10 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource Districtgreen2 sentences2010Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D. 1987). [¶ 10] The recreational use immunity statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 58-08, provide an exception to political subdivision liability under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(1). 2010Therefore, unless a political subdivision, through its employees, has committed a “[wjillful and malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity,” id., “the political subdivision is not liable for injuries to a nonpaying recreational user of the property.” Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 509 . [¶ 11] In this case, the district court concluded that the location of the accident, Discovery Middle School, fell within the definition of “land” in N.D.C.C. § 53-08-01(2); that M.M.’s practice jump was for an educational purpose, the school-related 60s Day, and conse | 2 | 3 |
M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1green2 sentences2012No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶¶ 1, 19, 22, 28 , 783 N.W.2d 806 , we concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. [¶ 3] On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. 2012No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶¶ 1, 19, 22, 28 , 783 N.W.2d 806 , we concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. [¶ 3] On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. | 2 | 2 |
Kappenman v. Klipfelgreen2 sentences2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . 2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . | 2 | 2 |
Hovland v. City of Grand Forksgreen2 sentences2009Our interpretation of the recreational use immunity statutes also helps alleviate the constitutional concerns expressed in Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388 (N.D.1997). 2009Our interpretation of the recreational use immunity statutes also helps alleviate the constitutional concerns expressed in Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388 (N.D.1997). | 2 | 2 |
Schmidt v. Gateway Community Fellowshipgreen2 sentences2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . 2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . | 1 | 1 |
County of Stutsman v. State Historical Society of North Dakotagreen1 sentence2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . | 1 | 1 |
Small v. Burleigh Countygreen2 sentences2009Section 24-07-03, N.D.C.C., provides that “[i]n all townships in this state, outside the limits of incorporated cities, and outside platted townsites, additions, or subdivisions ..., the congressional section lines are considered public roads open for public travel to the width of thirty-three feet [10.06 meters] on each side of the section lines.” See also Small v. Burleigh County, 225 N.W.2d 295, 300 (N.D.1974) (“We hold that congressional section lines outside the limits of incorporated cities, unless closed by proceedings permitted by statute, are open for public travel without the necessi 2009Ill [¶ 31] Kappenman and Ness argue the district court erred in dismissing Klipfel from the action because they claim he had a duty to warn travelers of known hazards existing on the section line. [¶ 32] In Small, 225 N.W.2d at 297 , this Court said that “[i]n North Dakota the rights of the public to section line highways and to streets are easements only, limited to the right to travel and other rights incident thereto, and the owner of the adjoining land owns the fee title to the property included in the 33 foot easement up to the sect[i]on line.” See also Burleigh County Water Res. | 1 | 1 |
Dan Nelson Construction, Inc. v. Nodland & Dicksongreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 2000 ND 61, ¶ 33 , 608 N.W.2d 267 (2000) (applying Wyoming law); DiMella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., 836 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1988); Hollonbeck v. Torrey, 171 F.R.D. 244, 245 (E.D.Ark.1997). 2006See, e.g., Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 2000 ND 61, ¶ 33 , 608 N.W.2d 267 (2000) (applying Wyoming law); DiMella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., 836 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1988); Hollonbeck v. Torrey, 171 F.R.D. 244, 245 (E.D.Ark.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Diane Dimella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., and Herb Edmunds, United States of Americagreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 2000 ND 61, ¶ 33 , 608 N.W.2d 267 (2000) (applying Wyoming law); DiMella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., 836 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1988); Hollonbeck v. Torrey, 171 *402 F.R.D. 244, 245 (E.D.Ark.1997). 2006See, e.g., Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 2000 ND 61, ¶ 33 , 608 N.W.2d 267 (2000) (applying Wyoming law); DiMella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., 836 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1988); Hollonbeck v. Torrey, 171 F.R.D. 244, 245 (E.D.Ark.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Herman v. City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2006See Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430 , 4 P.3d 973, 978 (Ariz.Ct.App.1999) (legislature did not clearly intend to render irrelevant the entrant’s “purposes” for coming onto the land, even though the legislature obviously intended the statute to limit public landowners’ liability to recreational users). 2006See Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430 , 4 P.3d 973, 978 (Ariz.Ct.App.1999) (legislature did not clearly intend to render irrelevant the entrant’s “purposes” for coming onto the land, even though the legislature obviously intended the statute to limit public landowners’ liability to recreational users). | 1 | 1 |
Hollonbeck v. Torreygreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 2000 ND 61, ¶ 33 , 608 N.W.2d 267 (2000) (applying Wyoming law); DiMella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., 836 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1988); Hollonbeck v. Torrey, 171 F.R.D. 244, 245 (E.D.Ark.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Ertelt v. Emcasco Insurancegreen2 sentences1997Co., 486 N.W.2d 233, 234 (N.D.1992) (citing Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985)). [¶ 6] In 1965, North Dakota created a recreational use immunity statute to protect landowners who opened their land for recreational purposes. 1997Co., 486 N.W.2d 233, 234 (N.D.1992) (citing Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985)). [¶ 6] In 1965, North Dakota created a recreational use immunity statute to protect landowners who opened their land for recreational purposes. | 1 | 1 |
Binstock v. Tschidergreen2 sentences1997Co., 486 N.W.2d 233, 234 (N.D.1992) (citing Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985)). [¶ 6] In 1965, North Dakota created a recreational use immunity statute to protect landowners who opened their land for recreational purposes. 1997Co., 486 N.W.2d 233, 234 (N.D.1992) (citing Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985)). [¶ 6] In 1965, North Dakota created a recreational use immunity statute to protect landowners who opened their land for recreational purposes. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lanning v. Andersongreen2 sentences2010Schools and School Districts § 683 (2008) (“a child who suffers injuries while on school premises as a student ..: is not a recreational user within the meaning of such a statute” (footnote omitted)); but see Banning v. Anderson, 22 Kan.App.2d 474 , 921 P.2d 813, 820-21 (1996) (stating that the recreational use exception eliminates the duty of ordinary care owed by teachers and school districts to properly supervise students and provide a safe environment while under their care). [¶ 18] When harmonizing N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03 and N.D.C.C. ch. 53-08, we agree with those courts that refuse to app 2010Schools and School Districts § 683 (2008) (“a child who suffers injuries while on school premises as a student ..: is not a recreational user within the meaning of such a statute” (footnote omitted)); but see Banning v. Anderson, 22 Kan.App.2d 474 , 921 P.2d 813, 820-21 (1996) (stating that the recreational use exception eliminates the duty of ordinary care owed by teachers and school districts to properly supervise students and provide a safe environment while under their care). [¶ 18] When harmonizing N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03 and N.D.C.C. ch. 53-08, we agree with those courts that refuse to app | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leet v. City of Minot
