federal separation of powers doctrine in California

9 California opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

Case	Followed	Cited
Bowsher v. Synargreen scotus · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2005 2 sentences 2005(See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar (1986) 478 U.S. 714 , 106 S.Ct. 3181 , 92 L.Ed.2d 583 [invaliding statutory provision that authorized the Controller General, an official subject to removal by Congress, to exercise an executive function]; MWAA v. CAAN (1991) 501 U.S. 252 , 111 S.Ct. 2298 , 115 L.Ed.2d 236 [invalidating statutory provision conferring upon a board of review composed of nine members of Congress the authority to veto executive decisions of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, an executive body].) Although these federal decisions establish that the provisions of the Coastal 2005(See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar (1986) 478 U.S. 714 , 106 S.Ct. 3181 , 92 L.Ed.2d 583 [invaliding statutory provision that authorized the Controller General, an official subject to removal by Congress, to exercise an executive function]; MWAA v. CAAN (1991) 501 U.S. 252 , 111 S.Ct. 2298 , 115 L.Ed.2d 236 [invalidating statutory provision conferring upon a board of review composed of nine members of Congress the authority to veto executive decisions of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, an executive body].) Although these federal decisions establish that the provisions of the Coastal	1	2
California Radioactive Materials Management Forum v. Department of Health Servicesgreen calctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001We note, too, that later high court cases do not apply this balancing test, but treat the separation of powers doctrine as a structural requirement that applies whether or not the encroachment appears to carry out an important policy. ( Chadha, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 944-946 [103 S.Ct. at pp. 2780-2782]; see also Bowsher v. Synar, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 736 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 3192-3193].) California Radioactive Materials Management Forum v. Department of Health Services, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 841 , is disapproved to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

Case	Cited	Years
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. green scotus · 1995 2 sentences 2021A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In his separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument i 2020A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In their separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument	7	2002–2021
People v. King green cal · 2002 2 sentences 2021A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In his separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument i 2020A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In their separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument	5	2020–2021
Perez v. Richard Roe 1 green calctapp · 2006 2 sentences 2021A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In his separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument i 2020A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Roe 1, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) In performing this function, “courts interpret and apply existing laws.” (Ibid.) In their separation of powers argument, the district attorney relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s companion cases Bunn and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . ( Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 5, 22-23; King, at p. 31.) At bottom, the district attorney’s argument	4	2020–2021
People v. Bunn green cal · 2002 2 sentences 2020Respondent relies primarily on Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1 and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 . 2020Respondent relies primarily on Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1 and People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King), which adopted the federal separation of powers analysis of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 .	2	2002–2020
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2005(See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar (1986) 478 U.S. 714 , 106 S.Ct. 3181 , 92 L.Ed.2d 583 [invaliding statutory provision that authorized the Controller General, an official subject to removal by Congress, to exercise an executive function]; MWAA v. CAAN (1991) 501 U.S. 252 , 111 S.Ct. 2298 , 115 L.Ed.2d 236 [invalidating statutory provision conferring upon a board of review composed of nine members of Congress the authority to veto executive decisions of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, an executive body].) Although these federal decisions establish that the provisions of the Coastal 2005(See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar (1986) 478 U.S. 714 , 106 S.Ct. 3181 , 92 L.Ed.2d 583 [invaliding statutory provision that authorized the Controller General, an official subject to removal by Congress, to exercise an executive function]; MWAA v. CAAN (1991) 501 U.S. 252 , 111 S.Ct. 2298 , 115 L.Ed.2d 236 [invalidating statutory provision conferring upon a board of review composed of nine members of Congress the authority to veto executive decisions of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, an executive body].) Although these federal decisions establish that the provisions of the Coastal	1	2005–2005
Buckley v. Valeo green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 2005(See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 124-136 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 .) In light of the language and history of the appointments clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that under the federal separation of powers doctrine, neither Congress as a whole, nor congressional leaders, may appoint a federal executive officer. ( Ibid. ) The United States Supreme Court also has made clear, however, that the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the federal Constitution, which governs the allocation and exercise of governmental authority by the federal legislative, execut 2005(See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 124-136 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 .) In light of the language and history of the appointments clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that under the federal separation of powers doctrine, neither Congress as a whole, nor congressional leaders, may appoint a federal executive officer. ( Ibid. ) The United States Supreme Court also has made clear, however, that the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the federal Constitution, which governs the allocation and exercise of governmental authority by the federal legislative, execut	1	2005–2005
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 2001Nixon directs that under the federal separation of powers doctrine a court first must determine whether legislative action is “unduly disruptive” (id. at p. 445 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2791 ]) and examine the “extent to which [the action] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. [Citation.] Only where the potential for disruption is present must [the court] then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.” (Id. at p. 443 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2790 ].) We have not ado 2001Nixon directs that under the federal separation of powers doctrine a court first must determine whether legislative action is “unduly disruptive” (id. at p. 445 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2791 ]) and examine the “extent to which [the action] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. [Citation.] Only where the potential for disruption is present must [the court] then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.” (Id. at p. 443 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2790 ].) We have not ado	1	2001–2001
Butt v. State of California green cal · 1992 1 sentence 2001Nixon directs that under the federal separation of powers doctrine a court first must determine whether legislative action is “unduly disruptive” (id. at p. 445 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2791 ]) and examine the “extent to which [the action] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. [Citation.] Only where the potential for disruption is present must [the court] then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.” (Id. at p. 443 [ 97 S.Ct. at p. 2790 ].) We have not ado	1	2001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 450 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

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