transcript of the sentencing hearing in Louisiana

1988State v. Soco, supra. The transcript of the sentencing hearing illustrates that the judge considered the statutory guidelines and justified the sentence with factual reasons.

1988State v. Soco, supra. Having reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing, we cannot say the judge failed to consider the statutory guidelines or to justify the sentence with factual reasons.

2006In State v. Neville , XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/95), 655 So.2d 785 , writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.9/29/95), 660 So.2d 851 [6] , the fourth circuit concluded that a trial court could not reconsider a defendant's sentence in reaction to a motion to reconsider filed 15 months after sentencing where the transcript of the sentencing hearing did not reflect that the time for filing the motion to reconsider was extended at sentencing.

2006In State v. Neville , XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/95), 655 So.2d 785 , writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.9/29/95), 660 So.2d 851 [6] , the fourth circuit concluded that a trial court could not reconsider a defendant's sentence in reaction to a motion to reconsider filed 15 months after sentencing where the transcript of the sentencing hearing did not reflect that the time for filing the motion to reconsider was extended at sentencing.

2004The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court clearly designated that each sentence was to be served concurrently with the others. [1] However, the minute entry does not indicate the concurrent application of the two sentences imposed on the convictions for armed robbery with each other and with the other two sentences. "[I]t is well settled that when the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails." State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369 , writ denied 00-2051 (La.9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62 ; See also State v. Lynch, 441

2004The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court clearly designated that each sentence was to be served concurrently with the others. [1] However, the minute entry does not indicate the concurrent application of the two sentences imposed on the convictions for armed robbery with each other and with the other two sentences. "[I]t is well settled that when the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails." State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369 , writ denied 00-2051 (La.9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62 ; See also State v. Lynch, 441

1996However, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in State v. Berniard, 625 So.2d 217 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied 93-2705 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1308 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1121 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1084 (1995), thus quieting the issue of whether a Court should consider constitutional violations on appeal that were not contemporaneously objected to in the trial court.

1996However, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in State v. Berniard, 625 So.2d 217 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied 93-2705 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1308 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1121 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1084 (1995), thus quieting the issue of whether a Court should consider constitutional violations on appeal that were not contemporaneously objected to in the trial court.

1996However, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in State v. Berniard, 625 So.2d 217 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied 93-2705 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1308 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1121 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1084 (1995), thus quieting the issue of whether a Court should consider constitutional violations on appeal that were not contemporaneously objected to in the trial court.

1994Johnson v. Day, 92-0122 (La. 5/13/94); 637 So.2d 1062 (La.1994). (2) The district court is ordered to appoint counsel *1275 for the purpose of holding a hearing to address the merits of (a) relator's claim of illegally lenient sentence in accordance with the procedures and guidelines set forth in State v. Desdunes, 579 So.2d 452 (La.1991); State v. Husband, 593 So.2d 1257 (La.1992); State v. Childs, 629 So.2d 375 (La.1993); and (b) relator's claim (supported by the multiple bill filed in the record) that the original sentencing judge erroneously sentenced relator as a third offender when he qu

1994Johnson v. Day, 92-0122 (La. 5/13/94); 637 So.2d 1062 (La.1994). (2) The district court is ordered to appoint counsel *1275 for the purpose of holding a hearing to address the merits of (a) relator's claim of illegally lenient sentence in accordance with the procedures and guidelines set forth in State v. Desdunes, 579 So.2d 452 (La.1991); State v. Husband, 593 So.2d 1257 (La.1992); State v. Childs, 629 So.2d 375 (La.1993); and (b) relator's claim (supported by the multiple bill filed in the record) that the original sentencing judge erroneously sentenced relator as a third offender when he qu

1994Johnson v. Day, 92-0122 (La. 5/13/94); 637 So.2d 1062 (La.1994). (2) The district court is ordered to appoint counsel *1275 for the purpose of holding a hearing to address the merits of (a) relator's claim of illegally lenient sentence in accordance with the procedures and guidelines set forth in State v. Desdunes, 579 So.2d 452 (La.1991); State v. Husband, 593 So.2d 1257 (La.1992); State v. Childs, 629 So.2d 375 (La.1993); and (b) relator's claim (supported by the multiple bill filed in the record) that the original sentencing judge erroneously sentenced relator as a third offender when he qu

1994Johnson v. Day, 92-0122 (La. 5/13/94); 637 So.2d 1062 (La.1994). (2) The district court is ordered to appoint counsel *1275 for the purpose of holding a hearing to address the merits of (a) relator's claim of illegally lenient sentence in accordance with the procedures and guidelines set forth in State v. Desdunes, 579 So.2d 452 (La.1991); State v. Husband, 593 So.2d 1257 (La.1992); State v. Childs, 629 So.2d 375 (La.1993); and (b) relator's claim (supported by the multiple bill filed in the record) that the original sentencing judge erroneously sentenced relator as a third offender when he qu

1986In State v. Coleman, 465 So.2d 709 (La.1985) the Supreme Court held that the language of the statutes “is not intended to authorize a court to correct a district attorney in the exercise of his constitutional and statutory discretion to proceed under a particular provision when an offender’s conduct is criminal according to several statutes or to selectively enforce enhancement statutes.” And in State v. Jackson, supra, the court held that “the statutory provisions ‘shall serve’ (14:95.2) and ‘shall impose’ (Art. 893.1) are neither self-operative nor imperative absent the district attorney’s c

1986In State v. Coleman, 465 So.2d 709 (La.1985) the Supreme Court held that the language of the statutes “is not intended to authorize a court to correct a district attorney in the exercise of his constitutional and statutory discretion to proceed under a particular provision when an offender’s conduct is criminal according to several statutes or to selectively enforce enhancement statutes.” And in State v. Jackson, supra, the court held that “the statutory provisions ‘shall serve’ (14:95.2) and ‘shall impose’ (Art. 893.1) are neither self-operative nor imperative absent the district attorney’s c

1985State v. Banks, supra. The transcript of the sentencing hearing establishes the trial court carefully studied the effect of the sentence to be imposed on defendant.