9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Golden State TD Investments, LLC v. Andrews Kurth LLP (In re California TD Investments, LLC)green2 sentences2025C.D.Cal. 2013) 489 B.R. 124, 132 (Golden State).) Thus, if the corporation had “at least one innocent decision- maker who could have stopped the wrongdoing if he or she had known of it,” the agent engaging in malfeasance is not the corporation’s sole decision maker and the sole actor doctrine will not apply. ( Bash, supra, 834 F.3d at pp. 677-679; Golden State, at p. 132; Smith v. Andersen L.L.P. 2025C.D.Cal. 2013) 489 B.R. 124, 132 (Golden State).) Thus, if the corporation had “at least one innocent decision- maker who could have stopped the wrongdoing if he or she had known of it,” the agent engaging in malfeasance is not the corporation’s sole decision maker and the sole actor doctrine will not apply. ( Bash, supra, 834 F.3d at pp. 677-679; Golden State, at p. 132; Smith v. Andersen L.L.P. | 2 | 3 |
Brian Bash v. Textron Financial Corporationgreen2 sentences2025Co.) (6th Cir. 2016) 834 F.3d 651, 676-677 (Bash).) 10 With respect to control, the sole actor doctrine applies where the agent has sole decision-making authority. 2025Co.) (6th Cir. 2016) 834 F.3d 651, 676-677 (Bash).) 10 With respect to control, the sole actor doctrine applies where the agent has sole decision-making authority. | 2 | 2 |
Coso Energy Developers v. County of Inyogreen2 sentences2024And, nowhere in the statute did the Legislature expressly identify the individuals to whom it granted the right to seek redress by civil action, and thereby exclude all others not mentioned. 19 The Cohens’ interpretation of the statute is supported by principles of interpretation governing clauses “written in the ‘passive voice.’”(Coso Energy Developers v. County of Inyo (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1524 (Coso).) Specifically, where, as here, the drafter of a sentence identifies the actor in the first clause, but uses the passive voice in the next clause, and therefore does not identify the ac 2024And, nowhere in the statute did the Legislature expressly identify the individuals to whom it granted the right to seek redress by civil action, and thereby exclude all others not mentioned. 19 The Cohens’ interpretation of the statute is supported by principles of interpretation governing clauses “written in the ‘passive voice.’”(Coso Energy Developers v. County of Inyo (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1524 (Coso).) Specifically, where, as here, the drafter of a sentence identifies the actor in the first clause, but uses the passive voice in the next clause, and therefore does not identify the ac | 2 | 2 |
Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences2016Civil Code section 2306 provides: “An agent can never have authority, either actual or ostensible, to do an act which is, and is known or suspected by the person with whom he deals, to be a fraud upon the principal.” The statute has been construed to mean “where an officer of a corporation is openly using the corporation to obtain a benefit for himself and his cohorts in a transaction, in which the corporation will ultimately not benefit, the other parties to the transaction cannot later seek to hold the corporation liable for his actions.” (Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist Church (2001) 90 Cal 2016Civil Code section 2306 provides: “An agent can never have authority, either actual or ostensible, to do an act which is, and is known or suspected by the person with whom he deals, to be a fraud upon the principal.” The statute has been construed to mean “where an officer of a corporation is openly using the corporation to obtain a benefit for himself and his cohorts in a transaction, in which the corporation will ultimately not benefit, the other parties to the transaction cannot later seek to hold the corporation liable for his actions.” (Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist Church (2001) 90 Cal | 2 | 2 |
Grassmueck v. The American Shorthorn Associationgreen2 sentences2016The sole actor exception applies when there is effectively no distinction between agent and principal: “the ‘sole actor doctrine,’ treats principal and agent as one.” (Rest.3d Agency, § 5.04, com. d, p. 399.) As explained by a federal court, “The sole actor doctrine provides that ‘where the principal and agent are one and the same,’ the agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal despite the fact that the agent is acting adversely to the principal. [Citation.] Where the principal and agent are alter egos, there is no reason to apply an adverse interest exception to the normal rules imputing 2016The sole actor exception applies when there is effectively no distinction between agent and principal: “the ‘sole actor doctrine,’ treats principal and agent as one.” (Rest.3d Agency, § 5.04, com. d, p. 399.) As explained by a federal court, “The sole actor doctrine provides that ‘where the principal and agent are one and the same,’ the agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal despite the fact that the agent is acting adversely to the principal. [Citation.] Where the principal and agent are alter egos, there is no reason to apply an adverse interest exception to the normal rules imputing | 1 | 1 |
