range of judicial inquiry in California

1993Rather, immunity should attach to those decisions which involve “basic policy” choices which, because they constitute an exercise of governmental administration, should “ ‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry.’ ” (Johnson, supra, at p. 793 , quoting 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.11, p. 484.) Elaborating on this thesis, the Johnson court stated: “Courts and commentators have . . . centered their attention on an assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government.

1993Rather, immunity should attach to those decisions which involve "basic policy" choices which, because they constitute an exercise of governmental administration, should "`remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry.'" ( Johnson, supra, at p. 793 , quoting 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.11, p. 484.) *897 Elaborating on this thesis, the Johnson court stated: "Courts and commentators have ... centered their attention on an assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government.

2021Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” A “ ‘workable definition’ of immune discretionary acts draws the line between ‘planning’ and ‘operational’ functions of government. [Citation.] Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy decisions [which have] … been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,’ and as to which judicial interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ ” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981 .) “[I]mmunity should attach to those decisions which inv

2021Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” A “ ‘workable definition’ of immune discretionary acts draws the line between ‘planning’ and ‘operational’ functions of government. [Citation.] Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy decisions [which have] … been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,’ and as to which judicial interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ ” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981 .) “[I]mmunity should attach to those decisions which inv

2021Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” A “ ‘workable definition’ of immune discretionary acts draws the line between ‘planning’ and ‘operational’ functions of government. [Citation.] Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy decisions [which have] … been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,’ and as to which judicial interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ ” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981 .) “[I]mmunity should attach to those decisions which inv

2016(See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, 168 U.S. 250 [refusal to grant a passport]; 6 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 297 [ 38 S.Ct. 309 ] [confiscation of hides]; Kirkpatrick, supra, 493 U.S. 400 [issuance of military contract].) These actions are the kind which “‘constitute an exercise of governmental administration’” and “‘should “‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’”’” because “‘“judicial review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.”’” (Masters v. San

2016(See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, 168 U.S. 250 [refusal to grant a passport]; 6 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 297 [ 38 S.Ct. 309 ] [confiscation of hides]; Kirkpatrick, supra, 493 U.S. 400 [issuance of military contract].) These actions are the kind which “‘constitute an exercise of governmental administration’” and “‘should “‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’”’” because “‘“judicial review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.”’” (Masters v. San

2016(See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, 168 U.S. 250 [refusal to grant a passport]; 6 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 297 [ 38 S.Ct. 309 ] [confiscation of hides]; Kirkpatrick, supra, 493 U.S. 400 [issuance of military contract].) These actions are the kind which “‘constitute an exercise of governmental administration’” and “‘should “‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’”’” because “‘“judicial review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.”’” (Masters v. San

2016(See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, 168 U.S. 250 [refusal to grant a passport]; 6 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 297 [ 38 S.Ct. 309 ] [confiscation of hides]; Kirkpatrick, supra, 493 U.S. 400 [issuance of military contract].) These actions are the kind which “‘constitute an exercise of governmental administration’” and “‘should “‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’”’” because “‘“judicial review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.”’” (Masters v. San

2016(See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, 168 U.S. 250 [refusal to grant a passport]; 6 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 297 [ 38 S.Ct. 309 ] [confiscation of hides]; Kirkpatrick, supra, 493 U.S. 400 [issuance of military contract].) These actions are the kind which “‘constitute an exercise of governmental administration’” and “‘should “‘remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’”’” because “‘“judicial review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.”’” (Masters v. San

1991(H & M Associates v. City of El Centro (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 399 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 392 ].) See also Osborne, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at pp. 514-515, where “advice by one governmental agency to another governmental agency not to perform an unenforceable oral contract to which the latter agency and a third person are parties ... is the product of a basic policy decision.” The conduct at issue here, i.e., advice by DWP to the Owner of the project that CCI’s performance was not to contract specifications, and that CCI should not perform on unit 2 of the project, is just such a “basic policy decision.” (

1991(H & M Associates v. City of El Centro (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 399 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 392 ].) See also Osborne, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at pp. 514-515, where “advice by one governmental agency to another governmental agency not to perform an unenforceable oral contract to which the latter agency and a third person are parties ... is the product of a basic policy decision.” The conduct at issue here, i.e., advice by DWP to the Owner of the project that CCI’s performance was not to contract specifications, and that CCI should not perform on unit 2 of the project, is just such a “basic policy decision.” (