official proceeding privilege in California

2021(Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) The Hawran court said, “[i]t is questionable whether a press release so widely disseminated to the public at large . . . can meet the requirements of the official proceeding privilege.” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283 .) The court cited Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , in which the court declined to apply the litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b), to press conferences or press releases, “explaining that the ‘ “connection or logical relation” which a communication must bear to litigation in order for the privile

2012In addressing the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), the court in Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284 ], declined to apply the privilege to press conferences or press releases, explaining that the “ ‘connection or logical relation’ which a communication must bear to litigation in order for the privilege to apply, is a functional connection,” i.e., the communication must “function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation process and must serve its purposes” (id. at p. 1146) and “cannot be satisfied by communications which only s

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2021(Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) The Hawran court said, “[i]t is questionable whether a press release so widely disseminated to the public at large . . . can meet the requirements of the official proceeding privilege.” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283 .) The court cited Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , in which the court declined to apply the litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b), to press conferences or press releases, “explaining that the ‘ “connection or logical relation” which a communication must bear to litigation in order for the privile

2021(Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) The Hawran court said, “[i]t is questionable whether a press release so widely disseminated to the public at large . . . can meet the requirements of the official proceeding privilege.” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283 .) The court cited Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , in which the court declined to apply the litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b), to press conferences or press releases, “explaining that the ‘ “connection or logical relation” which a communication must bear to litigation in order for the privile

2021(Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84 , 121–122 [defendant’s conduct in hiring private investigators to encourage the city attorney to prosecute the plaintiff is protected by the official proceeding privilege].) By compiling information to give to the sheriff, WSI furthered “the important public policy of encouraging the reporting of suspected crimes by ordinary citizens.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872, fn. 5 .) As a matter of law, Smith cannot prevail because investigating and reporting a suspected crime is absolutely privileged.

2021Lopez principally relies on Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 277 (Scott).

2021(Hagberg v. California Federal Bank, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 368 [communications “made in preparation for or to prompt investigation” are privileged]; Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953 , 971–972.) Smith must extirpate from her pleading allegations regarding appellants’ investigation in preparation for contacting the sheriff.3 2.

2020(Fontani, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 734 .) The court reasoned that “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protects communications made in preparation for or to prompt an investigation.” (Id. at p. 734.) In the case before the Fontani court, the defendant-employer’s U-Form statements concerning the basis for the broker-dealer’s termination was a “precursor to an investigation” by NASD.

2020As the Fontani court persuasively 17 explained, however, the jurisdictions in which these decisions were issued generally “do not afford the litigation privilege to the preliminary or investigative stages of otherwise protected proceedings.” (Fontani, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 734 .) By contrast, California extends the official proceeding privilege to “communications made in preparation for or to prompt an investigation.” (Ibid.) Given the reach of our state’s official proceeding privilege, we adopt the Fontani court’s conclusion that an absolute privilege applies to qualifying U-Form discl

2020(Vivian v. Labrucherie (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 267, 275 .) This is one such case.

2020It was, therefore, absolutely privileged.11 Third, Arges claims the official proceeding privilege does not apply to his breach of contract cause of action. “[G]enerally the [section 47] privilege is ‘described as one that precludes liability in tort, not liability for breach of contract.’ ” (McNair v. City & County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1169 .) However, the privilege can bar liability for a breach of contract cause of action when it “would further the policies underlying the privilege” to do so.

2020LPL is entitled to recover its fees and costs on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (§ 425.16, subd. (c); Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 946 .) McCONNELL, P. J.

2020(Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 767 .) Arges asserts four arguments as to why the official proceeding privilege did not preclude him from establishing a probability of success on his claims.

2004Applying California law, the federal district court opined that this court would agree with the court in Williams, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d 745 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 , that the privilege applied not only to communications made during pending official proceedings, but also to " preinvestigation communications intended to trigger official action." ( Johnson, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1110 .) The district court pointed to the many lower court cases in accord with Williams , to our statement in Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , that the official proceeding

2004Applying California law, the federal district court opined that this court would agree with the court in Williams, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d 745 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 , that the privilege applied not only to communications made during pending official proceedings, but also to " preinvestigation communications intended to trigger official action." ( Johnson, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1110 .) The district court pointed to the many lower court cases in accord with Williams , to our statement in Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , that the official proceeding

2004Applying California law, the federal district court opined that this court would agree with the court in Williams, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d 745 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 , that the privilege applied not only to communications made during pending official proceedings, but also to " preinvestigation communications intended to trigger official action." ( Johnson, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1110 .) The district court pointed to the many lower court cases in accord with Williams , to our statement in Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , that the official proceeding

2004Applying California law, the federal district court opined that this court would agree with the court in Williams, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d 745 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 , that the privilege applied not only to communications made during pending official proceedings, but also to " preinvestigation communications intended to trigger official action." ( Johnson, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1110 .) The district court pointed to the many lower court cases in accord with Williams , to our statement in Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , that the official proceeding

2004As we summarized in Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , "the privilege protect[s] communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings." ( Id. at p. 156 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , italics omitted.) In Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 , for example, the privilege for communications made in connection with "any other official proceeding" was held to apply to a letter urging a division of the Office of the Attorney General to institute an investigation into t

2004As we summarized in Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , "the privilege protect[s] communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings." ( Id. at p. 156 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 , italics omitted.) In Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 , for example, the privilege for communications made in connection with "any other official proceeding" was held to apply to a letter urging a division of the Office of the Attorney General to institute an investigation into t

2004In Fenelon, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1476 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 367 , a majority of the court determined that a citizen's statement to the police concerning the suspected criminal activity of another person did not concern an "official proceeding." The majority declared that the term "official proceeding" encompasses solely "proceedings `which [resemble] judicial and legislative proceedings, such as transactions of administrative boards and quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceedings....' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1480, 273 Cal.Rptr. 367 .) The primary reason advanced for this conclusion was that i

2004In Fenelon, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1476 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 367 , a majority of the court determined that a citizen's statement to the police concerning the suspected criminal activity of another person did not concern an "official proceeding." The majority declared that the term "official proceeding" encompasses solely "proceedings `which [resemble] judicial and legislative proceedings, such as transactions of administrative boards and quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceedings....' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1480, 273 Cal.Rptr. 367 .) The primary reason advanced for this conclusion was that i