Cox standard in Florida

2016The posteonviction court found that Mr. Cox’s claim was insufficiently pleaded because he failed to specify how the State’s expert’s analysis was unreliable and did not state the substance of the proposed expert’s testimony as required by Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004).

2013We have described the Cox standard as “narrow,” Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 575 , and “stringent,” Sun, 53 So.3d at 1076 ; Gehrmann v. City of Orlando, 962 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2013We have described the Cox standard as “narrow,” Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 575 , and “stringent,” Sun, 53 So.3d at 1076 ; Gehrmann v. City of Orlando, 962 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2013“Misconduct that falls short of the rigors of this test, including inconsistency, nondisclosure, poor recollection, dissemblance and even lying, is insufficient to support a dismissal for fraud, and, in many cases, may be well-managed and best resolved by bringing the issue to the jury’s attention through cross-examination,” Perrine, 85 So.3d at 1212 ; see Sun, 53 So.3d at 1077 , and by “traditional discovery sanctions,” Villasenor, 991 So.2d at 436 ; Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 576 .

2013“Misconduct that falls short of the rigors of this test, including inconsistency, nondisclosure, poor recollection, dissemblance and even lying, is insufficient to support a dismissal for fraud, and, in many cases, may be well-managed and best resolved by bringing the issue to the jury’s attention through cross-examination,” Perrine, 85 So.3d at 1212 ; see Sun, 53 So.3d at 1077 , and by “traditional discovery sanctions,” Villasenor, 991 So.2d at 436 ; Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 576 .

2013We have described the Cox standard as “narrow,” Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 575 , and “stringent,” Sun, 53 So.3d at 1076 ; Gehrmann v. City of Orlando, 962 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2013We have described the Cox standard as “narrow,” Ruiz, 859 So.2d at 575 , and “stringent,” Sun, 53 So.3d at 1076 ; Gehrmann v. City of Orlando, 962 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2012The Cox defendant argued that the trial court had weighed mitigating factors in a similar fashion to that condemned by this Court in Nibert v. State, 574 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1990).

2010See Cox v. State, 966 So.2d 337, 347-48 (Fla.2007) (noting that this Court’s finding that the prosecutor’s misstatements constituted harmless error was fatal to Cox’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them).

2010See Cox v. State, 966 So.2d 337, 347-48 (Fla.2007) (noting that this Court's finding that the prosecutor's misstatements constituted harmless error was fatal to Cox's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them).

2008See Amato v. Intindola, 854 So.2d 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2008See Amato v. Intindola, 854 So.2d 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2007The harmless error test as articulated by this Court requires the State "as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

2005See Romero v. State, 805 So.2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2002This Court has held that since all of the possible aggravating factors are detailed in section 921.141(5) of the *725 Florida Statutes, "there is no reason to require the State to notify defendants of the aggravating factors it intends to prove." Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921, 927 (Fla.1994); see also Mann v. Moore, 794 So.2d 595, 599 (Fla.2001).

2002This Court has held that since all of the possible aggravating factors are detailed in section 921.141(5) of the *725 Florida Statutes, "there is no reason to require the State to notify defendants of the aggravating factors it intends to prove." Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921, 927 (Fla.1994); see also Mann v. Moore, 794 So.2d 595, 599 (Fla.2001).