thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee

2024In State v. Johnson, a majority of this Court chose not to reinstate the thirteenth juror rule after it had been abolished due to concerns over its constitutionality. 692 S.W.2d 412 , 413–14 (Tenn. 1985), superseded by rule, Tenn. R.

2024Justice Drowota and one other justice dissented and argued for reinstatement of the thirteenth juror rule, finding the rule “may be the only safeguard available against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.” Id. at 415 (Drowota, J., dissenting). - 14 - Although the automatic remand for new trial remedy precludes the original trial judge from fulfilling his or her role as thirteenth juror upon remand, our law allows successor judges to serve as thirteenth juror when the original trial judge becomes incapacitated during trial or post-trial proceedings.

2024The rationale behind the thirteenth juror rule is that “[i]mmediately after the trial, the trial court judge is in the same position as the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and assess the weight of the evidence, based upon the live trial proceedings.” State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995).

2024The Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he purpose of the thirteenth juror rule is to be a ‘safeguard . . . against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.’” Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 308 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995)).

2014Moreover, after considering the legislature’s intent and the prior thirteenth juror rule, the Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted Rule 33 as “impos[ing] upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case.” State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995).

2013Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” This is the modern equivalent of the thirteenth juror rule and “imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case, and that approval by the trial judge of the jury’s verdict as the thirteenth juror is a necessary prerequisite to imposition of a valid judgment.” State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn.Crim.App.2006) (quoting State v. Carter, 896

2017Curran v. State, 157 Tenn. 7 , 4 S.W.2d 957, 958 (1928).

2017Curran v. State, 157 Tenn. 7 , 4 S.W.2d 957, 958 (1928).

2019Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” This is the modern equivalent of the thirteenth juror rule and “imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case, and that approval by the trial judge of the jury’s verdict as the thirteenth juror is a necessary prerequisite to imposition of a valid judgment.” State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Crim.

2019Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” This is the modern equivalent of the thirteenth juror rule and “imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case, and that approval by the trial judge of the jury’s verdict as the thirteenth juror is a necessary prerequisite to imposition of a valid judgment.” State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Crim.

2006In 1978, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.1978), that the thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee must be abolished, because it violated principles of double jeopardy.

2006In 1978, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978), that the thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee must be abolished, because it violated principles of double jeopardy.

2001See Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d [83,] 105 [ (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) ]; Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Tenn. Ct.App.1994).

2001See Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d [83,] 105 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)]; Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Tenn. Ct. App.1994).

2020Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The thirteenth juror rule requires the trial court to weigh the evidence independently, to pass upon the issues, and to decide whether the verdict is supported by the evidence.”).

2012Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 717-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

2024See, e.g., Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 310 (Tenn. 2017); Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

2010As stated in Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999): The thirteenth juror rule requires the trial court to weigh the evidence independently, to determine the issues, and to decide whether the verdict is supported by the evidence.

2025“The purpose of the thirteenth juror rule is - 48 - to be a ‘safeguard . . . against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.’” State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 823 (Tenn. Crim.

2010“The purpose of the thirteenth juror rule is to be a ‘safeguard . . . against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.’” State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 823 (Tenn. Crim.

2024See, e.g., Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 310 (Tenn. 2017); Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

2024The Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he purpose of the thirteenth juror rule is to be a ‘safeguard . . . against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.’” Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 308 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995)).

2019A claim that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror “is not a proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.” State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 115 (Tenn. Crim.

2018A claim that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror “is not a proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.” State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 115 (Tenn. Crim.

2006However, in rejecting this interpretation, the Supreme Court quoted from the Advisory Commission Comment to present Rule 33(d): New Rule [(33(d))] changes the holdings in State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.1985), and State v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn.1990), which had abolished the thirteenth juror rule in criminal cases.

2006However, in rejecting this interpretation, the Supreme Court quoted from the Advisory Commission Comment to present Rule 33(d): -2- New Rule [(33(d)] changes the holdings in State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1985), and State v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. 1990), which had abolished the thirteenth juror rule in criminal cases.

