73 California opinions name it 4 courts 2007–2026 26 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2026It is an injury that is greater than moderate harm.”].) Pattern jury instructions “are not themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7 .) Further, the revision of a CALCRIM instruction does not necessarily mean the prior version was defective. 2016The mere fact that the standard CALCRIM instruction for hate crimes now includes a substantial factor instruction does not itself provide authority for the proposition that a sua sponte instruction is required. "[J]ury instructions, whether published or not, are not themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 , 18 P.3d 11 ].) The trial court instructed the jury on the motivated by element of the offense. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2016If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable applicable to the corresponding CALCRIM instruction." (People v. Contreras (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 587, 591, fn. 4 .) 10 CALCRIM No. 704 reads: "Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a special circumstance allegation is true, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find that a special circumstance allegation is true, you mus 2015Case law addressing CALJIC instructions is still generally applicable to the corresponding CALCRIM instruction.” (People v. Contreras (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 587, 591, fn. 4 , citing People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1171, fn. 12 .) 4 is substantially relied upon for proof of guilt . . . .’ ” (People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 .) Both CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 instruct the jury on how to consider circumstantial evidence. | 3 | 3 |
People v. CROMPgreen2 sentences2024(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity) [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction”]; People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 [rejecting constitutional challenge to CALCRIM instruction based on California Supreme Court’s approval of materially similar CALJIC instruction].) Additionally, we agree with Gammage as applied to CALCRIM Nos. 301 and 1190. 2022(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction.”]; see also People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 [rejecting constitutional challenge to CALCRIM instruction based on California Supreme Court’s approval of materially similar CALJIC instruction].) Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial. 22We have used brackets to substitute the current instructions, CALCRIM No. 301 and CALCRIM No. 1190, for their predecessor | 2 | 4 |
People v. Samaniegogreen2 sentences2015Case law addressing CALJIC instructions is still generally applicable to the corresponding CALCRIM instruction.” (People v. Contreras (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 587, 591, fn. 4 , citing People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1171, fn. 12 .) 4 is substantially relied upon for proof of guilt . . . .’ ” (People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 .) Both CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 instruct the jury on how to consider circumstantial evidence. 2013(People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 .) In Samaniego, this court considered whether a challenge to CALCRIM No. 400— the CALCRIM instruction corresponding to CALJIC No. 3.00—had been forfeited by the defendant’s failure to object to the instruction below. ( Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1162-1163.) We determined that, since CALCRIM No. 400 is generally an accurate statement of law, the defendant was obliged to request modification or clarification and, having failed to do so, forfeited his challenge to the instruction. | 2 | 3 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity) [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction”]; People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 [rejecting constitutional challenge to CALCRIM instruction based on California Supreme Court’s approval of materially similar CALJIC instruction].) Additionally, we agree with Gammage as applied to CALCRIM Nos. 301 and 1190. 2022(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction.”]; see also People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 [rejecting constitutional challenge to CALCRIM instruction based on California Supreme Court’s approval of materially similar CALJIC instruction].) Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial. 22We have used brackets to substitute the current instructions, CALCRIM No. 301 and CALCRIM No. 1190, for their predecessor | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2015However, CALCRIM No. 225 advises a jury only on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant’s intent or mental state (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1222 ), whereas CALCRIM No. 224 discusses more generally how a jury should consider circumstantial evidence that is relied on for proof of guilt (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 885 (Rogers)). 2013(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 885 (Rogers).)16 However, it is error to give the more specific instruction on circumstantial evidence of intent or mental state (CALCRIM No. 225 or its predecessor CALJIC No. 2.02) where the defendant's intent is not the only element of the prosecution's case resting on circumstantial evidence. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Carrascogreen2 sentences2013The force required for commission of the second type of violation of section 69 is illustrated in the holding in People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ] (Carrasco). 2013The force required for commission of the second type of violation of section 69 is illustrated in the holding in People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ] (Carrasco). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2016This is because our Supreme Court has held use of the term "proximate cause" in such an instruction "may mislead jurors, causing them ... to focus improperly on the cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm." ( *1484 Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1052, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271 , 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) However, as we explain immediately below, the error was harmless under any standard. 2016This is because our Supreme Court has held use of the term "proximate cause" in such an instruction "may mislead jurors, causing them ... to focus improperly on the cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm." ( *1484 Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1052, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271 , 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) However, as we explain immediately below, the error was harmless under any standard. | 1 | 6 |
