criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver of the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial, the most relevant experience is previously having undergone a criminal trial.” (Daniels, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1001 8 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) But given Gee’s limited education, his learning disabilities, his psychiatric diagnoses, and the remoteness of his exposures to the criminal justice system, we cannot say his criminal history informed his jury trial waiver.

2025But based on the totality of “all relevant circumstances” here, such a colloquy was not necessary. ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 168–170.) “The test of a valid waiver ultimately turns, not on whether specific warnings or advisements were given, but whether “ ‘the record affirmatively shows that [the waiver] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1018 .) The record here “affirmatively” shows that Calderon’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent.

2025But based on the totality of “all relevant circumstances” here, such a colloquy was not necessary. ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 168–170.) “The test of a valid waiver ultimately turns, not on whether specific warnings or advisements were given, but whether “ ‘the record affirmatively shows that [the waiver] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1018 .) The record here “affirmatively” shows that Calderon’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent.

2024To be sure, where the state delegates to local governments some of its otherwise plenary authority to regulate, that delegation will be “strictly construed” (Rumford, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 550 ) and an exercise of that authority by a local government can be invalidated if that exercise is “so unreasonable as to make it void” (Neary, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at p. 726 ; Ratkovich, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 884 [“the Legislature cannot empower a municipality to enact arbitrary or unreasonable ordinances”]; accord, Orpheum, supra, 83 Cal.App.3rd at p. 876 [section 3482 immunity applied where mann

2024To be sure, where the state delegates to local governments some of its otherwise plenary authority to regulate, that delegation will be “strictly construed” (Rumford, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 550 ) and an exercise of that authority by a local government can be invalidated if that exercise is “so unreasonable as to make it void” (Neary, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at p. 726 ; Ratkovich, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 884 [“the Legislature cannot empower a municipality to enact arbitrary or unreasonable ordinances”]; accord, Orpheum, supra, 83 Cal.App.3rd at p. 876 [section 3482 immunity applied where mann

2024To be sure, where the state delegates to local governments some of its otherwise plenary authority to regulate, that delegation will be “strictly construed” (Rumford, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 550 ) and an exercise of that authority by a local government can be invalidated if that exercise is “so unreasonable as to make it void” (Neary, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at p. 726 ; Ratkovich, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 884 [“the Legislature cannot empower a municipality to enact arbitrary or unreasonable ordinances”]; accord, Orpheum, supra, 83 Cal.App.3rd at p. 876 [section 3482 immunity applied where mann

2024To be sure, where the state delegates to local governments some of its otherwise plenary authority to regulate, that delegation will be “strictly construed” (Rumford, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 550 ) and an exercise of that authority by a local government can be invalidated if that exercise is “so unreasonable as to make it void” (Neary, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at p. 726 ; Ratkovich, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 884 [“the Legislature cannot empower a municipality to enact arbitrary or unreasonable ordinances”]; accord, Orpheum, supra, 83 Cal.App.3rd at p. 876 [section 3482 immunity applied where mann

2019The determination of whether a claim is preempted depends on the particular facts of each case." ( Sciborski , supra , 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 808 .) "The primary point of reference in the preemption analysis is ... not state law writ large ... but the plaintiff's pleading." ( **769 Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904 , 923 (en banc) ( Alaska Airlines ).) The inquiry is not "into the merits of a claim; it is an inquiry into the claim's 'legal character' - whatever its merits - so as to ensure it is decided in the proper forum. ...

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019The determination of whether a claim is preempted depends on the particular facts of each case." ( Sciborski , supra , 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 808 .) "The primary point of reference in the preemption analysis is ... not state law writ large ... but the plaintiff's pleading." ( **769 Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904 , 923 (en banc) ( Alaska Airlines ).) The inquiry is not "into the merits of a claim; it is an inquiry into the claim's 'legal character' - whatever its merits - so as to ensure it is decided in the proper forum. ...

