unitary test in Hawaii

2020On the issue of the compensability of Cadiz’s illnesses, the Board stated that it would apply the unitary test as then-recently articulated by Van Ness, 131 Hawaiʻi at 560, 319 P.3d at 476 .

2016Pursuant to HRS § 386-85 (2015), “it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ... [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury[.]” The presumption “imposes upon the employer the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion.” Van Ness, 131 Hawai'i at 558 , 319 P.3d at 477 (citing Akamine v. Hawaiian Packing & Crating Co., 53 Haw. 406, 408 , 495 P.2d 1164, 1166 (1972)).

2014See Akamine, 53 Haw. 406 , 495 P.2d 1164 (awarding compensation for aggravation of heart condition resulting in death); Lawhead, 59 Haw. 551 , 584 P.2d 119 (holding that "a disease or illness such as influenza is an injury within the meaning of § 386-3” and awarding compensation because employee "contracted influenza as a result of her employment”).

2014See Akamine, 53 Haw. 406 , 495 P.2d 1164 (awarding compensation for aggravation of heart condition resulting in death); Lawhead, 59 Haw. 551 , 584 P.2d 119 (holding that "a disease or illness such as influenza is an injury within the meaning of § 386-3” and awarding compensation because employee "contracted influenza as a result of her employment”).

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2005See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 ("[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term `same offence' ... has two different meanings[.]") [15] HRS § 701-109(1) lists the five situations as follows: The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or solicitation to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is d

2003Acknowledging that its determination was governed by the unitary test, the supreme court affirmed LIRAB’s decision and concluded, in summary, as follows: (1)The “evidence unequivocally indicates that the [motor vehicle] accident [between the claimant and his co-worker’s wife], which was the subject matter of the dispute, was a personal matter, unconnected to [the claimant’s] employment.” Id. at 446 , 911 P.2d at 81 . (2) While the employer’s knowledge that the co-worker “ ‘was really upset’ and looking for” the claimant on the morning of the assault, was “ ‘an added factor’ to be considered in

2003Acknowledging that its determination was governed by the unitary test, the supreme court affirmed LIRAB’s decision and concluded, in summary, as follows: (1)The “evidence unequivocally indicates that the [motor vehicle] accident [between the claimant and his co-worker’s wife], which was the subject matter of the dispute, was a personal matter, unconnected to [the claimant’s] employment.” Id. at 446 , 911 P.2d at 81 . (2) While the employer’s knowledge that the co-worker “ ‘was really upset’ and looking for” the claimant on the morning of the assault, was “ ‘an added factor’ to be considered in

2002First articulated in Royal State National Insurance Co. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 53 Haw. 32 , 487 P.2d 278 (1971), the work connection approach simply requires the finding of a causal connection between the injury and any incidents or conditions of employment.

2002First articulated in Royal State National Insurance Co. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 53 Haw. 32 , 487 P.2d 278 (1971), the work connection approach simply requires the finding of a causal connection between the injury and any incidents or conditions of employment.

2002The Board held that Davenport’s injury stemmed from “his involvement in the Civil Service administrative appeals process.” Davenport I, 100 Hawai'i at 304 , 59 P.3d at 939 .

2002The Board held that Davenport's injury stemmed from "his involvement in the Civil Service administrative appeals process." Davenport I, 100 Hawai`i at 304, 59 P.3d at 939 .

2002Although the majority agrees with the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) that Davenport’s injuries are compensable, it grants certiorari because it believes that the ICA erred in (1) relying on Mitchell v. State Department of Education, 85 Hawai'i 250 , 942 P.2d 514 (1997), to hold that psychological injuries arising out of nondisciplinary personnel actions are compensa-ble under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-3 and (2) failing to apply the unitary test outlined in Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Telephone Co., 77 Hawai'i 100 , 881 P.2d 1246 (1994), to determine whether the alleged injuries arose

2002Although the majority agrees with the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) that Davenport's injuries are compensable, it grants certiorari because it believes that the ICA erred in (1) relying on Mitchell v. State Department of Education, 85 Hawai`i 250, 942 P.2d 514 (1997), to hold that psychological injuries arising out of non-disciplinary personnel actions are compensable under Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-3 and (2) failing to apply the unitary test outlined in Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Telephone Co., 77 Hawai`i 100, 881 P.2d 1246 (1994), to determine whether the alleged injuries arose ou

1992For example, in Teamsters Local Union No. 760 v. UPS, 921 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit decided that [w]e must first determine whether the district court abused its discretion by basing its Rule 11 determination on “an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461 .

1992For example, in Teamsters Local Union No. 760 v. UPS, 921 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit decided that [w]e must first determine whether the district court abused its discretion by basing its Rule 11 determination on “an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461 .