People v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2016This is because our Supreme Court has held use of the term "proximate cause" in such an instruction "may mislead jurors, causing them ... to focus improperly on the cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm." ( *1484 Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1052, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271 , 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) However, as we explain immediately below, the error was harmless under any standard. 2016This is because our Supreme Court has held use of the term "proximate cause" in such an instruction "may mislead jurors, causing them ... to focus improperly on the cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm." ( *1484 Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1052, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271 , 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) However, as we explain immediately below, the error was harmless under any standard. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Navagreen2 sentences2022(People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1010 , citing People v. Nava (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1497-1498 (Nava).) Moreover, the CALCRIM instruction guide advises that “[t]he instructions use brackets to provide optional choices that may be necessary or appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances of the case,” and “both parentheses and brackets may appear in the same sentence to indicate options that arise depending on which necessary alternatives are selected . . . .” (Judicial Council of Cal., Criminal Jury Instn. (2021) p. xxiv.) The examples set forth in CALCRIM No. 925 are w 2022(People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1010 , citing People v. Nava (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1497-1498 (Nava).) Moreover, the CALCRIM instruction guide advises that “[t]he instructions use brackets to provide optional choices that may be necessary or appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances of the case,” and “both parentheses and brackets may appear in the same sentence to indicate options that arise depending on which necessary alternatives are selected . . . .” (Judicial Council of Cal., Criminal Jury Instn. (2021) p. xxiv.) The examples set forth in CALCRIM No. 925 are w | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mendozared2 sentences2014(People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243 ; see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 , 179- 180.)5 Appellants contends that CALCRIM No. 372 differs significantly from CALJIC No. 2.52 because the CALCRIM instruction uses the phrase “aware of his guilt” which is not found in the earlier CALJIC instruction. 2014(People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243 ; see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 , 179- 180.)5 Appellants contends that CALCRIM No. 372 differs significantly from CALJIC No. 2.52 because the CALCRIM instruction uses the phrase “aware of his guilt” which is not found in the earlier CALJIC instruction. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Russogreen2 sentences2026Second, appellant argues that when the prosecutor chooses to present evidence of more than one act that may constitute the charged offense, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct “the jurors they need to unanimously agree on which act their verdict is based.” (Citing People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).) This principle applies here, appellant contends, because there was evidence he used force to pull his arm from Officer Tiffany’s grip, the Attorney General has characterized that conduct as violence in his respondent’s brief, and thus it is not clear whether appella 2026Second, appellant argues that when the prosecutor chooses to present evidence of more than one act that may constitute the charged offense, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct “the jurors they need to unanimously agree on which act their verdict is based.” (Citing People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).) This principle applies here, appellant contends, because there was evidence he used force to pull his arm from Officer Tiffany’s grip, the Attorney General has characterized that conduct as violence in his respondent’s brief, and thus it is not clear whether appella | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen1 sentence2026(See, e.g., People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 294 [“The fact that the commission [established by the Judicial Council] ultimately drafted the newer CALCRIM instructions, which the Judicial Council subsequently adopted [citation], does not establish that the prior CALJIC instructions were constitutionally defective. ‘Nor did their wording become inadequate to 18 Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that “[i]n the context of this particular trial, the jury was reasonably likely to misapply the instruction.” (Boldface omitted.) As defendant acknowledges, the prosecutor’s closing argu | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Van Maigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Centenogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Prettymanred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Olguingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Osbandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nitschmanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Escobargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bustosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Halegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coronagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guilfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Patinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. McCoy
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 , 713 (Powell).) Although the standard CALCRIM instruction for direct 5 aiding and abetting turns on whether the aider and abettor knew the actual perpetrator intended to commit “the crime,” and whether they intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing “the crime” (CALCRIM No. 401), Powell construed that language as requiring only proof that the aider and abettor knew that the actual perpetrator intended to commit a “life endangering act” that gives rise to liability for implied malice murder as well as proof that the aider and abettor inte 2024(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 , 713 (Powell).) Although the standard CALCRIM instruction for direct 5 aiding and abetting turns on whether the aider and abettor knew the actual perpetrator intended to commit “the crime,” and whether they intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing “the crime” (CALCRIM No. 401), Powell construed that language as requiring only proof that the aider and abettor knew that the actual perpetrator intended to commit a “life endangering act” that gives rise to liability for implied malice murder as well as proof that the aider and abettor inte | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Wade
green
