successor liability doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
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successor liability doctrine in California

10 California opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2026 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Beatrice Co. v. State Board of Equalizationgreen
cal · 1993 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2023
2 sentences

2023Straiton Forfeited His Successor Liability Argument Straiton argues for the first time on appeal that, “[t]hrough the doctrine of successor liability, [KBSI] is responsible for Binder’s debt to Straiton.” Straiton asserts that the record established that KBSI was a “‘mere continuation’” of King Baby and that “‘the transfer of assets to [KBSI]’” was for the “‘fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.’” The argument is forfeited and meritless. 21 When a corporation purchases the principal assets of another corporation, the purchaser does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless: “(1) there is

2012(See Beatrice, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 778 [same officers and directors alone was insufficient when the two corporations had separate identities and “recourse to the debtor corporation”].) The significant principle is that “ ‘if a corporation organizes another corporation with practically the same shareholders and directors, transfers all the assets but does not pay all the first corporation’s debts, and continues to carry on the same business, the separate entities may be disregarded and the new corporation held liable for the obligations of the old.’ ” (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p.

22
Cleveland v. Johnsongreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2026
2 sentences

2026(Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 28, 44, fn. 10, 45.) No single factual aspect establishes or negates the equitable doctrine of successor liability. ( Cleveland, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1333–1334.) Because plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations demonstrate substantial continuity between AJ SP and AJ LLC (Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., at p. 44), we conclude plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a theory of successor liability for purposes of surviving demurrer.

2023Straiton Forfeited His Successor Liability Argument Straiton argues for the first time on appeal that, “[t]hrough the doctrine of successor liability, [KBSI] is responsible for Binder’s debt to Straiton.” Straiton asserts that the record established that KBSI was a “‘mere continuation’” of King Baby and that “‘the transfer of assets to [KBSI]’” was for the “‘fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.’” The argument is forfeited and meritless. 21 When a corporation purchases the principal assets of another corporation, the purchaser does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless: “(1) there is

14
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025(BBA Aviation, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-430; CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118 (CenterPoint).) Here, there is no evidence that Zhongyan was controlling Ge, so this doctrine is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 7 The successor liability doctrine also applies in other circumstances, such as when “‘(1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption [of liabilities], (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations,’” or (3) “‘the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of esc

2023Straiton Forfeited His Successor Liability Argument Straiton argues for the first time on appeal that, “[t]hrough the doctrine of successor liability, [KBSI] is responsible for Binder’s debt to Straiton.” Straiton asserts that the record established that KBSI was a “‘mere continuation’” of King Baby and that “‘the transfer of assets to [KBSI]’” was for the “‘fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.’” The argument is forfeited and meritless. 21 When a corporation purchases the principal assets of another corporation, the purchaser does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless: “(1) there is

12
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem International, Inc.green
ca9 · 2017 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025(Axiom Foods, supra, 874 F.3d at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) It is also an adaptation of the successor liability doctrine.

2025(Axiom Foods, supra, 874 F.3d at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) It is also an adaptation of the successor liability doctrine.

11
Leek v. Coopergreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023(See Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [“the showing required to invoke” the equitable doctrines of alter ego and successor liability “is different”]; see also Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [“A complaint must set forth the facts with sufficient precision to put the defendant on notice about what the plaintiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought.”].) 6 On page 31 of his opening brief Straiton states: “The law bars a party from evading a debt by shifting assets to a new business—or himself.” This sentence, however, appears in a section about a

2023(See Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [“the showing required to invoke” the equitable doctrines of alter ego and successor liability “is different”]; see also Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [“A complaint must set forth the facts with sufficient precision to put the defendant on notice about what the plaintiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought.”].) 6 On page 31 of his opening brief Straiton states: “The law bars a party from evading a debt by shifting assets to a new business—or himself.” This sentence, however, appears in a section about a

11
Brown Bark III v. Haver CA4/3green
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023Straiton Forfeited His Successor Liability Argument Straiton argues for the first time on appeal that, “[t]hrough the doctrine of successor liability, [KBSI] is responsible for Binder’s debt to Straiton.” Straiton asserts that the record established that KBSI was a “‘mere continuation’” of King Baby and that “‘the transfer of assets to [KBSI]’” was for the “‘fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.’” The argument is forfeited and meritless. 21 When a corporation purchases the principal assets of another corporation, the purchaser does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless: “(1) there is

2023(See Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [“the showing required to invoke” the equitable doctrines of alter ego and successor liability “is different”]; see also Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [“A complaint must set forth the facts with sufficient precision to put the defendant on notice about what the plaintiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought.”].) 6 On page 31 of his opening brief Straiton states: “The law bars a party from evading a debt by shifting assets to a new business—or himself.” This sentence, however, appears in a section about a

11
In Re Savage Industries, Inc., Debtor. Western Auto Supply Company v. Savage Arms, Inc.green
ca1 · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See In re Savage Industries, Inc. (1st Cir. 1994) 43 F.3d 714 , 720-722 (successor liability claim, even if it constituted an "interest" under § 363(f), could not be extinguished where no notice provided to claimant); Truck Drivers Union v. Tasemkin, Inc. (7th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 48 , 50-51 (successor liability claim could proceed and was not cut off by prior bankruptcy proceeding); see generally In re Piper Aircraft Corp. (Bankr.