green
2 sentences2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . 2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . | 4 | 2009–2010 |
State v. Wetzel
green
2 sentences2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . 2010County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc’y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985).” 2009 ND 89, ¶ 21 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, ¶4 , 756 N.W.2d 775 ). [¶ 13] A majority of this Court has said that “ ‘[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.’ ” Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20 , 765 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶20 , 721 N.W.2d 398 ); see also Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 17 , 781 N.W.2d 200 . | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Bouchard v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2018Id. at ¶¶ 14-17. [¶ 40] In Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 86 -88 , we considered an equal protection challenge to a statute granting ski area operators immunity for damages resulting from an inherent risk of skiing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation District
green
2 sentences2010Considering the location of the accident, the purposes of the recreational use immunity statutes, and the laws governing schools and school students, we come to the same conclusion that the recreational use immunity statutes do not apply in this case. [¶ 14] Since their enactment in 1965, the recreational use immunity statutes have been intended “to encourage landowners to open their land for recreational purposes by giving them immunity from suit under certain circumstances.” Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶10 , 781 N.W.2d 200 ; see also Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 22 , 765 N.W.2d 716 ; Leet, 2006 ND 191, 2010Considering the location of the accident, the purposes of the recreational use immunity statutes, and the laws governing schools and school students, we come to the same conclusion that the recreational use immunity statutes do not apply in this case. [¶ 14] Since their enactment in 1965, the recreational use immunity statutes have been intended “to encourage landowners to open their land for recreational purposes by giving them immunity from suit under certain circumstances.” Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶10 , 781 N.W.2d 200 ; see also Kappenman, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 22 , 765 N.W.2d 716 ; Leet, 2006 ND 191, | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Duemeland v. Norback
neutral
2 sentences2009II [¶ 6] Kappenman and Ness contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their wrongful death action. [¶ 7] The principles governing summary judgment are well-established: Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposition *720 of any action without a trial "if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result." Duemeland v. Norback, 2 2009II [¶ 6] Kappenman and Ness contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their wrongful death action. [¶ 7] The principles governing summary judgment are well-established: Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposi tion of any action without a trial “if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result.” Duemeland v. Norback, 2003 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cudworth v. Midcontinent Communications
green
2 sentences2009To the extent our decision conflicts with the decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreting North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes in Umpleby and Cudworth v. Midcontinent Comm., 380 F.3d 375 (8th Cir. 2004), we find those decisions unpersuasive. [¶ 30] We conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing this action on the ground it was barred by the recreational use immunity statutes. 2009To the extent our decision conflicts with the decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreting North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statutes in Umpleby and Cudworth v. Midcontinent Comm., 380 F.3d 375 (8th Cir.2004), we find those decisions unpersuasive. [¶ 30] We conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing this action on the ground it was barred by the recreational use immunity statutes. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Duemeland v. Norback
neutral
2 sentences2009II [¶ 6] Kappenman and Ness contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their wrongful death action. [¶ 7] The principles governing summary judgment are well-established: Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposition *720 of any action without a trial "if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result." Duemeland v. Norback, 2 2009II [¶ 6] Kappenman and Ness contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their wrongful death action. [¶ 7] The principles governing summary judgment are well-established: Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposi tion of any action without a trial “if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result.” Duemeland v. Norback, 2003 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Umpleby v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (N.D.1987), this Court relied on Umpleby v. United States, 806 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.1986), in concluding the protection of the recreational use immunity statutes applied to political subdivisions, but held the political subdivision in that case had waived immunity by purchasing liability insurance. [¶ 8] In 1993, the Legislature first amended the statutes by changing the language of N.D.C.C. § 53-08-05(1) from "[w]illful or malicious" to "[w]illful and malicious." 1993 N.D. 2002Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (N.D.1987), this Court relied on Umpleby v. United States, 806 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.1986), in concluding the protection of the recreational use immunity statutes applied to political subdivisions, but held the political subdivision in that case had waived immunity by purchasing liability insurance. [¶ 8] In 1993, the Legislature first amended the statutes by changing the language of N.D.C.C. § 53-08-05(1) from “[wjillful or malicious” to “[wjillful and malicious.” 1993 N.D. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Stokka v. Cass County Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002However, as in Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 915 , we do not find helpful "[r]eference to abstract, factually dissimilar hypotheses" because Olson and Howard "may assert only matters relating to [their] constitutional rights." Olson and Howard concede they were engaged in a voluntary recreational use of the hill free of charge when they were injured. 2002However, as in Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 915 , we do not find helpful “[r]eference to abstract, factually dissimilar hypotheses” because Olson and Howard “may assert only matters relating to [their] constitutional rights.” Olson and Howard concede they were engaged in a voluntary recreational use of the hill free of charge when they were injured. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.