2 sentences2020Nor are we aware of any case authority imposing such a requirement.” (People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1150 .) Some physical pain or damage, such as “[a]brasions, lacerations, and bruising can constitute great bodily injury. [Citation.]” (People v. Jung (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042 ; People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042 , 1047–1048; see, e.g., People v. Corona (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 589 [swollen jaw, bruises to head and neck and sore ribs were sufficient to show “great bodily injury”]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718 , disapproved on other grounds in Peopl 2020As the Wade court explained “the statutory definition and relevant CALCRIM instruction (No. 3160) do not require a showing of necessity of medical treatment” to establish a great bodily injury, and that they were not “aware of any case authority imposing such a requirement.” (Wade, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150 .) If obtaining 10 treatment is not required, evidence concerning such treatment cannot be required either. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2018There, the court of appeal found that an improper jury instruction permitted the jury to convict the defendant of assault with a deadly weapon on the basis that the BB gun was "inherently dangerous," a lesser standard than "inherently deadly" as the CALCRIM instruction requires. ( Id. at p. 11, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 .) Nonetheless, the court ruled the error was harmless: "[T]here was ample evidence at trial Brown used the BB gun in a manner capable of inflicting and likely to inflict great bodily injury. 2018There, the court of appeal found that an improper jury instruction permitted the jury to convict the defendant of assault with a deadly weapon on the basis that the BB gun was "inherently dangerous," a lesser standard than "inherently deadly" as the CALCRIM instruction requires. ( Id. at p. 11, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 .) Nonetheless, the court ruled the error was harmless: "[T]here was ample evidence at trial Brown used the BB gun in a manner capable of inflicting and likely to inflict great bodily injury. | 2 | 2018–2020 |
People v. Starski
green
2 sentences2017Richman, J. *278 We began a recent opinion with the observation that "[o]ne of the more disconcerting things that can occur at a criminal trial is the discovery that there is no CALCRIM instruction for the offense charged, thus requiring the judge-hopefully with the assistance of counsel-to formulate appropriate instructions from scratch." ( People v. Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215 , 218, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 .) That observation is apt here, as there is no CALCRIM instruction for Penal Code section 149, 1 which criminalizes a "public officer who, under color of authority, without lawful neces 2017Richman, J. *278 We began a recent opinion with the observation that "[o]ne of the more disconcerting things that can occur at a criminal trial is the discovery that there is no CALCRIM instruction for the offense charged, thus requiring the judge-hopefully with the assistance of counsel-to formulate appropriate instructions from scratch." ( People v. Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215 , 218, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 .) That observation is apt here, as there is no CALCRIM instruction for Penal Code section 149, 1 which criminalizes a "public officer who, under color of authority, without lawful neces | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Pensinger
green
2 sentences2015Defendant’s point is valid, since the sentence, modified from the language of the CALCRIM instruction, suggests that implied malice can support a finding of murder in the first degree, which is not correct.7 (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 ; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245-1246 .) Nonetheless, the mistaken implication is entirely harmless because the court’s further instruction taken from CALCRIM No. 521 indicates that 7 This incorrect implication is not present in the language of the recommended form instruction. 2015Defendant’s point is valid, since the sentence, modified from the language of the CALCRIM instruction, suggests that implied malice can support a finding of murder in the first degree, which is not correct.7 (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 ; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245-1246 .) Nonetheless, the mistaken implication is entirely harmless because the court’s further instruction taken from CALCRIM No. 521 indicates that 7 This incorrect implication is not present in the language of the recommended form instruction. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Moon
green
2 sentences2015Defendant’s point is valid, since the sentence, modified from the language of the CALCRIM instruction, suggests that implied malice can support a finding of murder in the first degree, which is not correct.7 (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 ; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245-1246 .) Nonetheless, the mistaken implication is entirely harmless because the court’s further instruction taken from CALCRIM No. 521 indicates that 7 This incorrect implication is not present in the language of the recommended form instruction. 2015Defendant’s point is valid, since the sentence, modified from the language of the CALCRIM instruction, suggests that implied malice can support a finding of murder in the first degree, which is not correct.7 (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 ; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245-1246 .) Nonetheless, the mistaken implication is entirely harmless because the court’s further instruction taken from CALCRIM No. 521 indicates that 7 This incorrect implication is not present in the language of the recommended form instruction. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Pitts
green
2 sentences2013The “AUTHORITY” section following CALCRIM No. 801 indicates that the instruction’s definition of “serious bodily injury” came from the 1990 Pitts decision, which held that “great bodily injury is an element of mayhem.” (Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1558 , italics added; see Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. 2013The “AUTHORITY” section following CALCRIM No. 801 indicates that the instruction’s definition of “serious bodily injury” came from the 1990 Pitts decision, which held that “great bodily injury is an element of mayhem.” (Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1558 , italics added; see Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Hays
green
2 sentences2025Claiming that he did not, Chapman cites only People v. Hays (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 534 , which he describes as “instructive.” We would describe it as “distinguishable.” To begin with, Hays involved the crime of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), not stalking. 2025Claiming that he did not, Chapman cites only People v. Hays (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 534 , which he describes as “instructive.” We would describe it as “distinguishable.” To begin with, Hays involved the crime of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), not stalking. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Padilla
green
1 sentence2025Written at the bottom of the question form is, “Please look at all instructions, specifically 2521 again. [¶] If you continue to have any questions, please let us know.” The jury then sent the form back again with another question: “Is there a definition of (#4) of 25400: ‘under the control or direction?’ Additionally, if there is no definition, does the court agree with the prosecutor’s definition of control and direction in his closing statement?” The court eventually gave—over defense counsel’s objection—the jury the language the prosecutor requested about “possession” of an object.8 8 In d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Robin M.
