9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MacDonald v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2022(See also MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 159 [“so long as a sworn report is filed, it is consistent with the relaxed evidentiary standards” of a DMV administrative hearing that “an unsworn report filed by the arresting officer” can be considered]; People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 540-541 [rejecting contention the trial court “erred in failing to strike the hearsay testimony of [d]etectives . . . because they merely repeated information relayed to them by other officers” in light of the “evidentiary rule drawn from People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 and People 2011(MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 155, 159 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 81 P.3d 975 ].) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, and we presume that the person conducting the hearing has the education, experience, knowledge, and abilities required by State Personnel Board specifications to be a DMV hearing officer. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2022(See also MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 159 [“so long as a sworn report is filed, it is consistent with the relaxed evidentiary standards” of a DMV administrative hearing that “an unsworn report filed by the arresting officer” can be considered]; People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 540-541 [rejecting contention the trial court “erred in failing to strike the hearsay testimony of [d]etectives . . . because they merely repeated information relayed to them by other officers” in light of the “evidentiary rule drawn from People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 and People | 1 | 1 |
City of Santa Monica v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. 2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Slaytongreen2 sentences2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. 2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. | 1 | 1 |
Solovij v. Gourleygreen2 sentences2002(Solovij v. Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 ].) The trial court then determines, based on its independent judgment, whether the DMV’s decision was supported by the weight of the evidence. 2002(Solovij v. Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 ].) The trial court then determines, based on its independent judgment, whether the DMV’s decision was supported by the weight of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Santos v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2001(Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 545 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 ].) A driver who is not satisfied with the result of the DMV administrative hearing may file a petition for writ of mandate. 2001(Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 545 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 ].) A driver who is not satisfied with the result of the DMV administrative hearing may file a petition for writ of mandate. | 1 | 1 |
Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1995(Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 809, 817 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ].) In any event, Vehicle Code section 14104.7 provides that the DMV’s hearing officer “shall consider its official records and may receive sworn testimony.” (Italics added.) Unless the report can be considered an official record of the DMV, section 14104.7 strongly suggests the report must be sworn to be admissible at the DMV administrative hearing. 1995(Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 809, 817 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ].) In any event, Vehicle Code section 14104.7 provides that the DMV’s hearing officer “shall consider its official records and may receive sworn testimony.” (Italics added.) Unless the report can be considered an official record of the DMV, section 14104.7 strongly suggests the report must be sworn to be admissible at the DMV administrative hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lake v. Reed
green
2 sentences2013(Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 455 .) “The administrative hearing is held before either the director of the DMV, a hearing board or, more usually, a department hearing officer (§ 14104.2, subd. (a)).” (Id. at p. 456.) In a DMV administrative hearing in a refusal case, the DMV is required to suspend a person’s driving privilege if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a “peace officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle” under the influence of alcohol or drugs (§ 13557, subd. (b)(1)(A)), (2) “[t]he person was placed under arrest” 2009Discussion In a DMV administrative hearing, the DMV is required to suspend a person’s driving privilege if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a peace officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, (2) the person was placed under arrest, and (3) the person was driving with “ ‘0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.’ ” (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 456 .) The DMV bears the burden of proof. | 2 | 2009–2013 |
People v. Harvey
green
1 sentence2022(See also MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 159 [“so long as a sworn report is filed, it is consistent with the relaxed evidentiary standards” of a DMV administrative hearing that “an unsworn report filed by the arresting officer” can be considered]; People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 540-541 [rejecting contention the trial court “erred in failing to strike the hearsay testimony of [d]etectives . . . because they merely repeated information relayed to them by other officers” in light of the “evidentiary rule drawn from People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 and People | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Madden
green
1 sentence2022(See also MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 159 [“so long as a sworn report is filed, it is consistent with the relaxed evidentiary standards” of a DMV administrative hearing that “an unsworn report filed by the arresting officer” can be considered]; People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 540-541 [rejecting contention the trial court “erred in failing to strike the hearsay testimony of [d]etectives . . . because they merely repeated information relayed to them by other officers” in light of the “evidentiary rule drawn from People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 and People | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Devenpeck v. Alford
green
1 sentence2013Fourth Amendment principles regarding: warrantless arrests “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ In conformity with the rule at common law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” (Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 152 .) When the arrest occurs in the home or, as in this case, an attached garage, additional principles come into p | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2013(Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 455 .) “The administrative hearing is held before either the director of the DMV, a hearing board or, more usually, a department hearing officer (§ 14104.2, subd. (a)).” (Id. at p. 456.) In a DMV administrative hearing in a refusal case, the DMV is required to suspend a person’s driving privilege if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a “peace officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle” under the influence of alcohol or drugs (§ 13557, subd. (b)(1)(A)), (2) “[t]he person was placed under arrest” | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Isaac v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2013The court concluded the DMV could consider the statements in the citations because they constituted part of the Ohio record of conviction as statements lodged in the citation or charging document. ( Isaac, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-863.) The Isaac court emphasized the governing standards in an administrative proceeding differed from those found in a criminal trial: “[W]e must keep in mind the vast difference between the protections afforded a driver whose license may be suspended as the result of an administrative determination by DMV, which may properly be made on the basis of the rec 2013The court concluded the DMV could consider the statements in the citations because they constituted part of the Ohio record of conviction as statements lodged in the citation or charging document. ( Isaac, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-863.) The Isaac court emphasized the governing standards in an administrative proceeding differed from those found in a criminal trial: “[W]e must keep in mind the vast difference between the protections afforded a driver whose license may be suspended as the result of an administrative determination by DMV, which may properly be made on the basis of the rec | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re SC
green
2 sentences2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. 2006(See, e.g., In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 414 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ]; see generally People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 32 P.3d 1073 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 69-70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) We decline to reach such questions when it is unnecessary to do so. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Manriquez v. Gourley
green
2 sentences2006Administrative Hearing Burdens of Proof/Standard of Appellate Review This court addressed the burdens of proof at a DMV administrative hearing in Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 209 ] (Manriquez). 2006Administrative Hearing Burdens of Proof/Standard of Appellate Review This court addressed the burdens of proof at a DMV administrative hearing in Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 209 ] (Manriquez). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2006Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Decision to Grant the Petition Pointing out that in Williams, supra, 28 Cal.4th 408 , the California Supreme Court held PAS test results admissible in criminal driving under the influence trials to prove a driver’s BAC, the DMV contends PAS test results should likewise be admissible as substantive evidence of a driver’s BAC in a DMV administrative hearing, as long as the proper foundational showing is made. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.