molestation claim in California

2026(Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394 .) This includes that: “[T]he jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.

2025The former may be appropriate in some circumstances; the latter . . . clearly is not.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 393 .) To balance these competing concerns, the Bowker court noted that “several limitations must be observed.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 393 .) First, “the evidence must be tailored to the purpose for which it is being received.” (Ibid.) Second, “the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.

2026The former may be appropriate in some circumstances; the latter . . . clearly is not.” (Ibid., italics added.) “The evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested.” (Id. at p. 394.) When the prosecution presents CSAAS testimony at trial, the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction stating that “(1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) th

2026Specifically, Cortez argues that the instruction allowed the jury to consider the CSAAS evidence to evaluate witness credibility and to determine Cortez’s guilt, without specifying that “the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley).) Cortez also argues that CALCRIM No. 1193 erroneously instructed that the jury could find that the witnesses’ behavior was consistent with the behavior of an abuse victim rather than “not inconsistent with having been molested[.]

2022(Compare People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS”] with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074 (Mateo) [disagreeing with Housley and holding a limiting instruction “need only be given if requested”]; see also 30 People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [“if requested the jury must be admonished ‘that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation c

2022(Compare People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS”] with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074 (Mateo) [disagreeing with Housley and holding a limiting instruction “need only be given if requested”]; see also People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [“if requested the jury must be admonished ‘that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation clai

2026The prosecutor averred that the evidence would “not be offered to prove that a sexual assault occurred” and asked that the jury be admonished with “[]CALCRIM 1193/CALJIC 10.64[]” to “prevent the jury from considering the testimony for any improper purpose.” Pacheco’s counsel did not cite a specific jury instruction but asked that the jury be instructed that “the [CSAAS] testimony is introduced to dispel a myth the jury must not use that evidence to predict a molest has been committed.” (Sic.) Defense counsel also quoted People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721 , 735 where the court stated t

2022(Compare People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS”] with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074 (Mateo) [disagreeing with Housley and holding a limiting instruction “need only be given if requested”]; see also People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [“if requested the jury must be admonished ‘that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation clai

2022(Compare People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS”] with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074 (Mateo) [disagreeing with Housley and holding a limiting instruction “need only be given if requested”]; see also 30 People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [“if requested the jury must be admonished ‘that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation c

2022(Compare People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS”] with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074 (Mateo) [disagreeing with Housley and holding a limiting instruction “need only be given if requested”]; see also People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [“if requested the jury must be admonished ‘that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation clai

2025“CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171.) To keep CSAAS testimony tied to evaluating a witness’s credibility, the 9 As an initial matter, we conclude Defense counsel’s objections in court both in her trial briefs, and orally, were sufficient to preserve these arguments for review. 13 prosecution must “identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed to rebut”; the testimony “must be targeted to [the] specific ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ suggested by the evi

2021(Bowker, at pp. 393‒394; see, e.g., People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737 , 1744‒1745.) Further, a limiting instruction that CSAAS evidence is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true can help reduce the risk that a jury misuses CSAAS evidence.

2025Defendant contends the court prejudicially erred by so instructing the jury because CALCRIM No. 1193 does not comply with People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 , which he says requires that the jury be instructed that (1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.8 According to defendant, the instruction violated Housley because it told jur

2025The trial court instructed the jurors that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about CSAAS was “offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse” and “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him.” In the same vein, Dr. Carmichael testified that there is no “checklist” for 4 The Court of Appeal in Housley concluded that a jury must be instructed that CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and [] the exper

2024(Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 956 [explaining that although the CSAAS evidence could not be used to prove the molestation occurred, such evidence was properly admitted “to rehabilitate [the victim’s] credibility and to explain the pressures that sometimes cause molestation victims to falsely recant their claims of abuse”]; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 [explaining that although CSAAS evidence may not be “used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true,” it may be used “to rebut defense attacks on the [victim’s] credibility”].) Most significantly, our 8

2022Instructional Issue Expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is admissible if (1) the testimony is “tailored to address the specific myth[s] or misconception[s] suggested by the evidence” in terms of how children react to sexual abuse, and (2) the jury is instructed that “the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391-394 ; People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188 ; People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 ; People v. Humphrey (1996) 13

2016Any doubt as to the intent of the Bowker court has been eliminated, because the same court that decided Bowker held in three subsequent cases that the limiting instruction must be given “if requested.” (Stark, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 116 ; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 ] (Sanchez), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Bothuel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 581, 587 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bothuel), disapproved on another point in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 347-348 [

2014Accordingly, in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS we hold the jury must sua sponte be instructed that (1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (Id. at pp. 958-959.) People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 , 394 is to the same effect. 3 People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 , People v. Sanchez (1

2025Defendant contends the court prejudicially erred by so instructing the jury because CALCRIM No. 1193 does not comply with People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 , which he says requires that the jury be instructed that (1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.8 According to defendant, the instruction violated Housley because it told jur

2025Accordingly, in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS we hold the jury must sua sponte be instructed that (1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (Id. at pp. 958–959.) Thereafter, in Mateo, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Housley, explaining, “[T]he holding in Housley, [is] at odds with our Supreme Court’s

2025Relying on People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 , the court in People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 , explained that testimony concerning the common 16 psychological effects of child abuse cannot be used as a predictor of child abuse, but it may “be used to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions concerning abuse victims. [Citation.] First, the CSAAS evidence must be addressed to a specific ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ suggested by the evidence. [Citation.] Second, ‘if requested the jury must be admonished “that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine

2023As established by our Supreme Court, testimony of this nature is permissible for the limited purpose of disabusing the jury of misconceptions and cannot be used to demonstrate the abuse happened. ( Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 247–248.) To ensure the jury uses the testimony only for permissible reasons, “the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not 19 intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394 .) Without the contextualization offered in the “consistency” phrase,

2022According to defendant, “where the only evidence of the misconduct is the complaining witness’s own testimony, the believability of the complaining witness and the truth of the claim are effectively one and the same.” From this, he concludes the instruction violates the prohibition against using expert testimony “to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 .) “Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the er

2021Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the limited use of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, we find that any error was harmless under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2016Any doubt as to the intent of the Bowker court has been eliminated, because the same court that decided Bowker held in three subsequent cases that the limiting instruction must be given “if requested.” (Stark, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 116 ; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 ] (Sanchez), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Bothuel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 581, 587 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bothuel), disapproved on another point in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 347-348 [

2016Any doubt as to the intent of the Bowker court has been eliminated, because the same court that decided Bowker held in three subsequent cases that the limiting instruction must be given “if requested.” (Stark, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 116 ; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 ] (Sanchez), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Bothuel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 581, 587 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bothuel), disapproved on another point in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 347-348 [

2023(See People v. Day (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 405, 416 ; People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1088–1089.) The testimony is permissible only to confront “misconceptions regarding the behavior of abuse victims, and may not be used to corroborate the victim’s claims of abuse.” (People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 (Housley), citing Bowker, at p. 394.) Some courts have taken this further and require the court to instruct the jury that “(1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with havi