green
2 sentences2025VI, § 6, subd. (d); In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337 , 346 21 [invalidating a rule of court to the extent it was inconsistent with legislative intent].)7 Since rule 4.421(c) is the sole rule 4.421 aggravating factor now lacking either a CALCRIM instruction or a statutory definition, its meaning necessarily must be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis in the context of jury fact-finding. 2025VI, § 6, subd. (d); In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337 , 346 21 [invalidating a rule of court to the extent it was inconsistent with legislative intent].)7 Since rule 4.421(c) is the sole rule 4.421 aggravating factor now lacking either a CALCRIM instruction or a statutory definition, its meaning necessarily must be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis in the context of jury fact-finding. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hillhouse
green
2 sentences2025(See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 .) Therefore, any argument was forfeited. 2025(See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 .) Therefore, any argument was forfeited. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Montoya
green
1 sentence2025A. Applicable legal principles and standard of review “It is settled that, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are commonly or closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Crane v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2025In Crane, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession prior to trial, finding the confession was voluntary. ( Crane, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 683–684.) The trial court then excluded trial testimony about the circumstances of the defendant’s confession—the physical and psychological environment in which the confession was obtained—on the ground that the testimony pertained solely to the issue of voluntariness and was therefore inadmissible. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Beeman
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 , 713 (Powell).) Although the standard CALCRIM instruction for direct 5 aiding and abetting turns on whether the aider and abettor knew the actual perpetrator intended to commit “the crime,” and whether they intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing “the crime” (CALCRIM No. 401), Powell construed that language as requiring only proof that the aider and abettor knew that the actual perpetrator intended to commit a “life endangering act” that gives rise to liability for implied malice murder as well as proof that the aider and abettor inte 2024(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 , 713 (Powell).) Although the standard CALCRIM instruction for direct 5 aiding and abetting turns on whether the aider and abettor knew the actual perpetrator intended to commit “the crime,” and whether they intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing “the crime” (CALCRIM No. 401), Powell construed that language as requiring only proof that the aider and abettor knew that the actual perpetrator intended to commit a “life endangering act” that gives rise to liability for implied malice murder as well as proof that the aider and abettor inte | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Jorge M.
green
2 sentences2024Shavers, joined by Haywood, proposed the following pinpoint jury instruction regarding familiarity with firearms: “In determining whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have known a firearm had the distinctive characteristics of an assault weapon, you should consider the totality of circumstances, including the defendant’s familiarity with the firearm in question, the length of possession, and guns in general.” (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 , 884–886 [scienter requirement].) The trial court concluded that the standard CALCRIM instruction was sufficient and declined to give the 2024Shavers, joined by Haywood, proposed the following pinpoint jury instruction regarding familiarity with firearms: “In determining whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have known a firearm had the distinctive characteristics of an assault weapon, you should consider the totality of circumstances, including the defendant’s familiarity with the firearm in question, the length of possession, and guns in general.” (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 , 884–886 [scienter requirement].) The trial court concluded that the standard CALCRIM instruction was sufficient and declined to give the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. MacIel green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Bates
green
1 sentence2024Considering, as we must, the entire charge of the court, not the “ ‘parts of an instruction or … a particular instruction’ ” (People v. Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 ), the jury was instructed that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Nguyen
green
2 sentences2024In support, he cites the current CALCRIM instruction on provocative act 10 murder, CALCRIM No. 560, and People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 123 (Mai), disapproved on another ground in People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756 . 2024In support, he cites the current CALCRIM instruction on provocative act 10 murder, CALCRIM No. 560, and People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 123 (Mai), disapproved on another ground in People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Bell green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Barillas green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Santana green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Alvarez green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Lujano green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Braslaw green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Smithey green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. O'Dell green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Brady green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Price red | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Gilbert green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Whisenhunt green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Gutierrez green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Brooks green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Jung green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Dusky v. United States green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Jaramillo green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Sanchez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. MacK green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Washington green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Lightsey green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Cross green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.