Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1967–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beasley v. Mitel of Delawaregreen1 sentence1986See Beasley v. Mitel of Delaware, 449 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Company
green
2 sentences1981As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Coffey, 212 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1968), [while interpreting the substantially identical statutory predecessor of Section 316.066, Section 317.171, Florida Statutes (1967)]: And we think that these circumstances are ample to take the evidence of the results of the blood test out from under the protective cloak of Sec. 317.171, supra. This particular section of the statute was designed to protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Sec. 12, Decl. of Rights, Fla. Const., while, at the same time, requiring persons involved in acciden 1968And we think that these circumstances are ample to take the evidence of the results of the blood test out from under the protective cloak of Sec. 317.171, supra. This particular section of the statute was designed to protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Sec. 12, Decl. of Rights, Fla. Const., while, at the same time, requiring persons involved in accidents to make a true report thereof so as to enable the Department of Public Safety "to facilitate the ascertainment of the cause of accidents * * *" Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Fla.App. 1965, 177 So.2d | 2 | 1968–1981 |
Mehl v. State
green
1 sentence1994In light of the recent Florida Supreme Court decision in Mehl v. State, 632 So.2d 593 (Fla.1993), this argument also fails. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Coffey
green
1 sentence1981As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Coffey, 212 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1968), [while interpreting the substantially identical statutory predecessor of Section 316.066, Section 317.171, Florida Statutes (1967)]: And we think that these circumstances are ample to take the evidence of the results of the blood test out from under the protective cloak of Sec. 317.171, supra. This particular section of the statute was designed to protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Sec. 12, Decl. of Rights, Fla. Const., while, at the same time, requiring persons involved in acciden | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence1974The test for statutory exclusion under sec. 316.066 and as enunciated in State v. Mitchell, Fla.1971, 245 So.2d 618, 623 , is: “whether the information sought to be excluded was taken by the investigating officer for the purpose of making his accident report and formed a basis for that report. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Cooper v. State
green
2 sentences1967Appellant contends that the facts here involved clearly place the instant case within the meaning of this Court’s ruling in Cooper v. State, Fla.App., 183 So.2d 269 (1966), wherein it was held that the admission in evidence of a blood alcohol test result is reversible error when “* * * the taking of the blood sample is intended as a part of the investigation for the purpose of completing the report, required of the officer.” (at p. 272) The State contends in its brief, however, that this case is distinguishable from Cooper, supra, because the defendant was advised of his constitutional right t 1967Appellant contends that the facts here involved clearly place the instant case within the meaning of this Court’s ruling in Cooper v. State, Fla.App., 183 So.2d 269 (1966), wherein it was held that the admission in evidence of a blood alcohol test result is reversible error when “* * * the taking of the blood sample is intended as a part of the investigation for the purpose of completing the report, required of the officer.” (at p. 272) The State contends in its brief, however, that this case is distinguishable from Cooper, supra, because the defendant was advised of his constitutional right t | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.