10 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140, 143-44 (Tex. Crim. 2018Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140 , 143–44 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 4 |
Neill v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See also Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (construing the child-abandonment statute at Texas Penal Code Section 22.041(b), holding that "the fact that 'intentionally’ immediately precedes 'abandons’ means that the prescribed mental state is connected with the act of abandonment itself” rather than element of surrounding circumstances); Neill v. State, 154 Tex.Crim. 549 , 229 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1950) (construing meat-inspection statute, which prescribed mental states as to some elements and not as to others, as not requiring proof of a mental state as to latter elements). . 2013App. 1996) (construing the child-abandonment statute at Texas Penal Code Section 22.041(b), holding that "the fact that 'intentionally' immediately precedes 'abandons' means that the prescribed mental state is connected with the act of aba n donment itself" rather than element of surrounding circumstances); Neill v. State, 229 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Schultz v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See also Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (construing the child-abandonment statute at Texas Penal Code Section 22.041(b), holding that "the fact that 'intentionally’ immediately precedes 'abandons’ means that the prescribed mental state is connected with the act of abandonment itself” rather than element of surrounding circumstances); Neill v. State, 154 Tex.Crim. 549 , 229 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1950) (construing meat-inspection statute, which prescribed mental states as to some elements and not as to others, as not requiring proof of a mental state as to latter elements). . 2013Citing Long , Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental-state requirement, "it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim's age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legisl a tive intent clear." Id. (citing Long , 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). 6. 6 The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commis | 2 | 2 |
Hart v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Id. at 64 ; 3 The other mental-state requirement of “engaging in organized criminal activity” is the mens rea of the underlying felony—here, that appellant, with “intent to harm or defraud,” possessed certain 5 Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d 816, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). 2012Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 63 (Tex.Crim. *654 App.2002). | 1 | 2 |
Hughes v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
Nwosoucha v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Id. at 64 ; 3 The other mental-state requirement of “engaging in organized criminal activity” is the mens rea of the underlying felony—here, that appellant, with “intent to harm or defraud,” possessed certain 5 Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d 816, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Long v. State
green
2 sentences2013Citing Long , Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental-state requirement, "it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim’s age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legislative intent clear.” Id. (citing Long, 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). .The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or 2013Citing Long , Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental-state requirement, "it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim's age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legisl a tive intent clear." Id. (citing Long , 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). 6. 6 The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commis | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Satterwhite v. State
green
2 sentences2013Satterwhite Is Inapposite Appellant contends that, in Satterwhite v. State, this Court held that the offense of holding oneself out as a lawyer required proof of a culpable mental state beyond intent to obtain an economic benefit. 979 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 2013Satterwhite Is Inapposite Appellant contends that, in Satterwhite v. State , this Court held that the offense of holding oneself out as a lawyer required proof of a culpable mental state beyond intent to obtain an economic benefit. 979 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2013Citing Long , Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental-state requirement, "it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim’s age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legislative intent clear.” Id. (citing Long, 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). .The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or 2013Citing Long , Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental-state requirement, "it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim's age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legisl a tive intent clear." Id. (citing Long , 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). 6. 6 The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commis | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Elonis v. United States
green
2 sentences2025The Court further held that the mental-state requirement would be satisfied if the defendant had transmitted the communication “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Id. at 740 , 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . 2025The Court further held that the mental-state requirement would be satisfied if the defendant had transmitted the communication “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Id. at 740 , 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Neill v. State
green
1 sentence2013See also Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (construing the child-abandonment statute at Texas Penal Code Section 22.041(b), holding that "the fact that 'intentionally’ immediately precedes 'abandons’ means that the prescribed mental state is connected with the act of abandonment itself” rather than element of surrounding circumstances); Neill v. State, 154 Tex.Crim. 549 , 229 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1950) (construing meat-inspection statute, which prescribed mental states as to some elements and not as to others, as not requiring proof of a mental state as to latter elements). . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.