inferential rebuttal defense in Texas

2025Coop., 157 S.W.3d 429, 430 (Tex. 2005) (“An inferential rebuttal defense operates to rebut an essential element of the plaintiff’s case by proof of other facts.”); Select Ins.

2018She relies on cases pre-dating Dillard in 3 “An inferential rebuttal defense operates to rebut an essential element of the plaintiff’s case by proof of other facts.” Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 430 . 4 advocating for a narrow view of this instruction, limiting its application to its historical association with defendants who blame children or the weather.4 But “that is not what it says.

2019But the supreme court further recognized that an inferential rebuttal instruction reinforces for the jury that “no such implication is intended.” Id.; see also Urista, 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“The truth is, sometimes accidents are no one’s fault, and an unavoidable accident instruction, like the one in this case, simply explains to the jury that [it is] not required to find someone at fault.”).

2012Moreover, as we noted in Crista^ “when a defensive theory is submitted through an inferential rebuttal instruction, Casteel’s solution of departing from broad-form submission and instead employing granulated submission cannot apply.” Id. at 757 .

2014In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506 , 513 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.); Walzier v. Newton, 27 S.W.3d 561, 563 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).

2011Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex.2006); Walzier v. *700 Newton, 27 S.W.3d 561, 563-64 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).

2025Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. 1978) (“The basic characteristic of an inferential rebuttal is that it presents a contrary or inconsistent theory from the claim relied upon for recovery.”).

2015Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. 1978).

2018Coop., 157 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. 2005) (citing Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 472 ).3 An instruction on unavoidable accident is “most often used to inquire about the causal effect of some physical condition or circumstance such as fog, snow, sleet, wet or slick pavement, or obstruction of view, or to resolve a case involving a very young child who is legally incapable of negligence.” Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 472 .

2007To determine whether the incorrect submission of an inferential rebuttal instruction requires reversal, we examine the entire record to determine whether the instruction “ “was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.’” Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex.2006) (quoting Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995)); see also Tex. R.

2011Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex.2006); Walzier v. *700 Newton, 27 S.W.3d 561, 563-64 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).

2011Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. 2006); Walzier v. Newton, 27 S.W.3d 561 , 563– 64 (Tex. App. —Amarillo 2000, no pet.) .

2011Walzier v. Newton Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 561, 564 ( Tex.App .--Amarillo 2000, no pet.) ( citing American Jet., Inc. v. Leyendecker , 683 S.W.2d 121, 126 ( Tex.App .--San Antonio 1984, no writ)).

2011Walzier v. Newton Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (citing American Jet., Inc. v. Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ)).

2008See, e.g., Reid v. Best Waste Systems, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Charter Oak Fire Ins.

2008See, e.g., Reid v. Best Waste Systems, Inc. , 800 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Charter Oak Fire Ins.

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff’s cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, “is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue”); M

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff's cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, "is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue"

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff's cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, "is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue"

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff’s cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, “is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue”); M

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff's cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, "is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue"

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff’s cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, “is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue”); M

2008Id. at 757-59 (holding unavoidable accident submission harmless when cross-examination discredited plaintiffs claims and evidence failed to indicate result would have been different absent instruction); Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (holding unavoidable accident instruction harmless when ample evidence supported finding of no negligence by defendant, witnesses did not refer to term, counsel made little mention of it in closing, sudden emergency was also submitted without objection, and verdict was unanimous); Torres v. Tessier, 231 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist

2008Id. at 757–59 (holding unavoidable accident submission harmless when cross-examination discredited plaintiff’s claims and evidence failed to indicate result would have been different absent instruction); Reinhart v. Young , 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (holding unavoidable accident instruction harmless when ample evidence supported finding of no negligence by defendant, witnesses did not refer to term, counsel made little mention of it in closing, sudden emergency was also submitted without objection, and verdict was unanimous); Torres v. Tessier, 231 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

