defendant relies rule in California

9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Russellgreen calctapp · 2006 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2020 2 sentences 2020In contrast, the Sixth Appellate District had found in People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 , that “[i]f the defendant relies on a claim-of-right defense or if there is substantial evidence that supports the defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the defense.” Since defendant filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court has resolved the split, indicating that it agrees “with the Court of Appeal in Hussain . . . . 2016(Compare People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 [“If the defendant relies on a claim-of-right defense or if there is substantial evidence that supports the defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the defense.”] with People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 269 [“Since the claim of right defense, like accident or mistake of fact, serves only to negate the mental state required for grand theft, . . . the trial court had no duty to instruct sua sponte on it.”].) We need not weigh in on the i	2	3
People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.green cal · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021As we will explain, we agree with the defendant that Assembly Bill No. 1950’s two-year felony probation limitation applies retroactively. 1 The Estrada Presumption By default, criminal statutes are presumed to apply prospectively only. (§ 3 [“No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”]; see People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307 (Lara).) “However, this presumption is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either expl	1	1
People v. Frahsgreen cal · 2020 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021As we will explain, we agree with the defendant that Assembly Bill No. 1950’s two-year felony probation limitation applies retroactively. 1 The Estrada Presumption By default, criminal statutes are presumed to apply prospectively only. (§ 3 [“No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”]; see People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307 (Lara).) “However, this presumption is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either expl	1	1
People v. Salasgreen cal · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016(See People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 [noting “[w]e have not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the failure to instruct on an affirmative defense” and assuming, without deciding, “the more rigorous Chapman test applies”].) To succeed on a claim-of-right defense, the jury would have to believe not only that appellant held a good faith belief that Hart and Wilson consented to give him their property, but also that he held a good faith belief that he could effect the transfer of property without going through Hart’s and Wilson’s conservators.	1	1
People v. Hussaingreen calctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016(Compare People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 [“If the defendant relies on a claim-of-right defense or if there is substantial evidence that supports the defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the defense.”] with People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 269 [“Since the claim of right defense, like accident or mistake of fact, serves only to negate the mental state required for grand theft, . . . the trial court had no duty to instruct sua sponte on it.”].) We need not weigh in on the i	1	1
People v. Creathgreen calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006(People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 319 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 ], citing People v. Stewart, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 138 ; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) Defendant attempted to negate the knowledge element by arguing he did not know the property was stolen because he believed it was abandoned. 2006(People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 319 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 ], citing People v. Stewart, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 138 ; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) Defendant attempted to negate the knowledge element by arguing he did not know the property was stolen because he believed it was abandoned.	1	1
People v. Brevermangreen cal · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006(People v. Lucero, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018 & fn. 4; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) D. 2006(People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 319 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 ], citing People v. Stewart, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 138 ; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) Defendant attempted to negate the knowledge element by arguing he did not know the property was stolen because he believed it was abandoned.	1	1
People v. Rosenkrantzgreen calctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989(People v. Rosenkrantz (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1201 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 403 ].) For example, where a defendant relies on a defense of alibi or nonparticipation, accomplice instructions regarding defense witnesses may have the potential of being highly prejudicial to a defendant’s case. 1989(People v. Rosenkrantz (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1201 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 403 ].) For example, where a defendant relies on a defense of alibi or nonparticipation, accomplice instructions regarding defense witnesses may have the potential of being highly prejudicial to a defendant’s case.	1	1
Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co.green cal · 1910 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1935–1935 2 sentences 1935The plaintiffs contend for the rule stated in Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 272 [ 107 Pac. 115 , 27 L. 1935The plaintiffs contend for the rule stated in Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 272 [ 107 Pac. 115 , 27 L.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
In Re Estrada green cal · 1965 2 sentences 2021In support of this argument, the defendant relies on the presumption of retroactivity articulated in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 . 2021In support of this argument, the defendant relies on the presumption of retroactivity articulated in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 .	1	2021–2021
People v. Covarrubias green cal · 2016 1 sentence 2020Accordingly, here, because the asserted claim of right served only to negate the intent to steal element of the robbery charges and the trial court otherwise properly instructed the jury on this element, it was not required to instruct on the defense in the absence of a request by trial counsel.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874 .) In so doing, the Court “disapprove[d] Russell to the extent it is inconsistent with [its] decision.” (Id. at p. 874, fn. 14.) The trial court was not obligated to provide a sua sponte claim of right jury instruction. 18 IV The Use of Dr. Kelly’s Eval	1	2020–2020
People v. Stewart green cal · 1976 1 sentence 2006(People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 319 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 ], citing People v. Stewart, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 138 ; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) Defendant attempted to negate the knowledge element by arguing he did not know the property was stolen because he believed it was abandoned.	1	2006–2006
People v. Lucero green calctapp · 1988 1 sentence 2006(People v. Lucero, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018 & fn. 4; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) D.	1	2006–2006
People v. Flanders green calctapp · 1979 1 sentence 1989(See People v. Flanders, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 634, 638-640 .) Because Provencio denied participation in the burglaries, and Doldo testified in his behalf consistent with that defense, the use of the general accomplice instructions here could have easily raised a reasonable inference in the minds of the jury that all of Doldo’s testimony was suspect.	1	1989–1989
Buitrago v. Municipal Assembly of Guayama neutral prsupreme · 1923 1 sentence 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
Sparks v. Mendoza green calctapp · 1948 2 sentences 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice. 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
London v. McConkey green calctapp · 1939 2 sentences 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice. 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
Hatch v. Penzner green calctapp · 1941 2 sentences 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice. 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
Soberanes v. Soberanes green cal · 1893 1 sentence 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
Campbell v. Genshlea green cal · 1919 1 sentence 1953(Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal.App.2d 511 [ 189 P.2d 43 ] ; Hatch v. Penzner, 44 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 113 P.2d 295 ]; Estate of McConkey, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 92 P.2d 456 ]; Campbell v. Genshlea, 180 Cal. 213 [180 P. 336]; Soberanes v. Soberanos, 97 Cal. 140 [ 31 P. 910 ].) It is argued that the court found that a confidential relation existed here; that there was no consideration for these transfers ; and that there are neither findings nor evidence to show that these transfers were fair to the defendant, that she had a full understanding of them, or that she had received independent advice.	1	1953–1953
Doll v. Meador green · 1860 1 sentence 1941It may be said that since the decision in Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal. 295 , this court has recognized as a general proposition that title to property may not be attacked by persons showing no color of title in themselves, and that want of validity may not be set up by strangers and intruders, that is, persons who were neither in possession of the property nor connected in any way with the paramount source of title.	1	1941–1941
Brown v. Chase green wash · 1923 2 sentences 1935On the question of the burden of proof the defendant relies on the rule stated in Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542 [ 217 Pac. 23, 27 ], where it is stated: “That where the supply of water in the stream is more than ample for all possible riparian uses, the presumption is that the diversion by a nonriparian user will not injure any riparian right, and the burden is upon the riparian owner who claims that his riparian rights are being injured by the diversion of such water to prove substantial injury.”. 1935On the question of the burden of proof the defendant relies on the rule stated in Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542 [ 217 Pac. 23, 27 ], where it is stated: “That where the supply of water in the stream is more than ample for all possible riparian uses, the presumption is that the diversion by a nonriparian user will not injure any riparian right, and the burden is upon the riparian owner who claims that his riparian rights are being injured by the diversion of such water to prove substantial injury.”.	1	1935–1935

Where else courts name it

CT 10 (1951–2014) CA 9 (1935–2021) MA 9 (1906–2024) KS 9 (1929–2026) GA 5 (1940–1989) AL 5 (1922–1964) MO 4 (1958–2004) MI 4 (1931–2014) PA 3 (1901–1992) IL 3 (1971–2025) VA 3 (1989–2024) NC 3 (1988–2019) NY 2 (1922–1990) AR 2 (2002–2011) TN 2 (1986–2011) AK 2 (2003–2019) NM 2 (2015–2019) OK 2 (1929–1953)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check