defendant guilty absent error in California

2023Our task when applying the Chapman standard under these circumstances “is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element[s].’” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 .) As our high court explained in People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643 , “a demonstration of harmless error does not require proof that a particular jury ‘actually rested its verdict on the proper ground, but rather on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” (Id. at

2023(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 11 .) But it held that this reasoning “cannot be squared with our harmless-error cases.” (Ibid.) Instead, “the absence of a ‘complete verdict’ on every element of the offense establishes no more than that an improper instruction on an element of the offense violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.” (Id. at p. 12.) Neder went on to explain that such an error, like other federal constitutional errors, may be held harmless where it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” (Id. at p.

2023Our task when applying the Chapman standard under these circumstances “is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element[s].’” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 .) As our high court explained in People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643 , “a demonstration of harmless error does not require proof that a particular jury ‘actually rested its verdict on the proper ground, but rather on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” (Id. at

2022(See People v. 18 Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 666 [appropriate test to determine whether an instruction that erroneously omitted an element of an offense was harmless is whether the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error]; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 [reviewing the record to determine if “the record supports a reasonable doubt as to [the omitted] element” of the offense].) Accordingly, the conspiracy convictions must also be reversed.

2025Even assuming that Detective Tran’s testimony about the statements Abraham M. and Jabron H. made during their interrogations violated the confrontation clause, the error was harmless because, as we shall explain, it is “ ‘ “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” ’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 581; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 ; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) We recognize that the challenged evidence, particularly Abraham M.’s statement that Johnson was the shooter, was det

2022(Aledamat, at p. 3, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , italics added.) Under that standard, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aledamat, at p. 3., italics added.) The reviewing court asks: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 , quoting Neder v. United States (

2022Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Li

2021(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) [“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 [“The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ”].) We find no error. “ ‘[A] jury instruction cannot be judged on the basis of one or two phrases plucked out of context . . . .’ [Citation.] While a single sentence in an instruction ‘m

2023Our task when applying the Chapman standard under these circumstances “is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element[s].’” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 .) As our high court explained in People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643 , “a demonstration of harmless error does not require proof that a particular jury ‘actually rested its verdict on the proper ground, but rather on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” (Id. at

2022(See People v. 18 Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 666 [appropriate test to determine whether an instruction that erroneously omitted an element of an offense was harmless is whether the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error]; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 [reviewing the record to determine if “the record supports a reasonable doubt as to [the omitted] element” of the offense].) Accordingly, the conspiracy convictions must also be reversed.

2022Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Li

2022(See People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 324-325 .) “ ‘In deciding whether a trial court’s misinstruction on an element of an offense is prejudicial to the defendant, we ask whether it appears “ ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 14 contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 350 .) “Or, slightly differently . . . : ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) To determine whether the Peopl

2025Even assuming that Detective Tran’s testimony about the statements Abraham M. and Jabron H. made during their interrogations violated the confrontation clause, the error was harmless because, as we shall explain, it is “ ‘ “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” ’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 581; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 ; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) We recognize that the challenged evidence, particularly Abraham M.’s statement that Johnson was the shooter, was det

2022Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Li

2023(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 684 (Van Arsdall) [Confrontation Clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis].) The harmless error inquiry asks: “ ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 581.) And “[w]hether [a Crawford] error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors . . . includ[ing] the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evi

2020(People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 372 .) “Confrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 .) Under this analysis, “‘an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Ibid., quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 ).) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a ratio

2023(See, e.g., In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 580 (Lopez); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824, 831 (Merritt).) 11 Under the federal harmless error standard, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless after, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 (Aledamat); see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [asking “[i]s it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the d

2023(See, e.g., In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 580 (Lopez); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824, 831 (Merritt).) 11 Under the federal harmless error standard, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless after, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 (Aledamat); see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [asking “[i]s it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the d

2022Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Li

2020Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 ; accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 (Aledamat).) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. 14 For this same reason, we further conc

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2025(See People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 .) “The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‘requir[es] the beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Neal 14 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 ; see People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 8

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2025(See People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 .) “The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‘requir[es] the beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Neal 14 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 ; see People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 8

