PCRA time bar in Pennsylvania

2026To establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2025To establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2025See Jones, 54 A.3d at 16 (explaining that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves an exception to the PCRA time bar); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094 (stating that it is the petitioner’s “burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies”).

2018In order to avoid the PCRA time bar, Appellant must plead and prove one of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1093 .

2026Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 609 , 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1999).

2026Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 609 , 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1999).

2020The appeal for Trial Docket No. 6740-2004 (PIC and persons not to possess) is filed at appellate Docket No. 2695 EDA 2019, and the appeal for Trial Docket No. 6741-2004 (murder) is filed at appellate Docket No. 2696 EDA 2019. -7- J-S48041-20 Furthermore, there is no concise statement filed by Appellant at either trial court docket.12 Appellant raises the following two questions on appeal: [1] Where [Appellant] did not receive notice of his third PCRA petition being dismissed, and where [Appellant] has been continuously incarcerated, has [Appellant] otherwise satisfied the requirements for an e

2018Moreover, as explained supra, since Appellant does not couch his ineffective-assistance-of- -3- J-S16007-18 counsel claim in terms of a newly discovered fact or abandonment, our Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), is inapplicable.1 In Bennett, the High Court addressed whether a PCRA petitioner’s allegation that he recently discovered that PCRA counsel had abandoned him during his appeal from the order denying his timely first PCRA petition permitted him to circumvent the PCRA time bar under § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2022Furthermore, “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide an exception to the PCRA time bar.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 251 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005)).

2020“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Appellant’s claim of . . . counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy an exception to the PCRA time bar.”) (citation omitted).

2026See Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa. 2019) (“It is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2022See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Natividad, - 23 - J-S08024-22 200 A.3d 11, 29 (Pa. 2019) (concluding that although the appellant had satisfied an exception to the PCRA time bar which conferred jurisdiction, no relief was due as the issues were meritless); cf. Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 649 A.2d 139, 141-42, 143 (Pa. Super. 1994) (providing that although counsel’s no-merit letter fell “considerably short” of the requirements to withdraw under Finley, the defendant was not prejudiced due to there being no issues of merit).

2024Lewis alleges that he satisfied the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar. -5- J-S06020-24 To qualify for the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar, a petitioner must establish that “the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

2021Has Appellant satisfied the requirement for an exception to the PCRA time bar, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), [because] the statement contained in the secure docket was unknown to Appellant under Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017)?

2020To the extent Appellant relies on Alleyne as an exception to the PCRA time bar, we note that the new constitutional right exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) has two requirements: (1) “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time provided in this section,” and (2) “the right ‘has been held’ by ‘that court’ to apply retroactively.” Miller, 102 A.3d at 994 (citation omitted and formatting altered).

2018It is well settled that in order to establish an exception to the PCRA time bar under section 9545(b)(1)(iii), the petitioner must establish: (1) “the right ____________________________________________ 5Moreover, Appellant failed to establish that VOI/TIS constitutes a “fact,” see Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986-87 (Pa. 2011) (distinguishing between “law” and “facts” under section 9545(b)(1)(ii)), or that he exercised due diligence in discovering this alleged fact. -8- J-S10044-18 asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the S

2026Generally, “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide an exception to the PCRA time bar.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 251 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa.Super. 2021).

2026Generally, “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide an exception to the PCRA time bar.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 251 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 670 Pa. 17 , 265 A.3d 194 (2021).

2023See Commonwealth v. Gamboa–Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999). -6- J-S10007-23 As the PCRA court properly concluded Garcia’s PCRA petition was untimely and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing the petition.

2016See Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) (indicating that the interference by government officials exception to the PCRA time bar does not include “defense counsel, whether appointed or retained”).

2023See Pro Se Response to Intent to Dismiss First PCRA Amended Petition for PCRA Relief, 6/3/15, at 14- 15 (asserting that studies at that time indicated that adolescence did not end until the age of twenty); Counsel’s Letter to the PCRA Court, 1/4/16, at 8.7 Although Moody references Dr. Bigler’s and Dr. Steinberg’s discussions of more recent studies, those studies constitute new sources of existing facts or scientific principles for the purpose of the PCRA time bar, not new facts or scientific principles.8 Cf. Edmiston, 65 A.3d at 352 ; accord Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 669 (Pa. Supe

2020To qualify as a new fact, “the information may not be part of the public record.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. 2013) ____________________________________________ 4 Throughout his brief, Appellant uses the term “after-discovered facts,” instead of “newly discovered facts” in pleading an exception to the PCRA time- bar.

2018It is well settled that in order to establish an exception to the PCRA time bar under section 9545(b)(1)(iii), the petitioner must establish: (1) “the right ____________________________________________ 5Moreover, Appellant failed to establish that VOI/TIS constitutes a “fact,” see Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986-87 (Pa. 2011) (distinguishing between “law” and “facts” under section 9545(b)(1)(ii)), or that he exercised due diligence in discovering this alleged fact. -8- J-S10044-18 asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the S

2015To “accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time- bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011).

