10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Southwest Catholic Credit Union v. Charnesgreen2 sentences2005There is a “strong presumption that taxation is the rule and exemption the rare exception.” Howard Elec. & Mech., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 771 P.2d 475, 480 (Colo.1989) (quoting Southwest Catholic Credit Union v. Charnes, 665 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo.App.1982)). 1989This supports our conclusion that the Department’s interpretation of section 32-9-119(2)(a) as authorizing collection of an RTD tax is correct. *480 There is a “strong presumption that taxation is the rule and exemption the rare exception.” Southwest Catholic Credit Union v. Charnes, 665 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo.App.1982). | 2 | 3 |
Colorado Department of Revenue v. Woodmen of the Worldgreen2 sentences2014See Colo. Dep't of Revenue v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806, 810 (Colo.1996). 2001Further, we note that if we were to construe this statute as ambiguous, then there is a "strong presumption that taxation is the rule and exemption the rare exception." Colo. Dept of Revenue, 919 P.2d at 810 . | 1 | 3 |
Howard Electrical & Mechanical, Inc. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2005There is a “strong presumption that taxation is the rule and exemption the rare exception.” Howard Elec. & Mech., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 771 P.2d 475, 480 (Colo.1989) (quoting Southwest Catholic Credit Union v. Charnes, 665 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo.App.1982)). 1996E.g., Howard, 771 P.2d at 480 ; Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455, 458 , 495 P.2d 225, 226 (1972). | 1 | 2 |
Security Life and Accident Company v. Heckersgreen2 sentences1996E.g., Howard, 771 P.2d at 480 ; Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455, 458 , 495 P.2d 225, 226 (1972). 1996E.g., Howard, 771 P.2d at 480 ; Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455, 458 , 495 P.2d 225, 226 (1972). | 1 | 2 |
Ventetoulo v. Attorney General RIgreen2 sentences2026See id. (“It is only in an extreme case that a later upward revision of a sentence is so unfair that it is inconsistent with the fundamental notions of fairness found in the due process clause.”); DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that the underlying — and “very unusual” — case fell within “the very rare exception to the general rule that courts can, after sentence, revise sentences upward to correct errors”); Jordan, 235 A.3d at 821 (Due process protections 8 apply in “the rare or extreme case in which a defendant’s expectation of finality has crystalized.”). ¶ 1 2026See DeWitt, 6 F.3d at 35 ; Jordan, 235 A.3d at 821-22. ¶ 20 We agree with Selders that the nearly eight-year delay in correcting his illegal ten-year SOISP sentence and the prosecution’s failure to seek correction of the sentence during any of the postconviction opportunities to do so weigh in favor of a conclusion that his expectation of finality in the original sentence had crystalized. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Barry Davis, A/K/A \Mark Johnson\""green1 sentence2026See id. (“It is only in an extreme case that a later upward revision of a sentence is so unfair that it is inconsistent with the fundamental notions of fairness found in the due process clause.”); DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that the underlying — and “very unusual” — case fell within “the very rare exception to the general rule that courts can, after sentence, revise sentences upward to correct errors”); Jordan, 235 A.3d at 821 (Due process protections 8 apply in “the rare or extreme case in which a defendant’s expectation of finality has crystalized.”). ¶ 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride
green
2 sentences2020Conners stands as a rare exception to these trends.3 3 To my knowledge, the only other instance in which this court has determined that a non-contractual claim does not and could not lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA was in Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 532 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1975). 2020There, we held that claims brought pursuant to the Liability of Peace Officers Act, § 29-5-111, C.R.S. (2020), were not subject to the CGIA because “liability of a municipality’s police has traditionally existed despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” and thus “the legislature’s enactment of the [CGIA] was without effect on a peace officer’s vulnerability to liability.” Antonopoulos, 532 P.2d at 349 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State Ex Rel. Johnston v. DISTRICT COURT OF PLATTE CO.
green
1 sentence1987Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455 , 495 P.2d 255 (1972); Southwest Catholic Credit Union v. Charnes, 665 P.2d 626 (Colo.App.1982). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Weed v. City of Pueblo
neutral
2 sentences1982Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, supra. See also Weed v. Pueblo, 197 Colo. 52 , 591 P.2d 80 (1979); C.F. & I. 1982Security Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, supra. See also Weed v. Pueblo, 197 Colo. 52 , 591 P.2d 80 (1979); C.F. & I. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.