10 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1959–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re the Claim of Fernandezgreen1 sentence2023This Court has "accepted the Department of Labor's definition of an educational institution, as an organization established for the purpose of operating a school, schools, or alternative educational experience offering a program of instruction in academic, technical or vocational subjects, which is certified by, under contract to or subject to the regulations of the Commissioner of Education" ( Matter of Fernandez [Suffolk County Org. for Promotion of Educ.-Commissioner of Labor] , 50 AD3d 1399, 1400 [3d Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added], lv denied 11 | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Grubergreen1 sentence2008Although SCOPE argues that we should reject this definition and craft a new one since the meaning of the term “educational institution” is one of pure statutory construction and, thus, deference need not be accorded the administrative agency’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language (see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 322 [2003]; Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. of Personnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225, 231-232 [1996]; Matter of Scott [Commissioner of Labor], 25 AD3d 939, 940 [2006]; Matter of Wojnar [Commissioner of Labor], 5 AD3d 899, 900 [2004]), we find the definition | 1 | 1 |
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Rothgreen1 sentence2008Although SCOPE argues that we should reject this definition and craft a new one since the meaning of the term “educational institution” is one of pure statutory construction and, thus, deference need not be accorded the administrative agency’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language (see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 322 [2003]; Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. of Personnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225, 231-232 [1996]; Matter of Scott [Commissioner of Labor], 25 AD3d 939, 940 [2006]; Matter of Wojnar [Commissioner of Labor], 5 AD3d 899, 900 [2004]), we find the definition | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Wojnargreen1 sentence2008Although SCOPE argues that we should reject this definition and craft a new one since the meaning of the term “educational institution” is one of pure statutory construction and, thus, deference need not be accorded the administrative agency’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language (see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 322 [2003]; Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. of Personnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225, 231-232 [1996]; Matter of Scott [Commissioner of Labor], 25 AD3d 939, 940 [2006]; Matter of Wojnar [Commissioner of Labor], 5 AD3d 899, 900 [2004]), we find the definition | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Scottgreen1 sentence2008Although SCOPE argues that we should reject this definition and craft a new one since the meaning of the term “educational institution” is one of pure statutory construction and, thus, deference need not be accorded the administrative agency’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language (see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 322 [2003]; Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. of Personnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225, 231-232 [1996]; Matter of Scott [Commissioner of Labor], 25 AD3d 939, 940 [2006]; Matter of Wojnar [Commissioner of Labor], 5 AD3d 899, 900 [2004]), we find the definition | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Fischergreen1 sentence2008We previously have accepted the Department of Labor’s definition of an educational institution, as “ ‘an organization established for the purpose of operating a school, schools, or alternative educational experience offering a program of instruction in academic, technical or vocational subjects, which is certified by, under contract to or subject to the regulations of the Commissioner of Education’ ” (Matter of Fischer [Children’s Corner of Larchmont/Mamaroneck—Commissioner of Labor], 26 AD3d 551, 552 [2006], quoting New York State Department of Labor, Special Bulletin A-710-53, II [A] [rev Fe | 1 | 1 |
McCabe v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO.green1 sentence2005Defendants’ sponsorship of religious and educational programs for its minor parishioners, however, was not, in itself, sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff (see Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793 [2005]; see generally Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Mars v. Diocese of Rochestergreen1 sentence2005Defendants’ sponsorship of religious and educational programs for its minor parishioners, however, was not, in itself, sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff (see Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793 [2005]; see generally Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Holy See (State of Vatican City)green1 sentence2005Defendants’ sponsorship of religious and educational programs for its minor parishioners, however, was not, in itself, sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff (see Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793 [2005]; see generally Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Gonzalez v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1990Any review of a temporary release determination must start with the premise that participation in such a program is a privilege, not a right (Correction Law § 855 [9]; Matter of Gonzalez v Wilson, 106 AD2d 386 ). 1990Such determination will not be disturbed unless it violated a positive statutory requirement, denied a constitutional right, or was "affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Gonzalez v Wilson, supra, at 386-387; Matter of Schwimmer v Dunham, 91 AD2d 100, 104 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2023This Court has "accepted the Department of Labor's definition of an educational institution, as an organization established for the purpose of operating a school, schools, or alternative educational experience offering a program of instruction in academic, technical or vocational subjects, which is certified by, under contract to or subject to the regulations of the Commissioner of Education" ( Matter of Fernandez [Suffolk County Org. for Promotion of Educ.-Commissioner of Labor] , 50 AD3d 1399, 1400 [3d Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added], lv denied 11 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Murphy v. Kuhn
green
1 sentence2010The evidence that as a matter of routine Abetta referred all questions regarding its insurance claims to Amerisc and Amerisc handled all Abetta’s insurance needs, including referring its claims to insurers, establishes a special relationship between the two that imposed upon Amerisc a duty to Abetta to exercise a reasonable degree of care in notifying the appropriate primary or excess insurer of any claim reported to it by Abetta (see Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266 [1997]; Martini v Lafayette Studio Corp., 273 AD2d 112 [2000]; Stevens v Mickey-Finn & Co., 261 AD2d 300 [1999]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Stevens v. Hickey-Finn & Co.