2000(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [ 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1838 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ].) Specifically, “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” (Neder, supra, at p. 18 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1838 ].) Error is harmless “where an omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence,” as “where a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element . . . .” (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p

2000(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [ 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1838 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ].) Specifically, “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” (Neder, supra, at p. 18 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1838 ].) Error is harmless “where an omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence,” as “where a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element . . . .” (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p

2023(See, e.g., In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 580 (Lopez); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824, 831 (Merritt).) 11 Under the federal harmless error standard, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless after, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 (Aledamat); see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 [asking “[i]s it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the d

2021Prejudice “Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the 66 judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 .) “ ‘In deciding whether a trial court’s misinstruction on an element of an offense is prejudicial to the defendant, we ask whether it appears “ ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 350 .) In other words, t

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2025(See People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 .) “The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‘requir[es] the beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Neal 14 (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 ; see People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 8

2020According to the Attorney General, “[t]he test under those cases and the United States Supreme Court cases upon which they relied,” Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 (Neder) and Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57 (Hedgpeth), “is not whether the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the ‘jury’s actual verdicts were not tainted by the inaccurate jury instruction’ ” (quoting this court’s opinion, italics added by the Attorney General), but “whether it is ‘ “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error” ’ ” (

2017Traynor, The **426 Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)." ( Id . at p. 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) *827 Accordingly, the court concluded that the error could be found harmless if the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. ( Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) Or, slightly differently, the court described the harmless error inquiry as this: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" ( Id . at p. 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) *271 Several years after it decided Ned

2025Nontestimonial statements are those whose primary purpose is to deal with an ongoing emergency or some other purpose unrelated to preserving facts for later use at trial.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.5th at p. 689.) 9 criminal defendant unless the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was harmless.” (People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 ; see Gonzalez, at p. 398 [confrontation clause error is harmless where “‘“it [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error”’”].) 3.

2021We need not delve further into the high court’s divided confrontation clause jurisprudence because even if a Sixth Amendment violation is assumed, “ ‘it [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 [describing the harmless error standard applicable to a claim challenging the admission of DNA evidence under the confrontation clause]; see Rutterschmidt, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 661 [“Violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right requires reversal of the judgment against a c

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2022That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 27 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 , (Neal).) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 (Delgado).) Our review of the record satisfies us that the Miranda error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2023For example, harmless error may be demonstrated by showing that, in rendering a verdict, the jury “necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory.” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131 (Guiton); see also People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 506 [noting that instructional error is harmless where “the jury necessarily found the omitted element in connection with other findings required by the instructions”].) However, a reviewing court need not determine with “ ‘absolute certainty’ ” what a jury found in rendering a verdict (Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 62 ) or, i

2008For this theory of prejudice, defendant relies on People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ]. [2] Although Guiton observed that reliance on other portions of the verdict is "[o]ne way" of finding an instructional error harmless ( Guiton, at p. 1130), we have never intimated that this was the only way to do so.

2017A reviewing court, in asking whether a "rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," may look to whether "uncontroverted evidence" supports a finding on the omitted element. ( Id. at pp. 18-19, 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) In People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400 , 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ( Mil ), we extended Neder 's holding to the omission of two elements of a criminal offense, reasoning that "an instruction that omitted some-but not all-of the elements of an offense or special circumstance allegation would prevent a jury finding on the affected elements but would no

2017A reviewing court, in asking whether a "rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," may look to whether "uncontroverted evidence" supports a finding on the omitted element. ( Id. at pp. 18-19, 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) In People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400 , 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ( Mil ), we extended Neder 's holding to the omission of two elements of a criminal offense, reasoning that "an instruction that omitted some-but not all-of the elements of an offense or special circumstance allegation would prevent a jury finding on the affected elements but would no

2021(Cf. Wesley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 521, 524 [trial court failed to instruct on specific intent element].) Hence, “even if the instruction[] on [the permissive inference] w[as] incomplete” because it referred to a mere failure to appear rather than a willful or intentional failure to appear, “such a defect would be cured by reading [the] instruction[] as a whole.” (People v. Rhodes (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 10, 21 , fn. omitted; see People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [“Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions . . . .”].) Moreover, it is clear beyond a reason