2008Id. at 757-59 (holding unavoidable accident submission harmless when cross-examination discredited plaintiffs claims and evidence failed to indicate result would have been different absent instruction); Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (holding unavoidable accident instruction harmless when ample evidence supported finding of no negligence by defendant, witnesses did not refer to term, counsel made little mention of it in closing, sudden emergency was also submitted without objection, and verdict was unanimous); Torres v. Tessier, 231 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist

2008Id. at 757–59 (holding unavoidable accident submission harmless when cross-examination discredited plaintiff’s claims and evidence failed to indicate result would have been different absent instruction); Reinhart v. Young , 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (holding unavoidable accident instruction harmless when ample evidence supported finding of no negligence by defendant, witnesses did not refer to term, counsel made little mention of it in closing, sudden emergency was also submitted without objection, and verdict was unanimous); Torres v. Tessier, 231 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff's cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, "is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue"

2008See City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 237-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding jury instruction rather than separate jury question to be proper where the defense acted to negate the causation element of the plaintiff’s cause of action); Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. granted) (new and independent cause, which can negate the causation element in a negligence claim, “is an inferential rebuttal defense that may be submitted to the jury as an instruction but not as a special issue”); M

1999Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on “new and independent cause”, an inferential rebuttal defense, when supported by the evidence.) National Union Fire Ins.

1996Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on “new and independent cause”, an inferential rebuttal defense, when supported by the evidence.) National presented deposition testimony from an orthopedic surgeon who examined Kwiatkowski’s condition.

2016The purpose of this inferential rebuttal instruction is to ensure that the jury will understand that “they do not necessarily have to find that one or the other parties to the suit was to blame for the occurrence complained of,” Id. (citing Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex.1971)).

2015The purpose of this inferential rebuttal instruction is to ensure that the jury will understand that “they do not necessarily have to find that one or the other parties to the suit was to blame for the occurrence complained of.” Id. (citing 60 Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971)).

2022Compare Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (characterizing the borrowed servant doctrine as “an inferential rebuttal defense” because it “seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue”; namely, “control”), Everman Corp. v. Haws & Garrett Gen.

2022Compare Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (characterizing the borrowed servant doctrine as “an inferential rebuttal defense” because it “seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue”; namely, “control”), Everman Corp. v. Haws & Garrett Gen.

2016“The instruction is most often used to inquire about the causal effect of some physical condition or circumstance such as fog, snow, sleet, wet or slick pavement, or obstruction of view, or to resolve a case involving a very young child who is legally incapable of negligence.” Id. (citing Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex.1992)).

2015“The instruction is most often used to inquire about the causal effect of some physical condition or circumstance such as fog, snow, sleet, wet or slick pavement, or obstruction of view, or to resolve a case involving a very young child who is legally incapable of negligence.” Id. (citing Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992)).

2007To determine whether an act is a concurring or a new and independent cause, the “threshold, and often controlling, inquiry when distinguishing between a concurring and a superseding cause remains ‘whether the intervening cause and its probable consequences were such as could reasonably have been anticipated by the original wrongdoer.’ ” Id. at 452 (citing Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.1968)).

2007To determine whether an act is a concurring or a new and independent cause, the "threshold, and often controlling, inquiry when distinguishing between a concurring and a superseding cause remains `whether the intervening cause and its probable consequences were such as could reasonably have been anticipated by the original wrongdoer.'" Id. at 452 (citing Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.1968)).

1995There is no concrete evidence to suggest that such confusion actually occurs, and if there were, I would share Justice Peeples’ observation in Perez v. Weingarten Realty Investors, 881 S.W.2d 490, 498 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (Peeples, J., concurring): If juries are not intellectually capable of understanding an inferential rebuttal instruction, we need to ask whether we have overestimated their capacity for exercising the vast power we have given them in deciding the controlling issues.

1995There is no concrete evidence to suggest that such confusion actually occurs, and if there were, I would share Justice Peeples' observation in Perez v. Weingarten Realty Investors, 881 S.W.2d 490, 498 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (Peeples, J., concurring): If juries are not intellectually capable of understanding an inferential rebuttal instruction, we need to ask whether we have overestimated their capacity for exercising the vast power we have given them in deciding the controlling issues.

