thirteenth juror doctrine in South Carolina

2024But see Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254 , 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine is a vehicle by which the trial court may grant a new trial absolute when [s]he finds that the evidence does not justify the verdict.").

2024But see Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254 , 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine is a vehicle by which the trial court may grant a new trial absolute when [s]he finds that the evidence does not justify the verdict.").

2025Trivelas, 357 S.C. at 551 , 593 S.E.2d at 507 ("South Carolina's thirteenth juror doctrine allows the [trial] court . . . to grant a new trial absolute when [it] finds the evidence does not justify the verdict"); see also Howard, 376 S.C. at 156 , 654 S.E.2d at 884 ("The thirteenth juror doctrine is not the proper vehicle for ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as damages.").

2025Trivelas, 357 S.C. at 551 , 593 S.E.2d at 507 ("South Carolina's thirteenth juror doctrine allows the [trial] court . . . to grant a new trial absolute when [it] finds the evidence does not justify the verdict"); see also Howard, 376 S.C. at 156 , 654 S.E.2d at 884 ("The thirteenth juror doctrine is not the proper vehicle for ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as damages.").

2023Co., 350 S.C. 473, 478 , 567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (2002) (holding the thirteenth juror doctrine is a vehicle by which the circuit court may grant a new trial absolute when it finds the evidence does not justify the verdict); S.C.

2023Co., 350 S.C. 473, 478 , 567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (2002) (holding the thirteenth juror doctrine is a vehicle by which the circuit court may grant a new trial absolute when it finds the evidence does not justify the verdict); S.C.

2009We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Haselden v. Davis , 341 S.C. 486, 506 , 534 S.E.2d 295, 306 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine, we consider only whether there is any evidence to support the trial court's decision.

2009We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Haselden v. Davis , 341 S.C. 486, 506 , 534 S.E.2d 295, 306 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine, we consider only whether there is any evidence to support the trial court's decision.

2026Co., 427 S.C. 238, 244 , 830 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine empowers a trial court who believes the verdict is contrary to the evidence to 'hang' the jury, thus necessitating a new trial."); id. ("[B]ecause [the circuit court] is obligated to see that justice is done—it is duty-bound to grant a new trial if the evidence does not support the verdict."); Vinson, 324 S.C. at 411-12 , 477 S.E.2d at 727 ("The jury could have determined that the medical bills testified to by [the plaintiff] were not the result of the accident which gave rise to th[e] suit."); id. at

2026Co., 427 S.C. 238, 244 , 830 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine empowers a trial court who believes the verdict is contrary to the evidence to 'hang' the jury, thus necessitating a new trial."); id. ("[B]ecause [the circuit court] is obligated to see that justice is done—it is duty-bound to grant a new trial if the evidence does not support the verdict."); Vinson, 324 S.C. at 411-12 , 477 S.E.2d at 727 ("The jury could have determined that the medical bills testified to by [the plaintiff] were not the result of the accident which gave rise to th[e] suit."); id. at

2025"The thirteenth juror doctrine is not the proper vehicle for ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as damages." Howard v. Roberson, 376 S.C. 143, 156 , 654 S.E.2d 877, 884 (Ct. App. 2007).

2025"The thirteenth juror doctrine is not the proper vehicle for ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as damages." Howard v. Roberson, 376 S.C. 143, 156 , 654 S.E.2d 877, 884 (Ct. App. 2007).

2021Dept. of Transp., 380 S.C. 263, 272 , 670 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating a trial court is not obligated to explain its reasoning when ruling on new trial motions based on the thirteenth juror doctrine).

2021Dept. of Transp., 380 S.C. 263, 272 , 670 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating a trial court is not obligated to explain its reasoning when ruling on new trial motions based on the thirteenth juror doctrine).

