10 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The State v. Brogangreen2 sentences2019Thus, the trial court’s failure to make specific factual findings does not require remand; as there was no other basis for the motion, the trial court’s denial of the motion implicitly concludes that the consent was voluntary. 7 evidence most favorably to uphold the trial court’s judgment.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Brogan, 340 Ga. App. 232, 234 ( 797 SE2d 149 ) (2017). 2019Thus, the trial court’s failure to make specific factual findings does not require remand; as there was no other basis for the motion, the trial court’s denial of the motion implicitly concludes that the consent was voluntary. 7 evidence most favorably to uphold the trial court’s judgment.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Brogan, 340 Ga. App. 232, 234 ( 797 SE2d 149 ) (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Cummings v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Cummings v. State, 242 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 530 SE2d 782 ) (2000). 2001Cummings v. State, 242 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 530 SE2d 782 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Clapsaddle v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Hall’s first enumeration is that the court erred in allowing into evidence the results of the blood test because Hill did not advise Hall of his implied consent rights “at the time of the arrest,” based on Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841 ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993). 1996Hall’s first enumeration is that the court erred in allowing into evidence the results of the blood test because Hill did not advise Hall of his implied consent rights “at the time of the arrest,” based on Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841 ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Ratliff v. Stategreen2 sentences1994"Even though he was not given a copy of the test print-out, this [report] is sufficient to give defendant notice of the test result." Ratliff v. State, 207 Ga. App. 112, 113 ( 427 SE2d 85 ) (1993). 1994"Even though he was not given a copy of the test print-out, this [report] is sufficient to give defendant notice of the test result." Ratliff v. State, 207 Ga. App. 112, 113 ( 427 SE2d 85 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 188 SE2d 416 ); Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 210, 211 (3) ( 355 SE2d 120 ). “[T]he absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood (presumably so as to permit calculation of the blood alcohol content at the actual time of the offense from the results of a subsequently administered chemical test) does not render the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. 1987Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 188 SE2d 416 ); Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 210, 211 (3) ( 355 SE2d 120 ). “[T]he absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood (presumably so as to permit calculation of the blood alcohol content at the actual time of the offense from the results of a subsequently administered chemical test) does not render the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. | 1 | 1 |
Hogan v. Stategreen2 sentences1986(Compare Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 719 ( 231 SE2d 802 ) (1976), wherein this court noted that an indictment returned upon wholly illegal evidence may be quashed.) It does not appear that much other evidence will be admissible over the defendant’s objection, in view of the trial court’s previous ruling that not even the initial stop was justified, but the fact remains that the other evidence, i.e., the police officer’s observations about the appellant’s condition, has not yet been subjected to objection; the appellant’s motion to suppress pertained only to the results of the blood test. 1986(Compare Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 719 ( 231 SE2d 802 ) (1976), wherein this court noted that an indictment returned upon wholly illegal evidence may be quashed.) It does not appear that much other evidence will be admissible over the defendant’s objection, in view of the trial court’s previous ruling that not even the initial stop was justified, but the fact remains that the other evidence, i.e., the police officer’s observations about the appellant’s condition, has not yet been subjected to objection; the appellant’s motion to suppress pertained only to the results of the blood test. | 1 | 1 |
Strong v. Stategreen2 sentences1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong *84 v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver's license." It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains f 1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong *84 v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver's license." It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains f | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2017In December 2014, the Carroll County Solicitor-General’s Office filed a three-count accusation, charging Nicholson with driving under the influence (less safe), driving under the influence (per se), and failure to wear protective gear on a motorcycle. 3 Nicholson filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, which he later supplemented after our Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 ( 771 SE2d 373 ) (2015). 4 Following a hearing in May 2015, 5 at which the trooper was the only witness presented, the *120 trial court issued an order granting the motion to suppre 2017In December 2014, the Carroll County Solicitor-General’s Office filed a three-count accusation, charging Nicholson with driving under the influence (less safe), driving under the influence (per se), and failure to wear protective gear on a motorcycle. 3 Nicholson filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, which he later supplemented after our Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 ( 771 SE2d 373 ) (2015). 4 Following a hearing in May 2015, 5 at which the trooper was the only witness presented, the *120 trial court issued an order granting the motion to suppre | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013Corporal Greene then read the implied consent warning to Hughes, and Hughes submitted to a State-administered blood test. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 3 Hughes did not challenge the authority of the search incident to arrest. 4 Hughes filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was driving under the influence of drugs. 2013Corporal Greene then read the implied consent warning to Hughes, and Hughes submitted to a State-administered blood test. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 3 Hughes did not challenge the authority of the search incident to arrest. 4 Hughes filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was driving under the influence of drugs. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Warmack
green
2 sentences1999Moses moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing State v. Warmack, 230 Ga. App. 157 ( 495 SE2d 632 ) (1998), required the giving of Miranda warnings before requesting additional chemical tests. 1999Moses moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing State v. Warmack, 230 Ga. App. 157 ( 495 SE2d 632 ) (1998), required the giving of Miranda warnings before requesting additional chemical tests. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1987Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 188 SE2d 416 ); Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 210, 211 (3) ( 355 SE2d 120 ). “[T]he absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood (presumably so as to permit calculation of the blood alcohol content at the actual time of the offense from the results of a subsequently administered chemical test) does not render the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. 1987Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 188 SE2d 416 ); Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 210, 211 (3) ( 355 SE2d 120 ). “[T]he absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood (presumably so as to permit calculation of the blood alcohol content at the actual time of the offense from the results of a subsequently administered chemical test) does not render the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Breithaupt v. Abram
green
2 sentences1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong *84 v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver's license." It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains f 1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong *84 v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver's license." It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains f | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong *84 v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver's license." It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains f 1978As stated by Justice Ingram in his dissent in Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 ( 202 SE2d 428 ) (1973), "The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver’s license.” It should be noted in the majority view of this same opinion that even though the taking of the blood sample did not breach constitutional safeguards under Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U. S. 432 (77 SC 408, 1 LE2d 448); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908), nonetheless the majority opinion held, "There remains for d | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.