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27 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc.green2 sentences2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there 2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there | 4 | 14 |
Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc.green2 sentences1993In a long line of cases starting with Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24 , 28 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969), our Supreme Court has adopted the standards set forth in the Restatement (Second), Torts regarding the doctrine of superseding cause. 1993In a long line of cases starting with Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24 , 28 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969), our Supreme Court has adopted the standards set forth in the Restatement (Second), Torts regarding the doctrine of superseding cause. | 4 | 6 |
Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc.green2 sentences2019We note that several years before we decided Sapko , in Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc. , 287 Conn. 20 , 37, 946 A.2d 839 (2008), we rejected a nearly identical claim to that which we found persuasive in Sapko , namely, that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant's request to charge the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, when the defendant had argued that the negligence of the plaintiff's employer was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 2019We note that several years before we decided Sapko , in Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc. , 287 Conn. 20 , 37, 946 A.2d 839 (2008), we rejected a nearly identical claim to that which we found persuasive in Sapko , namely, that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant's request to charge the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, when the defendant had argued that the negligence of the plaintiff's employer was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. | 2 | 3 |
Lombardi v. Walladgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Lombardi v. Wallad , 98 Conn. 510 , 518, 120 A. 291 (1923) ("the intervening cause either must be a cause, whether intelligent or not, [that] so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any degree, produces the injury"); Mahoney v. Beatman , 110 Conn. 184 , 205, 147 A. 762 (1929) ( Maltbie , J. , dissenting) ("the circumstances [that] intervene may be natural phenomena, or the involuntary and unlawful act of a third person, or his negligent conduct, or his voluntary but lawful act, or his voluntary 2019See, e.g., Lombardi v. Wallad , 98 Conn. 510 , 518, 120 A. 291 (1923) ("the intervening cause either must be a cause, whether intelligent or not, [that] so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any degree, produces the injury"); Mahoney v. Beatman , 110 Conn. 184 , 205, 147 A. 762 (1929) ( Maltbie , J. , dissenting) ("the circumstances [that] intervene may be natural phenomena, or the involuntary and unlawful act of a third person, or his negligent conduct, or his voluntary but lawful act, or his voluntary | 2 | 2 |
RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp.green2 sentences2019Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984)] § 42, p. 274; see also id., § 53, p. 358.’’ RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381 , 388 n.4, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). 10 We note that several years before we decided Sapko, in Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 37 , 946 A.2d 839 (2008), we rejected a nearly identical claim to that which we found persuasive in Sapko, namely, that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, when the defendant had argued that the negligence 2019Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984)] § 42, p. 274; see also id., § 53, p. 358.’’ RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381 , 388 n.4, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). 10 We note that several years before we decided Sapko, in Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 37 , 946 A.2d 839 (2008), we rejected a nearly identical claim to that which we found persuasive in Sapko, namely, that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, when the defendant had argued that the negligence | 2 | 2 |
Levesque v. Bristol Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences2019See, e.g., Levesque v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 234 , 243 n.12, 943 A.2d 430 (2008); Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 434 ; Board of Education v. St. 2019See, e.g., Levesque v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 234 , 243 n.12, 943 A.2d 430 (2008); Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 434 ; Board of Education v. St. | 2 | 2 |
SAPKO v. Stategreen2 sentences2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there 2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there | 1 | 2 |
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.green2 sentences2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there 2026The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s] injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered, were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse- quence of defective product packaging and warehouse operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent conduct.”13 Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the parties’ respective appellate briefs, there | 1 | 2 |
Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroadgreen2 sentences2019E.g., Sapko v. State , supra, 305 Conn. at 377 , 44 A.3d 827 ("the superseding cause doctrine was largely abandoned in Barry in favor of comparative and contributory negligence ... subject ... to certain narrow exceptions, namely, situations in which an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or criminal event supersedes the defendant's tortious conduct" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ); Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. , supra, 292 Conn. at 167 , 971 A.2d 676 ( Barry "specifically limited our abolishment of the doctrine to the situation in cases ... 2019E.g., Sapko v. State , supra, 305 Conn. at 377 , 44 A.3d 827 ("the superseding cause doctrine was largely abandoned in Barry in favor of comparative and contributory negligence ... subject ... to certain narrow exceptions, namely, situations in which an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature or criminal event supersedes the defendant's tortious conduct" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ); Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. , supra, 292 Conn. at 167 , 971 A.2d 676 ( Barry "specifically limited our abolishment of the doctrine to the situation in cases ... | 1 | 2 |
Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen 2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Yale Universitygreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen 2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen | 1 | 1 |
Hasychak v. Zoning Board of Appealsgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Hasychak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 296 Conn. 434 , 437 n. 4, 994 A.2d 1270 (2010). [10] General Statutes § 52-572h (b) provides in relevant part: "In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought...." [11] General Statutes § 52-572o (a) provides: "In any claim under sections 2012See, e.g., Hasychak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 296 Conn. 434 , 437 n. 4, 994 A.2d 1270 (2010). [10] General Statutes § 52-572h (b) provides in relevant part: "In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought...." [11] General Statutes § 52-572o (a) provides: "In any claim under sections | 1 | 1 |
Sapko v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Sapko v. State, 123 Conn.App. 18, 26, 30 , 1 A.3d 250 (2010). 2012See Sapko v. State, 123 Conn.App. 18, 26, 30 , 1 A.3d 250 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
DiStefano v. Milardogreen2 sentences2006See DiStefano v. Milardo, supra, 276 Conn. at 421 , 886 A.2d 415 . 2006See DiStefano v. Milardo, supra, 276 Conn. at 421 , 886 A.2d 415 . | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co.green2 sentences1998See Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 243 Conn. 168 , 178 , 700 A.2d 38 (1997). 1998See Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 243 Conn. 168 , 178 , 700 A.2d 38 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Virelli v. Benhattie, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 29 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969); Virelli v. Benhattie, Inc., 146 Conn. 203, 209 , 148 A.2d 760 (1959). 2003Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 29 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969); Virelli v. Benhattie, Inc., 146 Conn. 203, 209 , 148 A.2d 760 (1959). | 5 | 1985–2003 |
Mahoney v. Beatman
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., Lombardi v. Wallad , 98 Conn. 510 , 518, 120 A. 291 (1923) ("the intervening cause either must be a cause, whether intelligent or not, [that] so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any degree, produces the injury"); Mahoney v. Beatman , 110 Conn. 184 , 205, 147 A. 762 (1929) ( Maltbie , J. , dissenting) ("the circumstances [that] intervene may be natural phenomena, or the involuntary and unlawful act of a third person, or his negligent conduct, or his voluntary but lawful act, or his voluntary 2019See, e.g., Lombardi v. Wallad , 98 Conn. 510 , 518, 120 A. 291 (1923) ("the intervening cause either must be a cause, whether intelligent or not, [that] so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in any degree, produces the injury"); Mahoney v. Beatman , 110 Conn. 184 , 205, 147 A. 762 (1929) ( Maltbie , J. , dissenting) ("the circumstances [that] intervene may be natural phenomena, or the involuntary and unlawful act of a third person, or his negligent conduct, or his voluntary but lawful act, or his voluntary | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019The defendants pleaded that, '[i]f the plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses as alleged in her complaint, said injuries and losses were the result of the intentional, criminal, reckless and/or negligent conduct of a third party, which intervened to break the chain of causation between [Sainval's] alleged negligence and/or carelessness and the plaintiff's alleged injuries and losses.' " (Footnotes altered; footnote in original, footnotes omitted.) Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 42 -45 , 158 A.3d 787 . "[T]he court initially indicated to the parties that it wa 2019The defendants pleaded that, '[i]f the plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses as alleged in her complaint, said injuries and losses were the result of the intentional, criminal, reckless and/or negligent conduct of a third party, which intervened to break the chain of causation between [Sainval's] alleged negligence and/or carelessness and the plaintiff's alleged injuries and losses.' " (Footnotes altered; footnote in original, footnotes omitted.) Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 42 -45 , 158 A.3d 787 . "[T]he court initially indicated to the parties that it wa | 2 | 2019–2019 |
D'Arcy v. Shugrue
green
2 sentences1997For instance, in D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 24-25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985), the Appellate Court stated in the context of a negligence action: “If the third person’s negligence is determined to be a superseding cause of the plaintiffs injury, that negligence, rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury. 1997For instance, in D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 24-25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985), the Appellate Court stated in the context of a negligence action: “If the third person’s negligence is determined to be a superseding cause of the plaintiffs injury, that negligence, rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury. | 2 | 1993–1997 |
Stewart v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Stores, Inc. , supra, 234 Conn. at 606 , 662 A.2d 753 . "[A]lthough nearly every treatise involving the law of torts acknowledges the existence of the doctrine of superseding cause, it is defined differently by various scholars. 2019Stores, Inc. , supra, 234 Conn. at 606 , 662 A.2d 753 . "[A]lthough nearly every treatise involving the law of torts acknowledges the existence of the doctrine of superseding cause, it is defined differently by various scholars. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pisel v. Stamford Hospital
green
