applicability of a statutory immunity in California

2024(See Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [“the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity”].) Civil Code section 1714 “standing alone, fails to provide the requisite statutory basis for public entity liability required by Government Code sections 815 and 815.6.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1182 .) It may, however, support liability under Government Code

2017As our Supreme Court held in Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 , "the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity." ( Id. at pp. 201-222, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 .) IV.

2024The key issue is the interpretation and application of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3. ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]’ (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)” (Estate of Ziegler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1363 (Ziegler); see also American Alternative Ins.

2024The key issue is the interpretation and application of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3. ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]’ (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)” (Estate of Ziegler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1363 (Ziegler); see also American Alternative Ins.

2011The trial court refused to apply “the ‘special relationship exception’ to statutory immunity.” (Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 22 , fn. omitted.) Noting that “the immunity cart has been placed before the duty horse,” the Supreme Court observed: “ ‘Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity. . . .’ ” (Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 22 .) Turning to the que

2011The trial court refused to apply “the ‘special relationship exception’ to statutory immunity.” (Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 22 , fn. omitted.) Noting that “the immunity cart has been placed before the duty horse,” the Supreme Court observed: “ ‘Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity. . . .’ ” (Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 22 .) Turning to the que

2016(See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 ) [applying the substantial evidence standard]; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [applying the abuse of discretion standard]; K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard to whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exists; applying abuse of discretion standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply the exception].) However, the “practical differences” among these standards of review are not significant (see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 ), and, o

2016(See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 ) [applying the substantial evidence standard]; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [applying the abuse of discretion standard]; K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard to whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exists; applying abuse of discretion standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply the exception].) However, the “practical differences” among these standards of review are not significant (see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 ), and, o

2025Standard of review We review de novo “the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on purely legal issues such as federal preemption” (Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 377, 383 ) as well as “ ‘[q]uestions of statutory interpretation . . . and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts’ ” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265 (Cal. State Fresno)).

2025Standard of review We review de novo “the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on purely legal issues such as federal preemption” (Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 377, 383 ) as well as “ ‘[q]uestions of statutory interpretation . . . and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts’ ” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265 (Cal. State Fresno)).

2016(See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 ) [applying the substantial evidence standard]; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [applying the abuse of discretion standard]; K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard to whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exists; applying abuse of discretion standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply the exception].) However, the “practical differences” among these standards of review are not significant (see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 ), and, o

2014(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) The “practical differences” among these various standards of revi

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024The key issue is the interpretation and application of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3. ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]’ (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)” (Estate of Ziegler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1363 (Ziegler); see also American Alternative Ins.

2024The key issue is the interpretation and application of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3. ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]’ (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)” (Estate of Ziegler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1363 (Ziegler); see also American Alternative Ins.

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2024Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245 [“The ruling on a motion for summary adjudication presents a question of law, so therefore, our review is de novo”].) “ ‘ “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ (Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 []; see Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198 [].) ‘ “ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in th

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012,

2020If the rule’s language is clear and unambiguous, it governs.” (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 (Alan).) “We give the words of the statute ‘a plain and commonsense meaning’ unless the statute specifically defines the words to give them a special meaning.” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1083 .) We also attempt to give meaning “to every word, phrase, sentence and part of a court rule,” if possible.

2020If the rule’s language is clear and unambiguous, it governs.” (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 (Alan).) “We give the words of the statute ‘a plain and commonsense meaning’ unless the statute specifically defines the words to give them a special meaning.” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1083 .) We also attempt to give meaning “to every word, phrase, sentence and part of a court rule,” if possible.

2020(See People v. Superior Court (Olivo) (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“Where the underlying material facts are not in dispute, we review the trial court’s order denying a peremptory challenge de novo.”]; Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [“Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.”].) “The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation of the California Rules of Court. [Citations.] Our objective is to determine the drafter’s in

2020(See People v. Superior Court (Olivo) (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“Where the underlying material facts are not in dispute, we review the trial court’s order denying a peremptory challenge de novo.”]; Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 [“Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.”].) “The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation of the California Rules of Court. [Citations.] Our objective is to determine the drafter’s in

2016(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) The beneficial parental relationship exception “applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 .) “No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an ‘emotional bond’ with the child, ‘the parents must show that they occupy “a parental role” in the child’s life.’ [Citations.] The relationship that gives rise to this exception to the statutory prefer

2016(See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 ) [applying the substantial evidence standard]; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [applying the abuse of discretion standard]; K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard to whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exists; applying abuse of discretion standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply the exception].) However, the “practical differences” among these standards of review are not significant (see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 ), and, o

2018However, statutory immunities apply where the entity or individual claiming immunity "would otherwise be liable under general principles of law." ( Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 , 985, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ; Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328 , 340, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [" 'Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant ... would be liable in the absence of such immunity.' "].) Plaintiffs' interpretation of section 4740 would render the immunity meaningless beca

2018However, statutory immunities apply where the entity or individual claiming immunity "would otherwise be liable under general principles of law." ( Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 , 985, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ; Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328 , 340, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [" 'Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant ... would be liable in the absence of such immunity.' "].) Plaintiffs' interpretation of section 4740 would render the immunity meaningless beca

2022Section 16061.8 is in part 4 of division 9 of the Probate Code. 20 (c) Standard of Review “The applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.” (Estate of Wilson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1290 .) Similarly, the “interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein.” (Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 254 ; see Key, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 540 .) 3.

2016(In re Marriage of Siegel (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 330 ]; Estate of Wilson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1290 [ 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 ] [“The applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.”].) DISCUSSION Annette asks us to consider equitable ways to divide the parties’ retirement benefits so that John does not receive 150 percent of the parties’ collective retirement (all of the Social Security and half of the LACERA benefits) while Annette receives no Social Security and

2021However, “[s]ince ‘the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff’ ” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785 ), we first consider whether defendants owed a duty to plaintiff to request recall of his sentence and resentencing, as alleged in the first amended complaint. “[I]n California, ‘all government tort liability must be based on statute.’ ” (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 ; see § 815.) “ ‘[S]overeign immunity is the rule in C

2003“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].) However, “To say that someone owes another a duty of care ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which

2018Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452 , 462, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 .) Under this standard, we determine " ' "whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review....' " ( Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498 , 514, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 .) Questions of law are reviewed de novo.

2018(Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) “Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.” (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604 .) C.

2018However, statutory immunities apply where the entity or individual claiming immunity "would otherwise be liable under general principles of law." ( Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 , 985, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ; Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328 , 340, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [" 'Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant ... would be liable in the absence of such immunity.' "].) Plaintiffs' interpretation of section 4740 would render the immunity meaningless beca

2018However, statutory immunities apply where the entity or individual claiming immunity "would otherwise be liable under general principles of law." ( Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 , 985, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ; Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328 , 340, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [" 'Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant ... would be liable in the absence of such immunity.' "].) Plaintiffs' interpretation of section 4740 would render the immunity meaningless beca