2015Our Court of Criminal Appeals has opined that, “[g]iven the statements made by our supreme court regarding the purpose of the thirteenth juror rule, it is difficult to see how a trial judge who has not heard the evidence and who has not seen the witnesses can act as the thirteenth juror when weight and credibility are issues.” State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tenn. Crim.

2013“Given the statement made by our supreme court regarding the purpose of the thirteenth juror rule, it is difficult to see how a trial judge who has not heard the evidence and who has not seen the witnesses can act as the thirteenth juror when weight and credibility are issues.” Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 275 .

1993In State v. Enochs, 823 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn.1991), we held that the thirteenth juror rule applies to all cases which were pending on direct review at the time the rule was reinstated and became effective.

1993CONCLUSION Alter careful consideration, we have concluded that the convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial in light of the 1991 amendment to Tenn.R.Crim.P. 33 adopting the thirteenth juror rule and our recent opinion in State v. Enochs, 823 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn.1991), applying the rule to cases pending on appeal when the rule was adopted.

2020However, when a judge discusses the reasons for his or her decision, the appellate court reviews the reasons simply to determine whether he or she properly considered the issues “‘and was satisfied or dissatisfied with the verdict thereon.’” Id. (quoting Davidson, 104 S.W.3d at 488 ); see also Bellamy, 2008 WL 5424015 , at *10 (“[W]e must review his [or her] comments to ensure they do not evidence a failure to comply with the thirteenth juror standard.”); Heath v. Memphis Radiological Prof’l Corp., 79 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2008In 2003, our Supreme Court, in Davidson v. Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Tenn. 2003), “reaffirmed” the thirteenth juror standard “that had been the law in Tennessee -4- [for] almost 100 years[,]”5 Blackburn, 2008 WL 2278497 , at *6-7, and examined the rule’s rationale: The reasons given for the rule are, in substance, that the circuit judge hears the testimony, just as the jury does, sees the witnesses, and observes their demeanor upon the witness stand; that, by his training and experience in the weighing of testimony, and the application of legal rules thereto, he is especially qualified for

2002“Under the thirteenth juror rule, the trial judge has a duty to act as the thirteenth juror to insure that a jury verdict is based upon satisfactory evidence, including that it be presented through sufficiently credible witnesses.” Id.

2002State v. Nail, 963 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. Crim.

2020However, when a judge discusses the reasons for his or her decision, the appellate court reviews the reasons simply to determine whether he or she properly considered the issues “‘and was satisfied or dissatisfied with the verdict thereon.’” Id. (quoting Davidson, 104 S.W.3d at 488 ); see also Bellamy, 2008 WL 5424015 , at *10 (“[W]e must review his [or her] comments to ensure they do not evidence a failure to comply with the thirteenth juror standard.”); Heath v. Memphis Radiological Prof’l Corp., 79 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2015Although neither the State nor the Defendant has presented an argument as to the standard of appellate review that should apply to the evaluation of witness credibility by a successor judge when determining whether he or she is able to rule as thirteenth juror, this Court recently decided the issue as a matter of first impression in Ellis, 453 S.W.3d at 909 ("[A]n appellate court should review a successor judge's decision about whether he can act as the thirteenth juror under a de novo standard of review.”). .

2014App. 2006) (quoting State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See Huskey v. Crisp, 865 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tenn. 1993) (observing that the thirteenth juror rule “applies only in the context of a motion for a new trial, for it is only there that the trial court has the duty to decide if the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.”).

2012Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d at 685 ; Potter v. Ford Motor Co., 213 S.W.2d 264 , 268 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Mairose v. Federal Express Corp., 86 S.W.3d 502, 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2012See Stare v. McKim, 2 15 S.W.3d 78 I , 79 1 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State v. Willoughby, 594 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980) ('"This Court has stated that a Rule 10 extraordinary appeal will lie whenever the prerequisites for common law certiorari exist: . . . the trial court's action is without legal authority . . . .").