owners challenge in Florida

1994In reaching our decision, we consider the instant case to be factually similar to Stewart v. Boho, Inc., 493 So.2d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), in which the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the owners of a bar.

1989The instant case is strikingly similar to Stewart v. Boho, Inc., 493 So.2d 95 (Fla. *472 4th DCA 1986), where summary judgment in favor of the owners of a bar was reversed on facts disclosing that the plaintiff, a frequent customer of the bar for the preceding ten years and well familiar with its layout, was injured during a dance, after tripping over the leg of another patron, and, in attempting to steady himself while stumbling backwards, fell through an opened doorway, across a stoop and onto the hood of a truck parked over the stoop immediately outside the doorway.

2020We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order granting Auto–Owners’ motion to sever.”); Kavouras, 88 So. 3d 213 (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing order granting motion to sever).

2013The order found both that it was “financially impossible” for Hardin to participate in arbitration and that if Hardin “were forced to pay 40 percent of arbitration costs, based on her income and her expenses, the amount would be unconscionable.” In this appeal, the Owners challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the trial court and the court’s findings that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and impossible for Hardin to perform. 1 Furthermore, the parties dispute the application of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randol

2013The order found both that it was “financially impossible” for Hardin to participate in arbitration and that if Hardin “were forced to pay 40 percent of arbitration costs, based on her income and her expenses, the amount would be unconscionable.” In this appeal, the Owners challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the trial court and the court’s findings that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and impossible for Hardin to perform. 1 Furthermore, the parties dispute the application of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randol

2000It was not then, a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act.” 72 So.2d at 289 ; see also Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 59 (Fla.1973) (“By granting the owners immunity from third-party tort suit, merely because ‘they were acting in concert with the general contractor,’ the ...

1989This case is unlike Plaza del Prado Condominium Association, Inc. v. Richman, 345 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), in which a condominium association approved nonconforming changes from time to time, and over one year had elapsed before the association notified the owners they were in violation of the condominium declaration.

1986Relying on City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the owners claim that, because the “P” zoning is more restrictive than the comprehensive plan, the property appraiser is not free to take into consideration the varied uses available under the plan.

1973His immunity from suit is commensurate with his liability for securing compensation — no more and no less." [7] By granting the owners immunity from third-party tort suit, merely because "they were acting in concert with the general contractor," the District Court erroneously expanded the single exception to the general rule announced in Jones v. Florida Power Corp., supra — that situation where the owners could also be considered "contractors" or "statutory employers." As then Chief Justice Roberts carefully explained, and, again, as the present Court reiterated and re-emphasized in Smith v.