Kurokawa v. Blumgreen1 sentence1995Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); see Kurokawa v. Blum, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 989 ; Scherer v. Mark, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 843 .) II Plaintiff further contends summary judgment erroneously was granted, in that a negligent act which causes physical injury is not a broadcast or publication entitling the actor to immunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Shapiro
green
2 sentences2016LEXIS 60481 (Cobalt), reconsideration granted on another point in Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Shapiro (S.D.N.Y 2012) 857 F.Supp.2d 419 .) Cobalt held where “a corporation has owners or managers who were innocent of the fraud and could have stopped the fraud if they had been aware of the it, the sole actor rule does not apply.” (Id. at p. *7.) In that case, “the corporation is the principal, with 300 allegedly innocent shareholders, and the agents are the allegedly fraudulent managers.” (Id. at p. *9.) The corporation’s “managers did not have complete control over the corporation, be 2016LEXIS 60481 (Cobalt), reconsideration granted on another point in Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Shapiro (S.D.N.Y 2012) 857 F.Supp.2d 419 .) Cobalt held where “a corporation has owners or managers who were innocent of the fraud and could have stopped the fraud if they had been aware of the it, the sole actor rule does not apply.” (Id. at p. *7.) In that case, “the corporation is the principal, with 300 allegedly innocent shareholders, and the agents are the allegedly fraudulent managers.” (Id. at p. *9.) The corporation’s “managers did not have complete control over the corporation, be | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mary Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Company
green
1 sentence2009We described the concept in Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 ]: “ ‘[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’ ” (Id. at p. 809, *273 quoting Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co. (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 267, 270-271 .) 13 The rationale underlying the inference, we said, is that “ ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to hi | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Warren A. PROUD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P.W. STONE, Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee
green
1 sentence2009We described the concept in Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 ]: “ ‘[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’ ” (Id. at p. 809, *273 quoting Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co. (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 267, 270-271 .) 13 The rationale underlying the inference, we said, is that “ ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to hi | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009We described the concept in Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 ]: “ ‘[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’ ” (Id. at p. 809, *273 quoting Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co. (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 267, 270-271 .) 13 The rationale underlying the inference, we said, is that “ ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to hi 2009We described the concept in Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 ]: “ ‘[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’ ” (Id. at p. 809, *273 quoting Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co. (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 267, 270-271 .) 13 The rationale underlying the inference, we said, is that “ ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to hi | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Scherer v. Mark
green
1 sentence1995Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); see Kurokawa v. Blum, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 989 ; Scherer v. Mark, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 843 .) II Plaintiff further contends summary judgment erroneously was granted, in that a negligent act which causes physical injury is not a broadcast or publication entitling the actor to immunity. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brooks v. Sessagesimo
neutral
2 sentences1974The actor is relieved from liability only if the intruder is, in fact, one whose intrusion involves danger of life and limb of the occupants of the dwelling place or is for the purpose of committing certain serious crimes, as to which see §§ 142(2) and 143(2) . . . .” Section 142, subdivision (2) concerns a riot “which threatens death or serious bodily harm.” As hereinafter appears, section 143, subdivision (2), contains a broader rule with respect to the type crim.e for the prevention of which deadly force is privileged than the rule followed herein. 4 Nakashima cited Brooks v. Sessagesimo, 1 1974The actor is relieved from liability only if the intruder is, in fact, one whose intrusion involves danger of life and limb of the occupants of the dwelling place or is for the purpose of committing certain serious crimes, as to which see §§ 142(2) and 143(2) . . . .” Section 142, subdivision (2) concerns a riot “which threatens death or serious bodily harm.” As hereinafter appears, section 143, subdivision (2), contains a broader rule with respect to the type crim.e for the prevention of which deadly force is privileged than the rule followed herein. 4 Nakashima cited Brooks v. Sessagesimo, 1 | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.