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2019Our only job is to decide whether, as pleaded, the claim 'in this case is "independent" of the [CBA] in the sense of "independent" that matters for ... preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Id . at p. 924.) The high court has also said that preemption applies "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent *293 upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 .) These concepts are not brig

2018Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require ... unguided speculation." ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475 , 490-491, 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ( Holloway ).) J-M's assertions and the high court's discussion are fully consistent with our own recognition in Anderson , supra , 211 Cal. at page 117 , 293 P. 788 , that simultaneous representation may "unconsciously" affect the decisionmaking of even well-intentioned attorneys.

2018Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require ... unguided speculation." ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475 , 490-491, 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ( Holloway ).) J-M's assertions and the high court's discussion are fully consistent with our own recognition in Anderson , supra , 211 Cal. at page 117 , 293 P. 788 , that simultaneous representation may "unconsciously" affect the decisionmaking of even well-intentioned attorneys.

2018Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require ... unguided speculation." ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475 , 490-491, 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ( Holloway ).) J-M's assertions and the high court's discussion are fully consistent with our own recognition in Anderson , supra , 211 Cal. at page 117 , 293 P. 788 , that simultaneous representation may "unconsciously" affect the decisionmaking of even well-intentioned attorneys.

2018Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require ... unguided speculation." ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475 , 490-491, 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ( Holloway ).) J-M's assertions and the high court's discussion are fully consistent with our own recognition in Anderson , supra , 211 Cal. at page 117 , 293 P. 788 , that simultaneous representation may "unconsciously" affect the decisionmaking of even well-intentioned attorneys.

2017When the high court stated that "evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights," it did so in the context of examining evidence of prior guilty pleas to determine the validity of the guilty plea at issue. ( Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20 , 37, 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 .) And when criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver of the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial, the most relevant experience is previouslyhaving undergone a criminal trial .

2017When the high court stated that "evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights," it did so in the context of examining evidence of prior guilty pleas to determine the validity of the guilty plea at issue. ( Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20 , 37, 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 .) And when criminal history is brought to bear on an inquiry into a waiver of the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial, the most relevant experience is previouslyhaving undergone a criminal trial .

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 364, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ["defendant, who was represented by counsel, had just undergone a jury trial"]; U.S. v. Carmenate (2d Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 105 , 108-109 ["Defendant's experience with the criminal justice system-having been recently tried before, and convicted by, a jury for similar offenses-is further evidence that he understood the nature of a jury trial"]; State v. Spurlock (La. 2015) 175 So.3d 955 , 956 ["defendant has past experience as an accused in the trial of a criminal prosecution where he was found guilty by a j

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 364, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ["defendant, who was represented by counsel, had just undergone a jury trial"]; U.S. v. Carmenate (2d Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 105 , 108-109 ["Defendant's experience with the criminal justice system-having been recently tried before, and convicted by, a jury for similar offenses-is further evidence that he understood the nature of a jury trial"]; State v. Spurlock (La. 2015) 175 So.3d 955 , 956 ["defendant has past experience as an accused in the trial of a criminal prosecution where he was found guilty by a j

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 364, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ["defendant, who was represented by counsel, had just undergone a jury trial"]; U.S. v. Carmenate (2d Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 105 , 108-109 ["Defendant's experience with the criminal justice system-having been recently tried before, and convicted by, a jury for similar offenses-is further evidence that he understood the nature of a jury trial"]; State v. Spurlock (La. 2015) 175 So.3d 955 , 956 ["defendant has past experience as an accused in the trial of a criminal prosecution where he was found guilty by a j

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 364, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ["defendant, who was represented by counsel, had just undergone a jury trial"]; U.S. v. Carmenate (2d Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 105 , 108-109 ["Defendant's experience with the criminal justice system-having been recently tried before, and convicted by, a jury for similar offenses-is further evidence that he understood the nature of a jury trial"]; State v. Spurlock (La. 2015) 175 So.3d 955 , 956 ["defendant has past experience as an accused in the trial of a criminal prosecution where he was found guilty by a j

1999See Faretta v. California, supra, [422 U.S.] at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (defendant waiving counsel must be `made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open"') ...; Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. [238,] 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (defendant pleading guilty must have `a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence')." ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 , italics in original.) As the above remarks and the refe

1999See Faretta v. California, supra, [422 U.S.] at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (defendant waiving counsel must be `made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open"') ...; Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. [238,] 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (defendant pleading guilty must have `a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence')." ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 , italics in original.) As the above remarks and the refe