2 sentences2019Id., comment (i), p. 504 (entitled ‘‘Understanding and characterizing the risk of harm’’); see also id., § 34, comments (d) and (e), pp. 572–74. 5 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320 , 323, 107 A.3d 381 (2015); Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 333 , 430 A.2d 1 (1980); 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 435 (1), p. 449; see also, e.g., Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.1-4, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/civil/civ- il.pdf (last visited August 5, 2019) (entitled ‘‘Proximate Cause—Foresee- able Risk’’). 6 In Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 2019Id., comment (i), p. 504 (entitled ‘‘Understanding and characterizing the risk of harm’’); see also id., § 34, comments (d) and (e), pp. 572–74. 5 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320 , 323, 107 A.3d 381 (2015); Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 333 , 430 A.2d 1 (1980); 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 435 (1), p. 449; see also, e.g., Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.1-4, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/civil/civ- il.pdf (last visited August 5, 2019) (entitled ‘‘Proximate Cause—Foresee- able Risk’’). 6 In Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
O'Connor v. O'Connor
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen 2012See, e.g., Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672 , 748 A.2d 834 (2000) ("[t]he purpose of the [act] ... is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992) (observing that comparative negligence statute is inapplicable to workers' compensation cases); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 654 , 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (workers' compensation scheme "eschews investigation into the possible negligen | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC
green
2 sentences2012The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. . . . [In other words], would the ordinary [person] in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 114-15 , 869 A.2d 179 (2005). [3] The trial court, in discussing the ramifications of extending a duty of care to the defendant under the circumstance 2012The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. . . . [In other words], would the ordinary [person] in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 114-15 , 869 A.2d 179 (2005). [3] The trial court, in discussing the ramifications of extending a duty of care to the defendant under the circumstance | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp.
green
2 sentences2012First, the plaintiff contends that, although the Appellate Court properly concluded that the superseding cause doctrine does not apply to cases arising under the act, the Appellate Court was incorrect in determining that the contrary conclusion of the board and the commissioner constituted harmless error. [7] Second, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly failed to heed this court's statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., supra, 288 Conn. 392 , 953 A.2d 28 , that "the substantial factor causation standard simply requires that the employment, or the risks incidental ther 2012First, the plaintiff contends that, although the Appellate Court properly concluded that the superseding cause doctrine does not apply to cases arising under the act, the Appellate Court was incorrect in determining that the contrary conclusion of the board and the commissioner constituted harmless error. [7] Second, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly failed to heed this court's statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., supra, 288 Conn. 392 , 953 A.2d 28 , that "the substantial factor causation standard simply requires that the employment, or the risks incidental ther | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
green
2 sentences2009The majority of the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness and that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the superseding cause doctrine because that doctrine is still valid in Connecticut. [3] *680 Id., at 745, 751 , 901 A.2d 1258 . 2009Id., at 751, 901 A.2d 1258 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Torres v. El Paso Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2003Additionally, with respect to cases in which the superseding cause doctrine is used by defendants to attempt to shift their fault to other intervening tortfeasors, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that a jury instruction based on superseding cause would “unduly emphasize the conduct of one tortfeasor over another and would potentially conflict with the jury’s duty to apportion fault.” Id., 737 . 2003Id., 739 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2003In Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. 2002), the Indiana Supreme Court analyzed the relationship between that state’s comparative fault act and the doctrine of superseding cause. 2003Id., 108 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Exxon Co., USA v. Sofec, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998However, "[t]he doctrine of superseding cause is . . . applied where the defendant's negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable." Id. , 1818. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Purcell v. Slagle green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wesson v. City of Milford
green
1 sentence1997For instance, in D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 24-25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985), the Appellate Court stated in the context of a negligence action: “If the third person’s negligence is determined to be a superseding cause of the plaintiffs injury, that negligence, rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Corey v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1997Virelli v. Benhattie, Inc., 146 Conn. 203, 209 , 148 A.2d 760 (1959); see also Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 29 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969); Corey v. Phillips, [ 126 Conn. 246, 254-56 , 10 A.2d 370 (1939)].” Thus, a manufacturer’s liability is limited only if the subsequent alteration or modification breaks the chain of causation, akin to an intervening superseding cause in negligence law. 1997Virelli v. Benhattie, Inc., 146 Conn. 203, 209 , 148 A.2d 760 (1959); see also Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 29 , 266 A.2d 370 (1969); Corey v. Phillips, [ 126 Conn. 246, 254-56 , 10 A.2d 370 (1939)].” Thus, a manufacturer’s liability is limited only if the subsequent alteration or modification breaks the chain of causation, akin to an intervening superseding cause in negligence law. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Burns v. Gleason Plant Security, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Merhi v. Becker green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.