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2005As to its request for a new trial absolute under the thirteenth juror doctrine, Hospital contended the jury’s questions regarding whether it was to determine if Baril were treated fairly indicate the jury did not understand the trial court’s instructions; therefore, the trial court should have granted a new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine. “On appeal, this court presumes the jury awarded an amount of damages within its discretion and it views all the evidence and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” Howle v. PYA/Monarch

2005As to its request for a new trial absolute under the thirteenth juror doctrine, Hospital contended the jury’s questions regarding whether it was to determine if Baril were treated fairly indicate the jury did not understand the trial court’s instructions; therefore, the trial court should have granted a new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine. “On appeal, this court presumes the jury awarded an amount of damages within its discretion and it views all the evidence and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” Howle v. PYA/Monarch

2011“A trial judge’s order granting or denying a new trial upon the facts will not be disturbed unless his decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, or the conclusion was controlled by an error of law.” Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254-55 , 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990). “[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.” Parker v. Evening Post Publ’g Co., 317 S.C. 236, 247 , 452 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct.App.1994). *501 LAW/ANALYSXS I.

2011“A trial judge’s order granting or denying a new trial upon the facts will not be disturbed unless his decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, or the conclusion was controlled by an error of law.” Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254-55 , 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990). “[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.” Parker v. Evening Post Publ’g Co., 317 S.C. 236, 247 , 452 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct.App.1994). *501 LAW/ANALYSXS I.

2004See Worrell, 186 S.C. at 313-14 , 195 S.E. at 641 (holding a “judge ... [, sitting as] the *554 thirteenth juror, possesses] the veto power to the Nth degree ...”); see also South Carolina State Highway Dep’t, 267 S.C. at 126-27 , 226 S.E.2d at 697 (holding an appellate court may not disturb a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial absolute based on the thirteenth juror doctrine unless the decision is wholly without evidentiary support or is the result of an error of law).

2004See Worrell, 186 S.C. at 313-14 , 195 S.E. at 641 (holding a “judge ... [, sitting as] the *554 thirteenth juror, possesses] the veto power to the Nth degree ...”); see also South Carolina State Highway Dep’t, 267 S.C. at 126-27 , 226 S.E.2d at 697 (holding an appellate court may not disturb a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial absolute based on the thirteenth juror doctrine unless the decision is wholly without evidentiary support or is the result of an error of law).

2015Co., 383 S.C. 590, 597-600 , 681 S.E.2d 879, 883-84 (2009) (reviewing the trial court's rationale for granting a new trial despite the fact the trial court granted the new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine and was not required to provide any reasons for the outcome); Youmans v. S.C.

2015Co., 383 S.C. 590, 597-600 , 681 S.E.2d 879, 883-84 (2009) (reviewing the trial court's rationale for granting a new trial despite the fact the trial court granted the new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine and was not required to provide any reasons for the outcome); Youmans v. S.C.

2012Sheriffs Dep’t, 358 S.C. 339, 355-56 , 594 S.E.2d 888, 897 (Ct.App.2004) (reading the trial court’s order as a whole in finding the reasons for the court’s order were “amply clear”); Youmans ex rel.

2012Sheriffs Dep’t, 358 S.C. 339, 355-56 , 594 S.E.2d 888, 897 (Ct.App.2004) (reading the trial court’s order as a whole in finding the reasons for the court’s order were “amply clear”); Youmans ex rel.

2008See Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 525 , 476 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1996) (holding when a decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case).

2008See Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 525 , 476 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1996) (holding when a decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case).

2002In contrast, the thirteenth juror doctrine has been interpreted consistently by this Court, albeit in varying language, as requiring something less. *480 For instance, this Court has held, “there can be no doubt that a trial judge has the discretionary power to grant a new trial absolute or Nisi in a law case upon Ms disapproval of the verdict on factual grounds, and in this role he has been recognized and designated as the thirteenth juror.” South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Townsend, 265 S.C. 253, 258 , 217 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1975) (emphasis added) (citing Worrell v. South Carolina Power C

2002In contrast, the thirteenth juror doctrine has been interpreted consistently by this Court, albeit in varying language, as requiring something less. *480 For instance, this Court has held, “there can be no doubt that a trial judge has the discretionary power to grant a new trial absolute or Nisi in a law case upon Ms disapproval of the verdict on factual grounds, and in this role he has been recognized and designated as the thirteenth juror.” South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Townsend, 265 S.C. 253, 258 , 217 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1975) (emphasis added) (citing Worrell v. South Carolina Power C

2020Prods., Inc., 315 S.C. 34, 36 , 431 S.E.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1993))).

2020Prods., Inc., 315 S.C. 34, 36 , 431 S.E.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1993))).

