cases support rule in Oklahoma

1954It is only when the person pays the debt to protect his own interest, equity will substitute such person to the position of the creditor without an agreement to that effect; otherwise the debt is extinguished ; and he who pays it is a volunteer or intermeddler without an interest to protect.” The following cases support the principle announcement in Bobier v. Horn, supra; Kahn v. McConnell, 37 Okl. 219 , 131 P. 682 , 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Tynes v. Smith, Sheriff, 105 Okl. 100 , 234 P. 637 .

1954It is only when the person pays the debt to protect his own interest, equity will substitute such person to the position of the creditor without an agreement to that effect; otherwise the debt is extinguished ; and he who pays it is a volunteer or intermeddler without an interest to protect.” The following cases support the principle announcement in Bobier v. Horn, supra; Kahn v. McConnell, 37 Okl. 219 , 131 P. 682 , 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Tynes v. Smith, Sheriff, 105 Okl. 100 , 234 P. 637 .

1954It is only when the person pays the debt to protect his own interest, equity will substitute such person to the position of the creditor without an agreement to that effect; otherwise the debt is extinguished ; and he who pays it is a volunteer or intermeddler without an interest to protect.” The following cases support the principle announcement in Bobier v. Horn, supra; Kahn v. McConnell, 37 Okl. 219 , 131 P. 682 , 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Tynes v. Smith, Sheriff, 105 Okl. 100 , 234 P. 637 .

1954It is only when the person pays the debt to protect his own interest, equity will substitute such person to the position of the creditor without an agreement to that effect; otherwise the debt is extinguished ; and he who pays it is a volunteer or intermeddler without an interest to protect.” The following cases support the principle announcement in Bobier v. Horn, supra; Kahn v. McConnell, 37 Okl. 219 , 131 P. 682 , 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Tynes v. Smith, Sheriff, 105 Okl. 100 , 234 P. 637 .

1954The following cases support the rule: City of Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okl. 117 , 299 P. 462 ; C.

1954The following cases support the rule: City of Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okl. 117 , 299 P. 462 ; C.

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1953“A remarriage between the parties themselves ordinarily terminates the jurisdiction of the court with respect to . maintenance .of their children." In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200 , 212 P. 608 , this court held: “Parties to a divorce action may remarry again within six months after the divorce is granted and remarriage may be shown by facts from which a common-law marriage may be presumed. *883 ♦ * * * ’ * ⅜ “After the remarriage of the parties, their relation to- their children and their duty to furnish support for the children • became exactly as they were before the divorce, and upon a sho

1936J. at page 1038, it is stated: “A citizen has a common-law right to make a reasonable use of the streets for the purpose of moving ,a building across or along the same from one location to another.” The following cases support this rule: Edison Electric Light & Power Co. v. Blomquist, 185 Fed. 615 ; State v. Omaha & C.

1926The following cases support the rule: Commonwealth Public Service Co. v. Lindsay (Ark.) 214 S. W. 9 ; Brown v. Edison Elec.

1926Illuminating Co., 90 Md. 400 , 46 L.

1923In re Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 92 ; Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah, 278 , 42 Pac. 1121 ; Delaplaine v. Jones, 8 N. J.

1923In re Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 92 ; Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah, 278 , 42 Pac. 1121 ; Delaplaine v. Jones, 8 N. J.

1916Co., 72 W.

1915The grantor is under no obligation to see to its recording or to examine the terms thereof.” The following cases support the rule in principle as announced by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: Modlin v. Roanoke Railroad & Navigation Co., 145 N. C. 218 , 56 S. E. 1075 ; American Freehold Land Mtg.

1915Co. v. Pace et al., 23 Tex. Civ.

1909Co., 72 Mo. App. 576 .” The following cases support this doctrine: Rockford, etc., *593 Ry.

1909Co. v. Coultas, 67 Ill. 398 ; N. & W.

1907But when -the agent has not the possession of the goods, and no other indicia of authority, and is only authorized to sell, the purchaser pays the agent at his peril, and it devolves upon him to show that the agent was authorized to receive payment.” “An agent selling on credit,has no implied authority to subsequently collect the price, unless the principal has held him out to third persons as having authority to receive payments.” And again on page 1016 of the same book, it is declared: “Independent of a controlling usage to the contrary, a travel *432 ing salesman or agent merely to solicit