premium waiver in California

2018In Carrington , supra, 289 F.3d 644 , the insured, Zipoy, was covered under his employer's group life insurance policy, which included a premium waiver provision analogous to the Rider in the instant case.

2018In Carrington , supra, 289 F.3d 644 , the insured, Zipoy, was covered under his employer's group life insurance policy, which included a premium waiver provision analogous to the Rider in the instant case.

1969If John had breached his agreement and failed to provide in his will for Madeline's support and she had recovered the value of her life estate in an action for damages against the estate, the amount of her recovery would not be, under Grogan, a transfer of property `brought about by means of a will' and, presumably, no tax liability would attach. 5 As suggested *Page 833 above, when the testator provides in his will for the payment of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, and the obligation would have been enforceable without rega

1969If John had breached his agreement and failed to provide in his will for Madeline’s support and she had recovered the value of her life estate in an action for damages against the estate, the amount of her recovery would not be, under Grogan, a transfer of property ‘brought about by means of a will’ and, presumably, no tax liability would attach. 5 As suggested above, when the testator provides in his will for the payment of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, and the obligation would have been enforceable without regard to the

2018(See id. at p. 646, fn. 2.) Zipoy left his employer due to a disability and failed to notify the insurance company of the disability, as required to continue coverage. ( Id. at p. 646.) After Zipoy died, the insurance company denied the death beneficiary's claim based in part on Zipoy's failure to notify the insurance company of his disability. ( Ibid. ) The district court granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the notice prejudice rule did not apply to the notice of disability requirement. ( Id. at p. 645.) The Ninth Circuit reversed and, applying *58 t

2018(See id. at p. 646, fn. 2.) Zipoy left his employer due to a disability and failed to notify the insurance company of the disability, as required to continue coverage. ( Id. at p. 646.) After Zipoy died, the insurance company denied the death beneficiary's claim based in part on Zipoy's failure to notify the insurance company of his disability. ( Ibid. ) The district court granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the notice prejudice rule *219 did not apply to the notice of disability requirement. ( Id. at p. 645.) The *198 Ninth Circuit reversed and, appl

2007Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064 .) In fact, it was required to rely upon Premium’s instruction to cancel the policy and return the unpaid premium. (§673, subd. (g)(2); Pacific Auto.

1998The insured contended that the incontestability clause barred the insurer's claims. ( Id. at pp. 341-343, 89 P.2d 732 .) In rejecting the insured's arguments, the court held that in order for coverage to exist under the relevant policies, the insured was required to plead and prove that when he filed the disability claim, he "was suffering from `a disease occurring and originating after the issuance of the policies." ( Id. at p. 346, 89 P.2d 732 .) On these facts the court held that the incontestability clause "does not extend the coverage beyond the terms of the policy" and that the insured "

1998The insured contended that the incontestability clause barred the insurer's claims. ( Id. at pp. 341-343, 89 P.2d 732 .) In rejecting the insured's arguments, the court held that in order for coverage to exist under the relevant policies, the insured was required to plead and prove that when he filed the disability claim, he "was suffering from `a disease occurring and originating after the issuance of the policies." ( Id. at p. 346, 89 P.2d 732 .) On these facts the court held that the incontestability clause "does not extend the coverage beyond the terms of the policy" and that the insured "

1943One of the purposes of these restrictions which were placed in the act is thus stated in Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 [ 58 S.Ct. 468 , 82 L.Ed. 607 ] : ‘‘Congress was entitled not only to prevent misapplication of the public funds and to protect the officials concerned from being misled, but also to protect those who sought loans from being imposed upon by extravagant or improper charges for services in connection with their applications.

1943One of the purposes of these restrictions which were placed in the act is thus stated in Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 [ 58 S.Ct. 468 , 82 L.Ed. 607 ] : ‘‘Congress was entitled not only to prevent misapplication of the public funds and to protect the officials concerned from being misled, but also to protect those who sought loans from being imposed upon by extravagant or improper charges for services in connection with their applications.