2026Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999). 3 “There are three exceptions to this [one year filing] time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). -4- J-S02033-26 10, 2015, to file a timely PCRA petition unless Appellant could plead and prove an exception to the PCRA time bar. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).Appellant’s petition was filed on January 21, 2025,

2023See Commonwealth v. Gamboa–Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999). -6- J-S10007-23 As the PCRA court properly concluded Garcia’s PCRA petition was untimely and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing the petition.

2020See Hernandez, supra at 651-52 .

2020See Hernandez, supra at 651-52 .

2021We have consistently held that “age is the sole factor in determining whether Miller applies to overcome the PCRA time-bar” and have “declined to extend [Miller’s] categorical holding.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 91-94 (Pa.Super. 2016) (rejecting a nineteen-year-old defendant’s claim that Miller allowed him to overcome the PCRA time bar -6- J-S28014-21 because he was a “technical juvenile” based on neuroscientific theories pertaining to immature brain development).

2020See Riccitello, 2019 WL 2246616 at *3 (discussing Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016), for the proposition that even if the newly recognized constitutional right regarding juvenile life without parole sentence was held to be retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), that right did not apply to individuals over the age of eighteen when they committed their offense and therefore could not be the basis for a PCRA time- bar exception).

2020“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Appellant’s claim of plea counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy an exception to the PCRA time bar.”) (citation omitted).

2020“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Appellant’s claim of . . . counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy an exception to the PCRA time bar.”) (citation omitted).

2024Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (defining the PCRA as “the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting an appellant cannot escape the PCRA time bar by titling their petition as a writ of habeas corpus).

2023Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013). -2- J-S43041-22 that Appellant’s petition was untimely and that Appellant failed to establish an exception to the PCRA time bar.3 On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1.

2025Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 50 (Pa. Super. 2011). -6- J-S14020-25 (1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a court of this Commonwealth may apply by making a written motion to the sentencing court at any time for the performance of forensic DNA testing on specific evidence that is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction. (2) The evidence may have been discovered either prior to or after the applicant’s conviction.

2014“Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Williams, supra. The PCRA “confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time- bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

2019Appellant attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar, relying on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (decided on June 17, 2013), and its Pennsylvania progeny.

2019Appellant attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar, relying on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (decided on June 17, 2013), and its Pennsylvania progeny.

2024Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676 . ____________________________________________ 4 See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing for 30 days after entry of an order of the Superior Court to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal). 5 A timely PCRA petition shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). - 11 - J-A18041-24 To satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must demonstrate that he “did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due

2023The PCRA time bar may “only be overcome by satisfaction of one of the three statutory exceptions codified at Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).” Spotz, 171 A.3d at 678 .

2023See Burton, 936 A.2d at 525 ; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

2017The constitutionality of the PCRA time bar was upheld by this Court in Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521 (Pa.Super. 2007), and our Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdictional effect of the time limitation in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) and Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2019In that petition, Appellant invoked the newly-recognized- retroactive-right exception to the PCRA time bar set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), asserting that he was entitled to relief under the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).3 The PCRA court took no action on the 2016 Petition.

2017Appellant attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar by citing three United States Supreme Court decisions: Alleyne v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (ruling unconstitutional mandatory life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juvenile offenders); and Montgomery v. Louisiana ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (filed January 25, 2016, and revised on January 27, 2016) (holding Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral r

2024Commonwealth v. Cruz, … [ 852 A.2d 287, 293 ] ([Pa.] 2004)[; see also id. at 297 ] (holding that incompetence qualifies under the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time- bar as long as the defendant files [a petition] within one year of regaining competency). [Appellant] alleged a low IQ, not ____________________________________________ 4 This argument was ostensibly raised at the PCRA hearing.

2024Commonwealth v. Cruz, … [ 852 A.2d 287, 293 ] ([Pa.] 2004)[; see also id. at 297 ] (holding that incompetence qualifies under the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time- bar as long as the defendant files [a petition] within one year of regaining competency). [Appellant] alleged a low IQ, not ____________________________________________ 4 This argument was ostensibly raised at the PCRA hearing.

2021“Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time- bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. (footnote omitted).

2019Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643 . ' Appellant's judgment of sentence became final well prior to his recent attempt to obtain post-conviction collateral relief from his conviction and thus, his current PCRA petition is patently untimely.5 Appellant recognized that hispetition was not timely filed and in an effort to overcome the PCRA time bar he, as noted above, claimed that he was incompetent during the time period set by law to file a timely PCRA petition and, thus, his second PCRA petition was timely filed.

2023See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/22/21, at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013), abrogation recognized in Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1 , 3 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc)).

2017The Court noted that the appellants’ “contention that a newly- recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not render their petition timely pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii).” Id. (emphasis in original). -5- J-S62028-17 exception to the PCRA time bar.5 Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing the petition.

2020See Riccitello, 2019 WL 2246616 at *3 (discussing Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016), for the proposition that even if the newly recognized constitutional right regarding juvenile life without parole sentence was held to be retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), that right did not apply to individuals over the age of eighteen when they committed their offense and therefore could not be the basis for a PCRA time- bar exception).

2019In his instant petition, filed pro se on March 25, 2016, Lawson claims the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), renders his petition timely under the “newly-recognized constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar.