ucspa claim in Utah

2012Thus, unlike the UCSPA claim, this cause of action does "depend[ ] upon a determination that the ... orders were illegal," Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2010 UT App 170, ¶ 9 , 237 P.3d 899 (omission in original), cert. granted, 245 P.3d 757 (Utah 2010).

2012Thus, unlike the UCSPA claim, this cause of action does "depend[ ] upon a determination that the ... orders were illegal," Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2010 UT App 170, ¶ 9 , 237 P.3d 899 (omission in original), cert. granted, 245 P.3d 757 (Utah 2010).

2012Hence their UCSPA claim does not "depend[] upon a determination that the [writs] were illegal." See Moss, 2010 UT App 170, 19 , 237 P.3d 899 .

2012Hence their UCSPA claim does not "depend[] upon a determination that the [writs] were illegal." See Moss, 2010 UT App 170, 19 , 237 P.3d 899 .

2024This is particularly true where Doctors did not invite us to resolve LeBaron’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on this alternative basis, leaving her with no opportunity to address the majority’s rationale. ¶19 In reaching this conclusion, I recognize that a reviewing court has the prerogative to affirm a judgment “on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee.” Bai

2024This is particularly true where Doctors did not invite us to resolve LeBaron’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on this alternative basis, leaving her with no opportunity to address the majority’s rationale. ¶19 In reaching this conclusion, I recognize that a reviewing court has the prerogative to affirm a judgment “on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee.” Bai

2024We caution, however, that in order to succeed on their UCSPA claim, the Pace Parties must demonstrate that Link’s representation was “deceptive,” see Utah Code § 13-11-4, a task that will require them to demonstrate that Link exhibited “intentional or knowing behavior,” see Martinez v. Best Buy Co., 2012 UT App 186, ¶ 4 , 283 P.3d 521 (stating that “the plain language of the UCSPA specifically identifies intentional or knowing behavior as an element of a deceptive act or practice”), cert. denied, 293 P.3d 376 (Utah 2012).

2024We caution, however, that in order to succeed on their UCSPA claim, the Pace Parties must demonstrate that Link’s representation was “deceptive,” see Utah Code § 13-11-4, a task that will require them to demonstrate that Link exhibited “intentional or knowing behavior,” see Martinez v. Best Buy Co., 2012 UT App 186, ¶ 4 , 283 P.3d 521 (stating that “the plain language of the UCSPA specifically identifies intentional or knowing behavior as an element of a deceptive act or practice”), cert. denied, 293 P.3d 376 (Utah 2012).

2024And in Meneses, we held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a UCSPA violation when the debt collector’s only asserted unlawful act was “its failure to comply with the UCAA’s registration requirement.” See 2023 UT App 117, ¶ 17 . ¶28 But in Meneses, we suggested that the plaintiffs might have stated a valid cause of action under the UCSPA if the debt collector had “represent[ed] that it was a debt collector operating in full compliance with the laws of Utah.” See id. ¶ 19.

2024And in Meneses, we held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a UCSPA violation when the debt collector’s only asserted unlawful act was “its failure to comply with the UCAA’s registration requirement.” See 2023 UT App 117, ¶ 17 . ¶28 But in Meneses, we suggested that the plaintiffs might have stated a valid cause of action under the UCSPA if the debt collector had “represent[ed] that it was a debt collector operating in full compliance with the laws of Utah.” See id. ¶ 19.

2024And they assert that there is little if any daylight between that representation and the one we referenced in Meneses: that the debt collector is “in full compliance with the laws of Utah.” Id. ¶29 We agree with the Pace Parties that, at this procedural stage, dismissal of their UCSPA claim was premature.

2024Accordingly, we reverse the court’s dismissal of the Pace Parties’ UCSPA claim. 20220841-CA 15 2024 UT App 4 Pace v. Link Debt Recovery B.

2024Because the facts central to LeBaron’s state law claims, including her claim under the UCSPA, are on essentially the same footing as the claims dealt with in our recent opinions in Meneses and Fell, we forgo a detailed discussion of these claims. 20210518-CA 5 2024 UT App 42 LeBaron v. Doctors Doctors’ registration status was “the relevant fact that’s central to [LeBaron’s] claim” and that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim arose when Doctors filed suit in its prior collection case.

2024The majority quotes LeBaron’s opening brief, where she states that because “the UCSPA prohibits the exact same conduct as the FDCPA, and it is intended to marry federal and state consumer rights, a 20210518-CA 11 2024 UT App 42 LeBaron v. Doctors deceptive and unconscionable act for purposes of the FDCPA should similarly create a cause of action under the UCSPA.” See supra ¶ 12. ¶22 Unlike the majority, I do not read this statement as a concession that if the court determines LeBaron’s UCSPA claim fails on its merits, then her FDCPA claim necessarily fails.

2021The Haskell II complaint realleged the UCSPA claims against Wakefield and also included claims for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement against Frawley related to the settlement agreement. ¶9 Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that all four claims had “already been litigated by these parties in Tooele County.” Appellees acknowledged the Haskell I court had dismissed that case without prejudice, but they asserted that the court did so only because Haskell, during the hearing, “argued for the first time that there

2015Similarly, the FDCPA provides that "[oln a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(8) (2012). 121 In denying Legaey's request, the district court concluded that even though it had ruled against Plaintiffs on their UCS-PA and FDCPA claims, the court could not "find based on the record before it that their action was without basis or brought in bad faith or for improper purposes." "When challen

2015Similarly, the FDCPA provides that "[oln a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(8) (2012). 121 In denying Legaey's request, the district court concluded that even though it had ruled against Plaintiffs on their UCS-PA and FDCPA claims, the court could not "find based on the record before it that their action was without basis or brought in bad faith or for improper purposes." "When challen

2014We therefore see no reason that UCSPA claims should not be assignable." Id. 1 85. {12 Likewise, we see no reason that LRFA claims should not be assignable.

2012Civil Conspiracy 12 Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that their complaint *1029 failed to adequately plead a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 113 To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: "'(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (8) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 1253 (quoting Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1290

2012Civil Conspiracy 12 Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that their complaint *1029 failed to adequately plead a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 113 To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: "'(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (8) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 1253 (quoting Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1290

2012(Supp. 2011)))); Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ¶ 36 , 20 P.3d 876 (quoting the language of the UCSPA and observing that it "requires that the supplier knowingly or intentionally deceive the consumer"); State ex rel.

2012(Supp. 2011)))); Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ¶ 36 , 20 P.3d 876 (quoting the language of the UCSPA and observing that it "requires that the supplier knowingly or intentionally deceive the consumer"); State ex rel.

2012Civil Conspiracy 12 Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that their complaint *1029 failed to adequately plead a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 113 To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: "'(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (8) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 1253 (quoting Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1290

2012Civil Conspiracy 12 Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that their complaint *1029 failed to adequately plead a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 113 To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: "'(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (8) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 1253 (quoting Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1290