relative hardship doctrine in California

2022No hard and fast rule can be adopted which will fit all cases and hence each must be determined upon its own peculiar facts.” (Pahl v. Ribero (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 .) This “balancing of the equities” legal doctrine has been known by several names over the years, including “a balancing of the conveniences,” “a balancing of the equities and hardships,” and “the relative hardship doctrine.” (See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 526 ; Associated Cal. Loggers, Inc. v. Kinder (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 34, 38-39 ; Hirshfield v. Schwartz, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 758 .) “Und

2022No hard and fast rule can be adopted which will fit all cases and hence each must be determined upon its own peculiar facts.” (Pahl v. Ribero (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 .) This “balancing of the equities” legal doctrine has been known by several names over the years, including “a balancing of the conveniences,” “a balancing of the equities and hardships,” and “the relative hardship doctrine.” (See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 526 ; Associated Cal. Loggers, Inc. v. Kinder (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 34, 38-39 ; Hirshfield v. Schwartz, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 758 .) “Und

2022(Ibid.; see Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513, 520 [reviewing court may take judicial notice of the fact that removal of encroaching structures, “as pictured in the exhibits” in the appellate record, “would involve considerable expense”] (Dolske).) Hirshfield explained that under the relative hardship doctrine, the court further has broad equitable powers to fashion a remedy to fit the requirements of specific cases. ( Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 765, 770-771 [“the courts are not limited to judicial passivity as in merely refusing to enjoin an encroachment.

2022(See Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 520 [in applying the relative hardship doctrine, the court considers, inter alia, the “proportionate hardships to the parties”].) In reaching its decision, the court also relied on the test articulated in Brown Derby Hollywood Corp. v. Hatton (1964) 61 Cal.2d 855, 858 [“ ‘[W]here the encroachment does not irreparably injure the plaintiff, was innocently made, and where the cost of removal would be great compared to the inconvenience caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may, in its discretion, deny the injunction and compe

2017(Cf. Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d 513, 520-521 ; Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 ] [discussing the relative hardship doctrine].) ‘“That doctrine does not apply unless there has been, in fact, a trespass on, or an invasion of, the property rights of another . . . .” (City of Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 548 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 274 ], citations omitted.) V.

2017(Cf. Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d 513, 520-521 ; Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 ] [discussing the relative hardship doctrine].) ‘“That doctrine does not apply unless there has been, in fact, a trespass on, or an invasion of, the property rights of another . . . .” (City of Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 548 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 274 ], citations omitted.) V.

2022(See Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1009 [“courts may exercise their equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner’s land which will protect the encroacher’s use”].) In other words, “[u]nder [the relative hardship] doctrine, once the court determines that a trespass has occurred, the court conducts an equitable balancing to determine whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the trespass or whether to award damages instead.” ( Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759, 761 [“Under the relative hardship test, the trial court must identify the competing

2022(See Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1009 [“courts may exercise their equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner’s land which will protect the encroacher’s use”].) In other words, “[u]nder [the relative hardship] doctrine, once the court determines that a trespass has occurred, the court conducts an equitable balancing to determine whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the trespass or whether to award damages instead.” ( Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759, 761 [“Under the relative hardship test, the trial court must identify the competing

2011For example, in Miller , the plaintiffs successfully sued to establish a right of ingress and egress to their property over a portion of the defendants’ property. ( Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 289 .) Acknowledging that in previous decisions applying the test “the courts were dealing with fixed structures which encroached on the property of another,” the appellate court concluded that “[t]here is no difference in principle, only in degree, between a driveway which cuts across a comer of lands of another and so encroaches 24 hours a day, and the transitory passage of vehicles which intermitten

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2022It then must balance the relative hardships of granting or denying an injunction to remove encroachments from the plaintiff’s property.”].) “ ‘ “[W]here the encroachment does not irreparably injure the plaintiff, was innocently made, and where 22. the cost of removal would be great compared to the inconvenience caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may, in its discretion, deny the injunction and compel the plaintiff to accept damages.” ’ ” (Salazar v. Matejcek (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 634, 649 (Salazar); Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 761 [an injuncti

2022Instead, in a proper case, the courts may exercise their equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner’s land which will protect the encroacher’s use”]; see Salazar, supra, 245 4 Here, the trial court personally viewed the disputed property and, as was the case in Hirshfield, its observations are not part of the record on appeal. 23.

2022(See Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 520 [in applying the relative hardship doctrine, the court considers, inter alia, the “proportionate hardships to the parties”].) In reaching its decision, the court also relied on the test articulated in Brown Derby Hollywood Corp. v. Hatton (1964) 61 Cal.2d 855, 858 [“ ‘[W]here the encroachment does not irreparably injure the plaintiff, was innocently made, and where the cost of removal would be great compared to the inconvenience caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may, in its discretion, deny the injunction and compe

2017(Cf. Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d 513, 520-521 ; Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 ] [discussing the relative hardship doctrine].) ‘“That doctrine does not apply unless there has been, in fact, a trespass on, or an invasion of, the property rights of another . . . .” (City of Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 548 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 274 ], citations omitted.) V.

2017(Cf. Dolske, supra, 58 Cal.2d 513, 520-521 ; Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 ] [discussing the relative hardship doctrine].) ‘“That doctrine does not apply unless there has been, in fact, a trespass on, or an invasion of, the property rights of another . . . .” (City of Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 548 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 274 ], citations omitted.) V.

2013“When reviewing a trial court’s exercise of its equity powers to fashion an equitable easement, we will overturn the decision only if we find that the court abused its discretion.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs insist, however, that we must independently review the trial court’s ruling because “the legal inquiry requires an evaluation of whether the legal principles of negligent and willful conduct were incorrectly interpreted and applied by the Trial Court to the doctrine of relative hardship, and to the legal concept of ‘innocent encroachment’. ” Plaintiffs’ reliance on Crocker National Bank v. City an

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2001The court’s reasoning tracked the analysis of Christensen , which has been described as a “definitive opinion” on the subject. (11 Witkin, supra, Equity, § 156, at p. 836.) The Hirshfields contend that the decision in Fairrington v. Dyke Water Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 198, 200-201 [ 323 P.2d 1001 ] (Fairrington), modified the Christensen formulation.

2001The court’s reasoning tracked the analysis of Christensen , which has been described as a “definitive opinion” on the subject. (11 Witkin, supra, Equity, § 156, at p. 836.) The Hirshfields contend that the decision in Fairrington v. Dyke Water Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 198, 200-201 [ 323 P.2d 1001 ] (Fairrington), modified the Christensen formulation.

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

2001(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 676 P.2d 584 ] (Warsaw); Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 375 P.2d 174 ] (Dolske); Fairrington, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 200-201; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-239 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] (Field-Escandon); Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 44-46 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 306, 307 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; Scheble, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d atpp. 437-438; Christensen, supra, 114 *759 Cal.App.2d 554, 562

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r

1952Thus, in Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 55 P.2d 1251 ], it is stated *564 that the trespass must be the result of “inadvertence and mistake”; in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp., 128 Cal.App. 348, 350 [ 17 P.2d 165 ], the words “innocent mistake” are used; in Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 690 [ 139 P.2d 976 ], the language is “innocent mistake or oversight”; while in the case of Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 128 [ 180 P. 67 ], the court states that the trespass must be the result of an “innocent mistake of fact” or there must be a “bona fide claim of r