Privette doctrine in California

2026It pointed first to the Supreme Court’s holding that the “Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees,’ ” calling this the “Privette presumption.” (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642 , quoting SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600 ; Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269 [“[w]hen a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely,” itali

2026It pointed first to the Supreme Court’s holding that the “Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees,’ ” calling this the “Privette presumption.” (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642 , quoting SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600 ; Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269 [“[w]hen a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely,” itali

2026“A trial court properly 5 grants a motion for summary judgment only if no issues of triable fact appear 4 injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 41 .) This rule, commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, applies to any person or entity in the hiring chain.

2026“A trial court properly 5 grants a motion for summary judgment only if no issues of triable fact appear 4 injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 41 .) This rule, commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, applies to any person or entity in the hiring chain.

2026He further maintains that even if the Privette presumption does apply, there are triable issues as to whether the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine set forth in Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 (Hooker) applies.

2026He further maintains that even if the Privette presumption does apply, there are triable issues as to whether the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine set forth in Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 (Hooker) applies.

2026Commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, the presumption originally stemmed from the following rationales: First, hirers usually have no right to control an independent contractor’s work. [Citation.] Second, contractors can factor in ‘the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price.’ [Citation.] Third, contractors are able to obtain workers’ compensation to cover any on-the-job injuries. [Citation.] Finally, contractors are typically hired for their expertise, which enables them to perform the contracted-for work safely and successfully.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (

2026Commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, the presumption originally stemmed from the following rationales: First, hirers usually have no right to control an independent contractor’s work. [Citation.] Second, contractors can factor in ‘the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price.’ [Citation.] Third, contractors are able to obtain workers’ compensation to cover any on-the-job injuries. [Citation.] Finally, contractors are typically hired for their expertise, which enables them to perform the contracted-for work safely and successfully.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (

2026(Id. at p. 270 & fn. 2; Tverberg I, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528 .) The court has identified only “two limited circumstances” in which the Privette presumption of delegation is overcome.

2026(Id. at p. 270 & fn. 2; Tverberg I, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528 .) The court has identified only “two limited circumstances” in which the Privette presumption of delegation is overcome.

2026It pointed first to the Supreme Court’s holding that the “Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees,’ ” calling this the “Privette presumption.” (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642 , quoting SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600 ; Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269 [“[w]hen a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely,” itali

2026It pointed first to the Supreme Court’s holding that the “Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees,’ ” calling this the “Privette presumption.” (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642 , quoting SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600 ; Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269 [“[w]hen a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely,” itali

2025Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (CBRE, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 646.) “As the moving party, [Crew] had the initial burden of establishing that Johnson . . . either could not prove or that there was a complete defense to each cause of action as alleged in the complaint. (§ 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 853 .) Assuming [Crew] met that burden by asserting that the Privette doctrine immunized [it] against all stated causes of action, the burden then shifted to Johnson to present evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact: in other words, evi

2025Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (CBRE, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 646.) “As the moving party, [Crew] had the initial burden of establishing that Johnson . . . either could not prove or that there was a complete defense to each cause of action as alleged in the complaint. (§ 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 853 .) Assuming [Crew] met that burden by asserting that the Privette doctrine immunized [it] against all stated causes of action, the burden then shifted to Johnson to present evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact: in other words, evi

2025The Privette rule—the notion that a hirer is not liable for on-the-job injuries to an independent contractor’s employee—was initially based on the availability of workers’ compensation to compensate the contractor’s employees for work-related injuries. ( Privette, supra, at 5 Cal.4th at pp. 692, 699.) The Privette court explained that “allow[ing] an independent contractor’s employees who incur work-related injuries compensable under the workers’ compensation system to also seek damages under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the person who hired the contractor would give those employees an 5

2025The Privette rule—the notion that a hirer is not liable for on-the-job injuries to an independent contractor’s employee—was initially based on the availability of workers’ compensation to compensate the contractor’s employees for work-related injuries. ( Privette, supra, at 5 Cal.4th at pp. 692, 699.) The Privette court explained that “allow[ing] an independent contractor’s employees who incur work-related injuries compensable under the workers’ compensation system to also seek damages under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the person who hired the contractor would give those employees an 5

2023Over time, our Supreme Court has “recast [the] primary rationale for the Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’ compensation.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256 , 270 (Sandoval); Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“[o]ur more recent cases emphasize delegation as the key principle underlying this rule”].) Since contractors typically are expected to perform the contracted work more safely than hirers, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a ‘strong policy’ of presuming that a hirer delegates all control over the contracted work, and with it all c

2023Over time, our Supreme Court has “recast [the] primary rationale for the Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’ compensation.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256 , 270 (Sandoval); Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“[o]ur more recent cases emphasize delegation as the key principle underlying this rule”].) Since contractors typically are expected to perform the contracted work more safely than hirers, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a ‘strong policy’ of presuming that a hirer delegates all control over the contracted work, and with it all c

2023Our premise is ordinarily that when the hirer delegates control, the hirer simultaneously delegates all tort duties the hirer might otherwise owe the contract workers.” (Id. at p. 271.) Our Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the Privette doctrine, which “apply where delegation is either ineffective or incomplete.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 271, italics added.) At issue in this case is the exception for incomplete delegation, recognized in Hooker. “[W]hen the hirer does not fully delegate the task of providing a safe working environment, but in some manner actively participates

2023Our premise is ordinarily that when the hirer delegates control, the hirer simultaneously delegates all tort duties the hirer might otherwise owe the contract workers.” (Id. at p. 271.) Our Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the Privette doctrine, which “apply where delegation is either ineffective or incomplete.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 271, italics added.) At issue in this case is the exception for incomplete delegation, recognized in Hooker. “[W]hen the hirer does not fully delegate the task of providing a safe working environment, but in some manner actively participates

2026(See Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1090 (Delgadillo) [even assuming owner failed to equip its commercial building with roof anchors as required by Cal-OSHA regulations, Privette doctrine applied].) Cordero insists that is not the case, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915 (Elsner).

2026(See Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1090 (Delgadillo) [even assuming owner failed to equip its commercial building with roof anchors as required by Cal-OSHA regulations, Privette doctrine applied].) Cordero insists that is not the case, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915 (Elsner).

2023There is no evidence anyone with [the contractor] asked defendant to move the forklift or lower the boom, but defendant did not do so; or that it was impossible or impractical to ask defendant to be sure the forklift was safely positioned to change the tires.” (Ibid.; accord, Brannon v. Lathrop Construction Associates, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1180 [“[The hirer’s] act of allowing the scaffolding to remain in place while the masonry work proceeded was no more an exercise of retained control over safety than 15 was Caltrans’s decision in Hooker to allow construction traffic to access th

2023There is no evidence anyone with [the contractor] asked defendant to move the forklift or lower the boom, but defendant did not do so; or that it was impossible or impractical to ask defendant to be sure the forklift was safely positioned to change the tires.” (Ibid.; accord, Brannon v. Lathrop Construction Associates, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1180 [“[The hirer’s] act of allowing the scaffolding to remain in place while the masonry work proceeded was no more an exercise of retained control over safety than 15 was Caltrans’s decision in Hooker to allow construction traffic to access th

2021(Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265 ; Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1241 (Camargo).) We reasoned that liability for a hirer’s failure to ensure the contractor takes reasonable care is “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative,’ ” and thus impermissible under the Privette doctrine.

2021(Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265 ; Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1241 (Camargo).) We reasoned that liability for a hirer’s failure to ensure the contractor takes reasonable care is “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative,’ ” and thus impermissible under the Privette doctrine.

2022The court had no difficulty, for example, in Ruiz in determining that a “contract administrator”—that was not even in the hiring or contracting chain—came within the Privette doctrine. ( Ruiz, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56, 62; see Zamudio, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 [construction manager came within doctrine].) Because the majority concludes the Privette doctrine does not apply, it does not consider whether the Kinsman exception applies.

2022The court had no difficulty, for example, in Ruiz in determining that a “contract administrator”—that was not even in the hiring or contracting chain—came within the Privette doctrine. ( Ruiz, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56, 62; see Zamudio, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 [construction manager came within doctrine].) Because the majority concludes the Privette doctrine does not apply, it does not consider whether the Kinsman exception applies.