11
Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron, Inc.green
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013To the contrary, successor liability is an equitable doctrine that applies when a purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation or the asset sale was fraudulently entered to escape debts and liabilities. 5 (Franklin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at *823 p. 621; Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 187, 195-196 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ].) Successor liability requires an underlying cause of action and merely extends the liability on that cause of action to a corporation that would not otherwise be liable.

2013To the contrary, successor liability is an equitable doctrine that applies when a purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation or the asset sale was fraudulently entered to escape debts and liabilities. 5 (Franklin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at *823 p. 621; Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 187, 195-196 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ].) Successor liability requires an underlying cause of action and merely extends the liability on that cause of action to a corporation that would not otherwise be liable.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Ray v. Alad Corp. green
cal · 1977
2 sentences

2025(BBA Aviation, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-430; CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118 (CenterPoint).) Here, there is no evidence that Zhongyan was controlling Ge, so this doctrine is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 7 The successor liability doctrine also applies in other circumstances, such as when “‘(1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption [of liabilities], (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations,’” or (3) “‘the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of esc

2023Straiton Forfeited His Successor Liability Argument Straiton argues for the first time on appeal that, “[t]hrough the doctrine of successor liability, [KBSI] is responsible for Binder’s debt to Straiton.” Straiton asserts that the record established that KBSI was a “‘mere continuation’” of King Baby and that “‘the transfer of assets to [KBSI]’” was for the “‘fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.’” The argument is forfeited and meritless. 21 When a corporation purchases the principal assets of another corporation, the purchaser does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless: “(1) there is

42012–2025
Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Campbell (In Re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.) green
txwb · 1998
2 sentences

2019W.D.Tex. 1998) 220 B.R. 909 ; American Bankruptcy Institute, 22nd Annual Spring Meeting (2004) Concurrent Session: Successor Liability Revisited: Recent Developments and Trends, Cohen, Successor Liability in Section 363 Sales, 041504 ABI-CLE 487, text accompanying fn. 17 (“There appears to have developed a bright-line rule that the failure to provide an identifiable holder of a successor liability claim with adequate notice of the bankruptcy in which a sale purports to be free and clear of successor liability claims renders the sale subject to that successor liability claim.

2019W.D.Tex. 1998) 220 B.R. 909 ; American Bankruptcy Institute, 22nd Annual Spring Meeting (2004) Concurrent Session: Successor Liability Revisited: Recent Developments and Trends , Cohen, Successor Liability in Section 363 Sales , 041504 ABI-CLE 487, text accompanying fn. 17 ("There appears to have developed a bright-line rule that the failure to provide an identifiable holder of a successor liability claim with adequate notice of the bankruptcy in which a sale purports to be free and clear of successor liability claims renders the sale subject to that successor liability claim.

22019–2019
Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank of New York green
calctapp · 1971
1 sentence

2025(Pringle v. Hunsicker (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 789, 794-795 .) Either way it is categorized, courts will impute the individual’s liabilities—and hence, the individual’s contacts with the forum state—to the corporation created by the individual only when the individual and the corporation have a “close identity,” such as when “‘the corporate entity and the individual [are] one and the same.’” (Pringle, at pp. 794-795; Postal Instant, at p. 1518; Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 434, 439-440 .) This doctrine is equitable in nature (see Mesler v. Bragg Manag

12025–2025
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. green
cal · 1985
1 sentence

2025(Pringle v. Hunsicker (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 789, 794-795 .) Either way it is categorized, courts will impute the individual’s liabilities—and hence, the individual’s contacts with the forum state—to the corporation created by the individual only when the individual and the corporation have a “close identity,” such as when “‘the corporate entity and the individual [are] one and the same.’” (Pringle, at pp. 794-795; Postal Instant, at p. 1518; Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 434, 439-440 .) This doctrine is equitable in nature (see Mesler v. Bragg Manag

12025–2025
Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. green
calctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2025(BBA Aviation, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-430; CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118 (CenterPoint).) Here, there is no evidence that Zhongyan was controlling Ge, so this doctrine is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 7 The successor liability doctrine also applies in other circumstances, such as when “‘(1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption [of liabilities], (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations,’” or (3) “‘the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of esc

