10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2023See id. (stating that the reviewing court “will not speculate whether the trial court would - 16 - No. 1-21-1205 have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing if counsel had adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c)”). ¶ 48 Accordingly, because counsel did not comply with her duties under Rule 651(c) by amending the petition to include a rote claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we will not assess the merits of any such claim. 2 See People v. Wallace, 2018 IL App (5th) 140385, ¶ 45 (declining “to consider the merits of the defendant’s petition where the tr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2023See id. (stating that the reviewing court “will not speculate whether the trial court would - 16 - No. 1-21-1205 have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing if counsel had adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c)”). ¶ 48 Accordingly, because counsel did not comply with her duties under Rule 651(c) by amending the petition to include a rote claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we will not assess the merits of any such claim. 2 See People v. Wallace, 2018 IL App (5th) 140385, ¶ 45 (declining “to consider the merits of the defendant’s petition where the tr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Russellgreen1 sentence2023See id. (stating that the reviewing court “will not speculate whether the trial court would - 16 - No. 1-21-1205 have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing if counsel had adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c)”). ¶ 48 Accordingly, because counsel did not comply with her duties under Rule 651(c) by amending the petition to include a rote claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we will not assess the merits of any such claim. 2 See People v. Wallace, 2018 IL App (5th) 140385, ¶ 45 (declining “to consider the merits of the defendant’s petition where the tr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Relerfordgreen1 sentence2020See Releford, 2017 IL 121094 , ¶¶ 71-76. ¶ 26 For the forgoing reasons, defendant’s conviction for burglary is affirmed. ¶ 27 Judgment affirmed. - 10 - | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of McElweegreen1 sentence2016App. 3d at 1069 (finding that order directing the sheriff to conduct a sale of debtor's personal property was a final order because it "finally decide[d] the debtor's right to possess a given piece of property"). ¶ 13 Although precedential guidance is limited, we find the circumstances of this case to be in line with In re Marriage of McElwee, 230 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Yucisgreen1 sentence2016See Id. ¶ 27 (holding that order was a final judgment where it conclusively determined that a debtor was not entitled to damages for her claim that bank had wrongfully seized her independent retirement account); Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp., 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 26 (determining that order denying substitution of judge was not a final judgment under Rule 304(b)(4) because it did not put the plaintiff in a position to collect the judgment amount or direct the third-party respondents to turn over funds or substantively determine any of the parties' rig | 1 | 1 |
Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corporationgreen1 sentence2016See Id. ¶ 27 (holding that order was a final judgment where it conclusively determined that a debtor was not entitled to damages for her claim that bank had wrongfully seized her independent retirement account); Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp., 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 26 (determining that order denying substitution of judge was not a final judgment under Rule 304(b)(4) because it did not put the plaintiff in a position to collect the judgment amount or direct the third-party respondents to turn over funds or substantively determine any of the parties' rig | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rich v. Baldwingreen1 sentence1986But see Rich v. Baldwin (1985), 133 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Levaccare v. Levaccare
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy
green
1 sentence2025Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 24 . ¶ 60 Moreover, the agreement lacks a release of either One Stop or Global from any claims brought by the other, including a claim for the payment of any invoiced amounts. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ammons v. Jet Credit Sales, Inc.
green
1 sentence1986App. 2d 456, 461 , 181 N.E.2d 601, 603 .) However, plaintiff has not alleged this tort, and we take no position on the merits of any such claim in this case. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
The People v. Church
green
1 sentence1966In People v. Church, 366 Ill 149, 7 NE2d 894 , the court held that it was improper for the prosecuting attorney to state in his closing argument to the jury that the People had been placed at a disadvantage because the defendant waived her right to make an opening statement. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Crane Construction Co. v. Symons Clamp & Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1964Co. 25 Ill.2d 521 , did either of the parties refer to those provisions of the governing statutes which state, “Claims for credit hereunder must be filed with and initially determined by the Department, the remedy herein provided being exclusive; and no court shall have jurisdiction to determine the merits of any claim except upon review as provided herein.” Ill. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Landgraf v. Kuh
neutral
2 sentences1958The Act of 1897, like the ordinances in question, failed to state specifically who should provide the required fire escapes, but with respect to this omission the court said: “. . . we think the fair and reasonable intendment is that the owner or owners shall perform that duty, and we so held in construing the Fire-escape act of 1885, the provisions of which in this regard are the same as the act under consideration, in the recent case of Landgraf v. Kuh, 188 Ill. 484 .” Where a building required to be equipped with fire-prevention appliances is in the possession of a lessee, the decisions are 1958The Act of 1897, like the ordinances in question, failed to state specifically who should provide the required fire escapes, but with respect to this omission the court said: "... we think the fair and reasonable intendment is that the owner or owners shall perform that duty, and we so held in construing the Fire-escape act of 1885, the provisions of which in this regard are the same as the act under consideration, in the recent case of Landgraf v. Kuh, 188 Ill. 484 ." [2] Where a building required to be equipped with fire-prevention appliances is in the possession of a lessee, the decisions a | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.