2022(Dis. opn. at p. 14.) But the unfairness the Privette doctrine was originally designed to avoid is “impos[ing] liability on [one entity] for an injury attributable to [another entity], whose liability is limited by workers’ compensation insurance.” (Laico, at p. 668; Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 256 ; see Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 [policy aim is to ensure “the ultimate responsibility for the injury will be borne by the person whose fault caused 20 that injury or, failing that, by the person who benefited from the work”].) Here,

2021(Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265 ; Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1241 (Camargo).) We reasoned that liability for a hirer’s failure to ensure the contractor takes reasonable care is “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative,’ ” and thus impermissible under the Privette doctrine.

2024Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 653, 661 [“both the owner of land and a general contractor who hires an independent contractor may have liability pursuant to the peculiar risk doctrine” under Privette].) Furthermore, “[u]nder the Privette doctrine, there is no legal distinction between a general contractor and a landowner who hires independent contractors; both are ‘hirers’ within the meaning of the doctrine.” (Michael v. Denbeste Transportation, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1097 , bold type added.) The Supreme Court has also used “landowner” in addressing the peculiar risk doctrine “to refer t

2024Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 653, 661 [“both the owner of land and a general contractor who hires an independent contractor may have liability pursuant to the peculiar risk doctrine” under Privette].) Furthermore, “[u]nder the Privette doctrine, there is no legal distinction between a general contractor and a landowner who hires independent contractors; both are ‘hirers’ within the meaning of the doctrine.” (Michael v. Denbeste Transportation, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1097 , bold type added.) The Supreme Court has also used “landowner” in addressing the peculiar risk doctrine “to refer t

2022(Dis. opn. at p. 14.) But the unfairness the Privette doctrine was originally designed to avoid is “impos[ing] liability on [one entity] for an injury attributable to [another entity], whose liability is limited by workers’ compensation insurance.” (Laico, at p. 668; Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 256 ; see Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 [policy aim is to ensure “the ultimate responsibility for the injury will be borne by the person whose fault caused 20 that injury or, failing that, by the person who benefited from the work”].) Here,

2022The court had no difficulty, for example, in Ruiz in determining that a “contract administrator”—that was not even in the hiring or contracting chain—came within the Privette doctrine. ( Ruiz, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56, 62; see Zamudio, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 [construction manager came within doctrine].) Because the majority concludes the Privette doctrine does not apply, it does not consider whether the Kinsman exception applies.

2023Over time, our Supreme Court has “recast [the] primary rationale for the Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’ compensation.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256 , 270 (Sandoval); Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“[o]ur more recent cases emphasize delegation as the key principle underlying this rule”].) Since contractors typically are expected to perform the contracted work more safely than hirers, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a ‘strong policy’ of presuming that a hirer delegates all control over the contracted work, and with it all c

2023Over time, our Supreme Court has “recast [the] primary rationale for the Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’ compensation.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256 , 270 (Sandoval); Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“[o]ur more recent cases emphasize delegation as the key principle underlying this rule”].) Since contractors typically are expected to perform the contracted work more safely than hirers, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a ‘strong policy’ of presuming that a hirer delegates all control over the contracted work, and with it all c

2021Development, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 430 (Lopez), our colleagues in the Second District Court of Appeal reviewed at least five Supreme Court cases discussing the equitable principles underlying the Privette rule of nonliability and concluded that those same principles should apply regardless of whether the hired contractor actually procured workers’ compensation insurance.

2021Development, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 430 (Lopez), our colleagues in the Second District Court of Appeal reviewed at least five Supreme Court cases discussing the equitable principles underlying the Privette rule of nonliability and concluded that those same principles should apply regardless of whether the hired contractor actually procured workers’ compensation insurance.

2017(See, e.g., Gravelin v. Satterfield (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1209 , 1214, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 913 [" Privette bars plaintiff's action absent a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception applies that would permit plaintiff to recover against defendants. [Citation.]"]; Khosh v. Staples (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 712 , 714, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 ["the trial court correctly granted a motion for summary judgment against the injured employee when he failed to present evidence that respondent affirmatively contributed to his injuries"].) The Privette doctrine is "equally applicable in determining the liabili

2017(See, e.g., Gravelin v. Satterfield (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1209 , 1214, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 913 [" Privette bars plaintiff's action absent a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception applies that would permit plaintiff to recover against defendants. [Citation.]"]; Khosh v. Staples (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 712 , 714, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 ["the trial court correctly granted a motion for summary judgment against the injured employee when he failed to present evidence that respondent affirmatively contributed to his injuries"].) The Privette doctrine is "equally applicable in determining the liabili