superseding cause instruction in Maryland

1990As the Court of Appeals noted in Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125 , 304 A.2d 831 (1973), We recognize that a determination of whether the intervening act of a third person is a superseding cause ... may be a question for the trier of fact.

1975In Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125 , the Court of Appeals through Judge Digges declined to permit a superseding cause instruction on the basis of parental negligence conceding it an “attempted end run around the provisions of Art. 75, § 2.” The Court said at 131: “ ... if that section is to have any meaning it is only in the somewhat extraordinary situation where the parent’s negligence is such as to constitute an independent and superseding cause of the child’s injuries, that the dormant negligent act of another is discharged, Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307 ; Farley. v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 ;

2016While no Maryland case is completely indistinguishable from the case at bar, we find guidance in cases from other jurisdictions such as Siggers v. Barlow, 906 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.1990).

2009As to the more general implied warranty of merchantability, based on industry standards, a superseding cause analysis would likewise be appropriate, but only upon facts susceptible of but one inference.” Id. at 586-87 , 933 A.2d at 577-78 .

2009As to the more general implied warranty of merchantability, based on industry standards, a superseding cause analysis would likewise be appropriate, but only upon facts susceptible of but one inference.” Id. at 586-87 , 933 A.2d at 577-78 .

2007The Court held that “[a]n intermediary’s negligent failure to prevent harm will be a superseding cause when it is ‘so extraordi *581 nary’ as to not have been reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 224 , 604 A.2d 445 .

2001But recently, in May v. Giant Food, Inc., 122 Md.App. 364 , 712 A.2d 166 (1998), we held that “for purposes of contributory negligence, the issue of whether the defendant’s act of primary negligence constitutes an intervening or superseding cause is properly analyzed as a question of proximate causation and foreseeability”—not under a superseding cause analysis.

2001But recently, in May v. Giant Food, Inc., 122 Md.App. 364 , 712 A.2d 166 (1998), we held that “for purposes of contributory negligence, the issue of whether the defendant’s act of primary negligence constitutes an intervening or superseding cause is properly analyzed as a question of proximate causation and foreseeability”—not under a superseding cause analysis.

1998Relying on the tripartite test described in Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 111 Md.App. 124, 151 , 680 A.2d 569 , cert. denied, 344 Md. 118 , 685 A.2d 452 (1996), the trial court refused to give a superseding cause instruction.

1998Relying on the tripartite test described in Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 111 Md.App. 124, 151 , 680 A.2d 569 , cert. denied, 344 Md. 118 , 685 A.2d 452 (1996), the trial court refused to give a superseding cause instruction.

1990A superseding cause instruction is appropriate “where there is reasonable room for disagreement whether the third party action [Bethlehem Steel’s failure to warn] ... was extraordinary and not foreseeable, or otherwise fits the legal definition of superseding cause.” Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 496 .

1990This court applied Maryland’s doctrine of superseding cause in Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.App. 408 , 475 A.2d 1243 (1984) (worker injured by conveyor belt brought product liability action against manufacturer of belt).

1990This court applied Maryland’s doctrine of superseding cause in Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.App. 408 , 475 A.2d 1243 (1984) (worker injured by conveyor belt brought product liability action against manufacturer of belt).

1975In Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125 , the Court of Appeals through Judge Digges declined to permit a superseding cause instruction on the basis of parental negligence conceding it an “attempted end run around the provisions of Art. 75, § 2.” The Court said at 131: “ ... if that section is to have any meaning it is only in the somewhat extraordinary situation where the parent’s negligence is such as to constitute an independent and superseding cause of the child’s injuries, that the dormant negligent act of another is discharged, Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307 ; Farley. v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 ;

1975Thus it would seem that if the contributory negligence of the child is not a bar, Miller, supra, and the neglect if any of the parent being far from “extraordinary” as a matter of law can neither be imputed to the child, Courts Art. § 10-910, nor serve as a superseding cause, Caroline v. Reicher, supra; Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. at 448-450, appellees cannot by synergism combine the two to effect a preclusive result which neither alone could achieve.

1975In Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125 , the Court of Appeals through Judge Digges declined to permit a superseding cause instruction on the basis of parental negligence conceding it an “attempted end run around the provisions of Art. 75, § 2.” The Court said at 131: “ ... if that section is to have any meaning it is only in the somewhat extraordinary situation where the parent’s negligence is such as to constitute an independent and superseding cause of the child’s injuries, that the dormant negligent act of another is discharged, Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307 ; Farley. v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 ;