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37 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1947–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas a & M University-Kingsville v. Yarbroughgreen2 sentences2023See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality.”); Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289 , 290–91 (Tex. 2011) (“‘Capable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine.” (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001))). 2020Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990)). “ʻCapable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine.” Texas A & M University–Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011). | 6 | 9 |
Williams v. Laragreen2 sentences2023See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality.”); Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289 , 290–91 (Tex. 2011) (“‘Capable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine.” (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001))). 2017Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011) (citing Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 ). | 5 | 6 |
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chemical Companygreen2 sentences2007Co., 815 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.1987) ] (quoting Rochester Tel. 2007Co. , 815 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1987)] (quoting Rochester Tel. | 3 | 3 |
Philbrook v. Berrygreen2 sentences2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) ("clerical error"). 2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) (“clerical error”). | 3 | 3 |
Stone v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) ("clerical error"). 2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) (“clerical error”). | 3 | 3 |
May v. Stategreen2 sentences1988However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. 1985“It is a rare exception when an indictment in the words of the statute will be held insufficient to give the required notice to the accused.” Hansen v. State, 636 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1982, no pet.); Accord May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). | 2 | 8 |
General Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767 v. Albertson's Distribution, Inc.green2 sentences2026Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767 v. Albertson’s Distribution, Inc., 331 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (interpreting “this rare exception to mean that a court will not order arbitration if ‘no rational mind’ could question [(1)] that the parties intended for a procedural provision to preclude arbitration and [(2)] that breach of the procedural requirement was clear”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up)); see also Seven Hills Commercial, LLC v. Mirabal Custom Homes, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 706, 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (recognizing same) (citing Amir v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 419 S.W.3 2020Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767 v. Albertson’s Distribution, Inc., 331 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). | 2 | 2 |
Baker v. City of McKinneygreen2 sentences2025As a rare exception to this rule, however, we have suggested that a compensable taking may not occur when the government takes action to address a matter of “great public necessity,” such as a fire or “war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity,” because of which the property is “destined to destruction anyway.” Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 ; see Baker v. City of McKinney, 84 F.4th 378 , 385 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that “history, tradition, and historical precedent reaching back to the Founding supports the existence of a necessity exception to the Takings Clause”), cert. denied, No. 2 2025As a rare exception to this rule, however, we have suggested that a compensable taking may not occur when the government takes action to address a matter of “great public necessity,” such as a fire or “war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity,” because of which the property is “destined to destruction anyway.” Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 ; see Baker v. City of McKinney, 84 F.4th 378 , 385 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that “history, tradition, and historical precedent reaching back to the Founding supports the existence of a necessity exception to the Takings Clause”), cert. denied, No. 2 | 2 | 2 |
Seven Hills Commercial, LLC v. Mirabal Custom Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2026Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767 v. Albertson’s Distribution, Inc., 331 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (interpreting “this rare exception to mean that a court will not order arbitration if ‘no rational mind’ could question [(1)] that the parties intended for a procedural provision to preclude arbitration and [(2)] that breach of the procedural requirement was clear”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up)); see also Seven Hills Commercial, LLC v. Mirabal Custom Homes, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 706, 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (recognizing same) (citing Amir v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 419 S.W.3 2026Stated otherwise, as our sister court has recognized, “[t]he exception may apply and a court may determine procedural arbitrability questions when the issues are factually undisputed.” Seven Hills Commercial, LLC, 442 S.W.3d at 722 (citing In re Pisces Foods, L.L.C., 228 S.W.3d 349 , 352–53 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, orig. proceeding)). | 1 | 1 |
Rami Amir and Ron Aliezer v. International Bank of Commercegreen1 sentence2026Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767 v. Albertson’s Distribution, Inc., 331 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (interpreting “this rare exception to mean that a court will not order arbitration if ‘no rational mind’ could question [(1)] that the parties intended for a procedural provision to preclude arbitration and [(2)] that breach of the procedural requirement was clear”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up)); see also Seven Hills Commercial, LLC v. Mirabal Custom Homes, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 706, 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (recognizing same) (citing Amir v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 419 S.W.3 | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Lyonsgreen1 sentence2023See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality.”); Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289 , 290–91 (Tex. 2011) (“‘Capable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine.” (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001))). | 1 | 1 |
GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TEX. v. Oxy USA, Inc.green1 sentence2020Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990)). “ʻCapable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine.” Texas A & M University–Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Nueces Countygreen1 sentence2016Corp. v. Nueces Cty., 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994) (stating that “the public 10 interest exception permits judicial review of questions of considerable public importance if the nature of the action makes it capable of repetition and yet prevents effective judicial review”).5 An issue does not evade review if appellate courts have addressed the issue on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
