10 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1989–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Grimsteadgreen2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067 , 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). 2018Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067 , 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Billips v. Com.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., Billips, 274 Va. at 808-09 , 652 S.E.2d at 101 (“[T]he Spencer rule applies to the use of scientific evidence in judicial proceedings generally.”); Pope v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 486, 515-16 , 729 S.E.2d 751, 765-66 (2012) (affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude scientific evidence under Spencer). 2015See, e.g., Billips, 274 Va. at 808-09 , 652 S.E.2d at 101 (“[T]he Spencer rule applies to the use of scientific evidence in judicial proceedings generally.”); Pope v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 486, 515-16 , 729 S.E.2d 751, 765-66 (2012) (affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude scientific evidence under Spencer). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Pope, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Billips, 274 Va. at 808-09 , 652 S.E.2d at 101 (“[T]he Spencer rule applies to the use of scientific evidence in judicial proceedings generally.”); Pope v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 486, 515-16 , 729 S.E.2d 751, 765-66 (2012) (affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude scientific evidence under Spencer). 2015See, e.g., Billips, 274 Va. at 808-09 , 652 S.E.2d at 101 (“[T]he Spencer rule applies to the use of scientific evidence in judicial proceedings generally.”); Pope v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 486, 515-16 , 729 S.E.2d 751, 765-66 (2012) (affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude scientific evidence under Spencer). | 1 | 1 |
Clagett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011Because Spencer failed to proffer the questions he wanted to ask Dr. Roberts and the answers Dr. Roberts would have made, we are unable to review Spencer's claim."); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 95 , 472 S.E.2d 263, 272 (1996) ("The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to Clagett's attempt to cross-examine the lead investigator concerning Holsinger's remorse for her part in the crime. 2011Because Spencer failed to proffer the questions he wanted to ask Dr. Roberts and the answers Dr. Roberts would have made, we are unable to review Spencer's claim."); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 95 , 472 S.E.2d 263, 272 (1996) ("The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to Clagett's attempt to cross-examine the lead investigator concerning Holsinger's remorse for her part in the crime. | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 400-01 , 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989) (holding that a defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal after a trial court granted the very relief sought by the defendant); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 , 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988) (“No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobate—to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.”). 2007See Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 400-01 , 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989) (holding that a defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal after a trial court granted the very relief sought by the defendant); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 , 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988) (“No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobate—to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.”). | 1 | 1 |
Buchanan v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 400-01 , 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989) (holding that a defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal after a trial court granted the very relief sought by the defendant); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 , 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988) (“No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobate—to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.”). 2007See Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 400-01 , 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989) (holding that a defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal after a trial court granted the very relief sought by the defendant); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 , 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988) (“No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobate—to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.”). | 1 | 1 |
Venable v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007Moreover, the record plainly reveals that when offered the choice between incarceration or a shorter jail sentence with probation while on medication, Spencer not only agreed, but also assured the court, that he would “take the medication if it means” he could “get [his] life back together and get it on track.” Therefore, “this probation condition was imposed with [Spencer’s] full and voluntary consent.” Venable v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 380, 391 , 632 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2006). -5- Therefore, Spencer’s claim on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing sentence is barred. 2007Moreover, the record plainly reveals that when offered the choice between incarceration or a shorter jail sentence with probation while on medication, Spencer not only agreed, but also assured the court, that he would “take the medication if it means” he could “get [his] life back together and get it on track.” Therefore, “this probation condition was imposed with [Spencer’s] full and voluntary consent.” Venable v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 380, 391 , 632 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2006). -5- Therefore, Spencer’s claim on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing sentence is barred. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 535607green1 sentence1998The Fourth Circuit considered Ms. Spencer’s claim no different from that presented in Dowdy . “[Plaintiffs] claim is reduced to one based on [employer’s] negligence in failing to prevent [employee] from intentionally harassing her by making unwanted sexual solicitations and by engaging in sexual horseplay.” Spencer, 894 F.2d at 657. | 1 | 1 |
McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc.green1 sentence1989Judge Ellis in McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc. noted, however, that although "the court agrees with Judge Spencer that the recognition of any exception must only be undertaken in light of the policies and purposes of the WCA . . . the Court . . . disagrees with the remainder of Judge Spencer’s analysis." McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
MacKall v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1989See *306 Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 256-57 , 372 S.E.2d 759, 769 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. __ , 109 S.Ct. 3261 (1989). 6 Ill JURY MATTERS A Voir Dire During the voir dire of prospective juror Patricia Jackson, Spencer’s counsel asked Jackson the following question in an attempt to show bias: “If an individual who is a scientist, an expert gets on the stand and tells you a fact, would you accept that as fact simply because he is a scientist?” The trial court ruled the question improper on the ground that Spencer was “asking the juror to pass on testimony before the whole evidenc 1989See *306 Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 256-57 , 372 S.E.2d 759, 769 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. __ , 109 S.Ct. 3261 (1989). 6 Ill JURY MATTERS A Voir Dire During the voir dire of prospective juror Patricia Jackson, Spencer’s counsel asked Jackson the following question in an attempt to show bias: “If an individual who is a scientist, an expert gets on the stand and tells you a fact, would you accept that as fact simply because he is a scientist?” The trial court ruled the question improper on the ground that Spencer was “asking the juror to pass on testimony before the whole evidenc | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 10013
green
1 sentence2018Because neither this inference, nor the circuit court’s consequent finding that the evidence did not support the conclusion that there was implied consent to remove the cap, was plainly wrong, I would affirm the circuit court’s judgment granting Spencer’s motion to suppress.13 13 I further disagree that United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1996), is applicable to the instant case. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Turner v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2008Turner, 259 Va. at 652 . 2008Turner, 259 Va. at 652 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Billips v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2007The Court of Appeals held the Spencer rule inapplicable here because a "relaxed standard of admissibility [applies] at sentencing hearings" and concluded that, at the sentencing stage, all that is required is that the proffered evidence bear "some indicia of reliability." Billips, 48 Va.App. at 300 , 305 , 630 S.E.2d at 351 , 354 . 2007The Court of Appeals held the Spencer rule inapplicable here because a "relaxed standard of admissibility [applies] at sentencing hearings" and concluded that, at the sentencing stage, all that is required is that the proffered evidence bear "some indicia of reliability." Billips, 48 Va.App. at 300 , 305 , 630 S.E.2d at 351 , 354 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Guill v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court concluded "[b]ased on the above factual differences, evidence of the 1985 crime was inadmissible under a Spencer analysis because that offense was not idiosyncratic in relation to the facts of the present offense." Id. 1998The Supreme Court concluded "[b]ased on the above factual differences, evidence of the 1985 crime was inadmissible under a Spencer analysis because that offense was not idiosyncratic in relation to the facts of the present offense." Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
O'Dell v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Mackall, 236 Va. at 256-57, 372 S.E.2d at 769 ; O'Dell, 234 Va. at 697-98, 364 S.E.2d at 505-06 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Spencer v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1989Also defaulted for the same reason is Spencer’s claim on appeal that the death penalty statute is “vague” because it “does not specify which party bears the burden of proof on the question of mitigation, and does not specify the standard of proof for carrying that burden.” 3 Because of our holding on this issue, we need not address Spencer’s other contentions relating to his alleged right to act as co-counsel. 4 For an explanation of how a larger data base increases the statistical likelihood of finding matching DNA patterns in a given population, see Spencer I, 238 Va. at 288 n.8, 384 S.E.2d 1989Also defaulted for the same reason is Spencer’s claim on appeal that the death penalty statute is “vague” because it “does not specify which party bears the burden of proof on the question of mitigation, and does not specify the standard of proof for carrying that burden.” 3 Because of our holding on this issue, we need not address Spencer’s other contentions relating to his alleged right to act as co-counsel. 4 For an explanation of how a larger data base increases the statistical likelihood of finding matching DNA patterns in a given population, see Spencer I, 238 Va. at 288 n.8, 384 S.E.2d | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stamper v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1989He argues, however, that “the introduction of the graphic videotape, coupled with the still photographs, was inflammatory to the point of tending to induce a guilty verdict regardless of any other evidence.” The photographic evidence in the present case, as in Stamper , “portrayed a scene of otherwise indescribable violence.” 220 Va. at 271 , 257 S.E.2d at 816 . 1989He argues, however, that “the introduction of the graphic videotape, coupled with the still photographs, was inflammatory to the point of tending to induce a guilty verdict regardless of any other evidence.” The photographic evidence in the present case, as in Stamper , “portrayed a scene of otherwise indescribable violence.” 220 Va. at 271 , 257 S.E.2d at 816 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.