premium rule in Illinois

2000Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229 .

1996(Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229 ; Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425 , 401 N.E.2d 539, 542 .) As the provision in this case is not ambiguous, the premium rule does not affect the result.

1996(Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229 ; Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425 , 401 N.E.2d 539, 542 .) As the provision in this case is not ambiguous, the premium rule does not affect the result.

1996(Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229 ; Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425 , 401 N.E.2d 539, 542 .) As the provision in this case is not ambiguous, the premium rule does not affect the result.

1994App. 3d 99 , 599 N.E.2d 999 .) Accordingly, we refuse to apply the premium rule to the case at bar.

1992(Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 167, 180-81 , 370 N.E.2d 1033 , 1049.) The premium rule has been analyzed in a similar context by our colleagues on the First District Appellate Court in Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill.

1992(Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 167, 180-81 , 370 N.E.2d 1033 , 1049.) The premium rule has been analyzed in a similar context by our colleagues on the First District Appellate Court in Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill.

1992App. 3d 638 , 410 N.E.2d 150 , in which they stated: “[T]he ‘Premium Rule’ is best understood as a mere explication of the general rule that the insured is to be favored in construing insurance policies.

1991(Maid, 101 Ill.

1991App. 3d at 1067 .) Defendant argues that the premium rule is a rule of contract construction ( 101 Ill.

1983App. 3d 899 , 407 N.E.2d 674 .) Since the issue before us does not involve the construction of an ambiguous insurance contract, the premium rule has no relevance.

1981(Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. (1978), 58 Ill.

1947Heck v. Schupp, supra. Furthermore, there is nothing contained in the cases cited by defendant with reference to the legal position of children at common law, which would specifically or by implication bar the right of action presented herein.

1908In Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Baddin, 120 U. S. 183 , the court, in speaking of this question said: “It follows that the -only question upon the instructions of the court to the jury, which is open to the defendant on this bill of exceptions, is whether, if insurers accept payment of a premium after they Imow that there has been a breach of a condition of the policy, their acceptance of the premium is a waiver of the right to ■avoid the policy for that breach.