1999Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on “new and independent cause”, an inferential rebuttal defense, when supported by the evidence.) National Union Fire Ins.

1996Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on “new and independent cause”, an inferential rebuttal defense, when supported by the evidence.) National presented deposition testimony from an orthopedic surgeon who examined Kwiatkowski’s condition.

2012While Casteel’s presumed harm analysis is necessary in instances where the appellate court cannot determine “whether the improperly submitted theories formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding” because the broad-form question mixed valid and invalid theories of liability, Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 389 , or when the broad-form question commingled damage elements that are unsupported by legally sufficient evidence, Harris Cnty., 96 S.W.3d at 235 , an improper inferential rebuttal instruction and improper defensive theory of contributory negligence presented in a broad-form question with separate

2008The dissent says that the majority has sua sponte incorrectly applied Casteel’s “presumed harm” analysis even if we assume the trial court erred in submitting the question of Ronnie’s contributory negligence and giving Dr. Thota an inferential rebuttal instruction on new and independent cause. 33 However, it is not just that combination that requires us to presume harm but the incorrect submission of one correct theory of liability—Dr. Thota’s negligence—with one incorrect theory of liability—Ronnie’s alleged contributory negligence—which, according to Casteel, when submitted in one broad-form

2015See, e.g., Harris through an inferential rebuttal instruction, Cnty., 96 S.W.3d at 235–36.

2015Inferential rebuttal whether the jury properly found Dr. issues are distinct from theories of liability Thota not negligent, properly found that and damage elements because they ‘‘can- his negligence was excused based upon not be submitted in the jury charge as the unavoidable accident instruction, or separate questions and instead must be improperly found that his negligence presented through jury instructions.’’ Id. was excused based upon the new and Like the inferential rebuttal instruction on independent cause instruction alone or unavoidable accident in Urista, the new combined with its i

2015Inferential rebuttal whether the jury properly found Dr. issues are distinct from theories of liability Thota not negligent, properly found that and damage elements because they ‘‘can- his negligence was excused based upon not be submitted in the jury charge as the unavoidable accident instruction, or separate questions and instead must be improperly found that his negligence presented through jury instructions.’’ Id. was excused based upon the new and Like the inferential rebuttal instruction on independent cause instruction alone or unavoidable accident in Urista, the new combined with its i

2015Inferential rebuttal whether the jury properly found Dr. issues are distinct from theories of liability Thota not negligent, properly found that and damage elements because they ‘‘can- his negligence was excused based upon not be submitted in the jury charge as the unavoidable accident instruction, or separate questions and instead must be improperly found that his negligence presented through jury instructions.’’ Id. was excused based upon the new and Like the inferential rebuttal instruction on independent cause instruction alone or unavoidable accident in Urista, the new combined with its i

2014In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506 , 513 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.); Walzier v. Newton, 27 S.W.3d 561, 563 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).

2009Nor is an allegation that Dustin’s damages and injuries were caused by a pre-existing condition sufficient to do so.4 Such an allegation amounts to an inferential rebuttal claim that does not place a “mental condition at issue so as to make medical records about that condition discoverable.” Pennington, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5359 , at *9-10; see Nance, 143 S.W.3d at 512-13 .

2024See Banks, 233 S.W.3d at 70 (explaining that an instruction is not an abuse of discretion “if there is any support in the evidence for it”); Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm Springs Rehab.

2022See Cooke, 2016 WL 836781 , at *2; Villanova, 511 S.W.3d at 99 (defendant not entitled to summary judgment on its inferential rebuttal defense because it failed to conclusively prove its defense as matter of law).

2022See Cooke, 2016 WL 836781 , at *2; Villanova, 511 S.W.3d at 99 (defendant not entitled to summary judgment on its inferential rebuttal defense because it failed to conclusively prove its defense as matter of law).