green
1 sentence2010The evidence that as a matter of routine Abetta referred all questions regarding its insurance claims to Amerisc and Amerisc handled all Abetta’s insurance needs, including referring its claims to insurers, establishes a special relationship between the two that imposed upon Amerisc a duty to Abetta to exercise a reasonable degree of care in notifying the appropriate primary or excess insurer of any claim reported to it by Abetta (see Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266 [1997]; Martini v Lafayette Studio Corp., 273 AD2d 112 [2000]; Stevens v Mickey-Finn & Co., 261 AD2d 300 [1999]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Martini v. Lafayette Studio Corp.
green
1 sentence2010The evidence that as a matter of routine Abetta referred all questions regarding its insurance claims to Amerisc and Amerisc handled all Abetta’s insurance needs, including referring its claims to insurers, establishes a special relationship between the two that imposed upon Amerisc a duty to Abetta to exercise a reasonable degree of care in notifying the appropriate primary or excess insurer of any claim reported to it by Abetta (see Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266 [1997]; Martini v Lafayette Studio Corp., 273 AD2d 112 [2000]; Stevens v Mickey-Finn & Co., 261 AD2d 300 [1999]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doe v. Holy See
green
1 sentence2005Defendants’ sponsorship of religious and educational programs for its minor parishioners, however, was not, in itself, sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff (see Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793 [2005]; see generally Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229 [2004]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Avery
green
1 sentence2001As the program was under the control and supervision of a private agency (compare, People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503, 506 ), the imposition of interim probation was superfluous here and did not implicate the statutory requirements of CPL 390.30 (6). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Moore
green
1 sentence1991The defendant cannot be heard to complain that consecutive terms of imprisonment were excessive (see, People v McNiell, 164 AD2d 951 ; People v Moore, 155 AD2d 696 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Rashid
green
1 sentence1991The defendant cannot be heard to complain that consecutive terms of imprisonment were excessive (see, People v McNiell, 164 AD2d 951 ; People v Moore, 155 AD2d 696 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Schwimmer v. Dunham
green
1 sentence1990Such determination will not be disturbed unless it violated a positive statutory requirement, denied a constitutional right, or was "affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Gonzalez v Wilson, supra, at 386-387; Matter of Schwimmer v Dunham, 91 AD2d 100, 104 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In re Kilroy
green
1 sentence1987The Education Law provides that instruction given in a private school or at home must be "substantially equivalent" to that given in the public school of the city or district where the student resides ( id., § 3204[2]). * Under Department of Education Guidelines, the public school board of education, through the superintendent of schools of the district in which the child resides, is responsible for ascertaining whether the child is receiving instruction substantially equivalent in time and quality to that provided in the public school ( Matter of Kilroy v Fickstein, 121 Misc.2d 98 , 100-101 [ | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Oakknoll v. Coughlin
green
1 sentence1986Participation in this program is a privilege, not a right, conditioned upon documentation of a valid marriage license (see, Matter of Mary of Oakknoll v Coughlin, 101 AD2d 931, 932 ; 7 NYCRR 220.3 [d] [1]). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Edell v. Municipal Broadcasting System
green
1 sentence1959Ref.].) In the case of Matter of Edell v. Municipal Broadcasting System ( 9 Misc 2d 220 ) there was evidence that a personal difference between petitioner and respondent’s director had arisen because it was claimed that the director had wrongfully blamed petitioner for a program error of another employee, which incident may have left the director with a hostile feeling toward petitioner. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.