| Few v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hansen v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) ("clerical error"). 2004See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994) (“clerical error”). | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Phillips v. State
green
2 sentences1988However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. 1982However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. | 8 | 1981–1988 |
Parr v. State
green
2 sentences1988Beck, supra, at 554 ; Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Boney v. State, 572 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). 1988Phillips v. State, supra; Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). | 6 | 1981–1988 |
Lopez v. State
neutral
2 sentences1988Phillips v. State, supra; Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). 1985Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). | 4 | 1981–1988 |
Ames v. State
green
2 sentences1988Phillips v. State, supra; Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). 1985Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). | 4 | 1981–1988 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1988However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. 1982However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
Bedwell v. State
green
2 sentences1988However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. 1982However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
Cameron v. State
green
2 sentences1988However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. 1982However, as noted in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981): [Ujnless a fact is essential for notice to the defendant, the indictment need not plead the evidence relied on by the State, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), Bedwell v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 599 , 155 S.W.2d 930 (1941), and it is a rare exception when an indictment drawn in the language of the penal statute is legally insufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the charged offense. | 3 | 1981–1988 |
May v. State
green
2 sentences1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 3 | 1983–1984 |
Beechwood Sanitarium v. Axelrod
green
2 sentences1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 3 | 1983–1984 |
May v. Texas
green
2 sentences1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 3 | 1983–1984 |
Spiegel, Inc. v. Whitaker
green
2 sentences1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1984May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 , 102 S.Ct. 497 , 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981), aff'd, on remand, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 3 | 1983–1984 |
Steele v. City of Houston
green
2 sentences2025As a rare exception to this rule, however, we have suggested that a compensable taking may not occur when the government takes action to address a matter of “great public necessity,” such as a fire or “war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity,” because of which the property is “destined to destruction anyway.” Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 ; see Baker v. City of McKinney, 84 F.4th 378 , 385 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that “history, tradition, and historical precedent reaching back to the Founding supports the existence of a necessity exception to the Takings Clause”), cert. denied, No. 2 2025As a rare exception to this rule, however, we have suggested that a compensable taking may not occur when the government takes action to address a matter of “great public necessity,” such as a fire or “war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity,” because of which the property is “destined to destruction anyway.” Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 ; see Baker v. City of McKinney, 84 F.4th 378 , 385 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that “history, tradition, and historical precedent reaching back to the Founding supports the existence of a necessity exception to the Takings Clause”), cert. denied, No. 2 | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2001Constitutional due process requires that cases be tried on the merits rather than by case determinative sanctions, with the rare exception of those cases where discovery abuse precludes “the rightful decision of the cause.” Hammond Packing, 212 U.S. at 351 , 29 S.Ct. 370 . 2001Constitutional due process requires that cases be tried on the merits rather than by case determinative sanctions, with the rare exception of those cases where discovery abuse precludes “the rightful decision of the cause.” Hammond Packing, 212 U.S. at 351 , 29 S.Ct. 370 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Pisces Foods, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2026Stated otherwise, as our sister court has recognized, “[t]he exception may apply and a court may determine procedural arbitrability questions when the issues are factually undisputed.” Seven Hills Commercial, LLC, 442 S.W.3d at 722 (citing In re Pisces Foods, L.L.C., 228 S.W.3d 349 , 352–53 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, orig. proceeding)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
McIntire's Administrator v. Bond
neutral
2 sentences2015Accordingly, although the analysis suggested above has not necessarily been applied in the cases as a basis for decision, it has been uniformly held or assumed in connection with a related holding that, if after an oil and gas lease has been granted, the lessor should convey the minerals without exception or reservation or should otherwise make a complete disposition of the right to receive royalty payments, such lessor is entitled to receive those royalty payments which have accrued to the date of the conveyance.7 With very rare exception,8 it has likewise been held or assumed that the right 2015Accordingly, although the analysis suggested above has not necessarily been applied in the cases as a basis for decision, it has been uniformly held or assumed in connection with a related holding that, if after an oil and gas lease has been granted, the lessor should convey the minerals without exception or reservation or should otherwise make a complete disposition of the right to receive royalty payments, such lessor is entitled to receive those royalty payments which have accrued to the date of the conveyance.7 With very rare exception,8 it has likewise been held or assumed that the right | 1 | 2015–2015 |
White v. McVey
green
1 sentence2015See also §§ 44.4(e) and 44.6. 4 See § 39.1. 5 See § 40.4. 6 See § 40.2. 7 Clark v. Richfield Oil Co. of Cal., 127 CalApp 495, 16 P(2d) 162 (1932); McIntire v. Bond, 227 Ky 607, 13 SW(2d) 772 , 64 ALR 630 (1929); Duvall v. Stone, 54 NM 27 , 213 P(2d) 212 (1949); White v. McVey, 168 Okla 19, 31 P(2d) 850, 94 ALR 656 (1934); Handlan v. Bennett (4th Cir 1931), 51 F(2d) 21. 8See the second appeal in Wettengel v. Gormley, 184 Pa 354, 39 Atl 57 (1898), in which the court regarded the right to receive royalty under an oil and gas lease as a personal right of the lessor which did not pass with a devise | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Daniels v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Solis v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Thomas v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Boney v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Marrs v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Beck v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Polk v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Preusse v. McLerran neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.