12025–2025
BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2025(BBA Aviation, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-430; CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118 (CenterPoint).) Here, there is no evidence that Zhongyan was controlling Ge, so this doctrine is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 7 The successor liability doctrine also applies in other circumstances, such as when “‘(1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption [of liabilities], (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations,’” or (3) “‘the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of esc

12025–2025
Pringle v. Hunsicker neutral
calctapp · 1957
1 sentence

2025(Pringle v. Hunsicker (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 789, 794-795 .) Either way it is categorized, courts will impute the individual’s liabilities—and hence, the individual’s contacts with the forum state—to the corporation created by the individual only when the individual and the corporation have a “close identity,” such as when “‘the corporate entity and the individual [are] one and the same.’” (Pringle, at pp. 794-795; Postal Instant, at p. 1518; Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 434, 439-440 .) This doctrine is equitable in nature (see Mesler v. Bragg Manag

12025–2025
Hernandez v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco green
calctapp5d · 2019
1 sentence

2025(BBA Aviation, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-430; CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118 (CenterPoint).) Here, there is no evidence that Zhongyan was controlling Ge, so this doctrine is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 7 The successor liability doctrine also applies in other circumstances, such as when “‘(1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption [of liabilities], (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations,’” or (3) “‘the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of esc

12025–2025
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc. green
ca7 · 1995
1 sentence

2019See In re Savage Industries, Inc. (1st Cir. 1994) 43 F.3d 714 , 720-722 (successor liability claim, even if it constituted an "interest" under § 363(f), could not be extinguished where no notice provided to claimant); Truck Drivers Union v. Tasemkin, Inc. (7th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 48 , 50-51 (successor liability claim could proceed and was not cut off by prior bankruptcy proceeding); see generally In re Piper Aircraft Corp. (Bankr.

12019–2019
Elliott v. General Motors LLC green
ca2 · 2016
1 sentence

2019Elliott v. GM LLC (In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co.) Given the limited nature of a bankruptcy court’s ability to extinguish future successor liability claims under section 363(f), I think plaintiff is correct to rely on the latest circuit-level case to address the issue, Elliott v. GM LLC (In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co.) (2d Cir. 2016) 829 F.3d 135 (Elliott), for the proposition that an asset sale does not eliminate successor liability arising from unknown claims at the time of sale.

12019–2019
Pueblo Radiology Medical Group, Inc. v. Gerlach green
calctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2013(Franklin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 ; Ray, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 28 .) Moreover, Brown Bark would have been entitled to recover its attorney fees under the Line of Credit Contracts‟ attorney fee provisions because those agreements included the following provision making all their terms binding on the contracting parties‟ successors: “This Agreement . . . shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Borrower and Lender and their respective successors and assigns . . . .” (Italics added.) Accordingly, because Westover Capital would have been subject to the burden of the Line of Cred

12013–2013
Darrel Franklin v. USX Corp. green
calctapp · 2001
1 sentence

2013(Franklin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 ; Ray, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 28 .) Moreover, Brown Bark would have been entitled to recover its attorney fees under the Line of Credit Contracts‟ attorney fee provisions because those agreements included the following provision making all their terms binding on the contracting parties‟ successors: “This Agreement . . . shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Borrower and Lender and their respective successors and assigns . . . .” (Italics added.) Accordingly, because Westover Capital would have been subject to the burden of the Line of Cred

12013–2013
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson green
cal · 1979
1 sentence

2013(Franklin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 ; Ray, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 28 .) Moreover, Brown Bark would have been entitled to recover its attorney fees under the Line of Credit Contracts‟ attorney fee provisions because those agreements included the following provision making all their terms binding on the contracting parties‟ successors: “This Agreement . . . shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Borrower and Lender and their respective successors and assigns . . . .” (Italics added.) Accordingly, because Westover Capital would have been subject to the burden of the Line of Cred

12013–2013
McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owners Ass'n green
calctapp · 2001
1 sentence

2012(See Beatrice, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 778 [same officers and directors alone was insufficient when the two corporations had separate identities and “recourse to the debtor corporation”].) The significant principle is that “ ‘if a corporation organizes another corporation with practically the same shareholders and directors, transfers all the assets but does not pay all the first corporation’s debts, and continues to carry on the same business, the separate entities may be disregarded and the new corporation held liable for the obligations of the old.’ ” (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p.

12012–2012

Where else courts name it

CA 10 (2012–2026) MI 10 (2005–2025) IL 7 (1996–2022) NY 6 (2005–2023) NJ 6 (1987–2024) PA 6 (1999–2022) WA 5 (1982–2017) WI 4 (2000–2024) TX 3 (1986–2013) OH 3 (2005–2015) AZ 2 (1992–2024) IA 2 (2015–2019) CO 2 (1992–2011) NV 2 (2019–2019) AK 2 (2017–2017) KS 2 (2018–2026) MN 2 (2003–2015) MA 2 (2005–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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