2026Co., 427 S.C. 238, 244 , 830 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine empowers a trial court who believes the verdict is contrary to the evidence to 'hang' the jury, thus necessitating a new trial."); id. ("[B]ecause [the circuit court] is obligated to see that justice is done—it is duty-bound to grant a new trial if the evidence does not support the verdict."); Vinson, 324 S.C. at 411-12 , 477 S.E.2d at 727 ("The jury could have determined that the medical bills testified to by [the plaintiff] were not the result of the accident which gave rise to th[e] suit."); id. at

2026Co., 427 S.C. 238, 244 , 830 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The thirteenth juror doctrine empowers a trial court who believes the verdict is contrary to the evidence to 'hang' the jury, thus necessitating a new trial."); id. ("[B]ecause [the circuit court] is obligated to see that justice is done—it is duty-bound to grant a new trial if the evidence does not support the verdict."); Vinson, 324 S.C. at 411-12 , 477 S.E.2d at 727 ("The jury could have determined that the medical bills testified to by [the plaintiff] were not the result of the accident which gave rise to th[e] suit."); id. at

2025See Nestler v. Fields, 426 S.C. 34 , 39–42, 824 S.E.2d 461 , 464–65 (Ct. App. 2019) (upholding a trial court's denial of a new trial absolute, new trial based on the thirteenth juror doctrine, and new trial nisi when a jury only awarded the plaintiff the amount of his medical bills despite hearing evidence of "permanent impairment, pain and suffering, and other non-economic damages").

2021However, this power may be exercised only when the verdict 'is shockingly disproportionate to the injuries suffered and thus indicates that passion, caprice, prejudice, or other considerations not reflected by the evidence affected the amount awarded.'" (quoting Becker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629, 635 , 529 S.E.2d 758, 761 (2000))); id. ("A jury's determination of damages is entitled to substantial deference.

2021However, this power may be exercised only when the verdict 'is shockingly disproportionate to the injuries suffered and thus indicates that passion, caprice, prejudice, or other considerations not reflected by the evidence affected the amount awarded.'" (quoting Becker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629, 635 , 529 S.E.2d 758, 761 (2000))); id. ("A jury's determination of damages is entitled to substantial deference.

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2021Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14 , 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938)); id. at 55-56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("An order denying a new trial on this theory will hardly ever be reversed. . . . '[T]o reverse the denial of a new trial motion under [the thirteenth juror doctrine,] we must, in essence, conclude that the moving party was entitled to a directed verdict at trial.'" (quoting Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500 , 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011)) (second and third alterations in original)); id. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial absolute.

2019See Johnson v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 421-22 , 453 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding "[u]nder the thirteenth juror doctrine, a trial court may grant a new trial if the [court] believes the verdict is unsupported by the evidence," or "the verdict is inconsistent and reflects the jury's confusion"). 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

2019See Johnson v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 421-22 , 453 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding "[u]nder the thirteenth juror doctrine, a trial court may grant a new trial if the [court] believes the verdict is unsupported by the evidence," or "the verdict is inconsistent and reflects the jury's confusion"). 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

2018Each time [the Court has] refused to abolish the doctrine."); see also Lane, 383 S.C. at 600 , 681 S.E.2d at 884 ("Th[e] Court has reviewed the doctrine on several occasions and has refused to abolish it."); Howard v. Roberson, 376 S.C. 143, 152 , 654 S.E.2d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 2007) (restating our supreme court's refusal to abolish the doctrine); Shea by Reynolds v. State Dep't of Mental Retardation, 279 S.C. 604, 608 , 310 S.E.2d 819, 821 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The maintenance of a harmonious body of decisional law is essential to the efficient administration of justice.

2018Each time [the Court has] refused to abolish the doctrine."); see also Lane, 383 S.C. at 600 , 681 S.E.2d at 884 ("Th[e] Court has reviewed the doctrine on several occasions and has refused to abolish it."); Howard v. Roberson, 376 S.C. 143, 152 , 654 S.E.2d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 2007) (restating our supreme court's refusal to abolish the doctrine); Shea by Reynolds v. State Dep't of Mental Retardation, 279 S.C. 604, 608 , 310 S.E.2d 819, 821 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The maintenance of a harmonious body of decisional law is essential to the efficient administration of justice.

2015South Causeway bases these arguments on the following language from subsection F of the Commitment: “An additional $550,000.00 of the proceeds of the Loan shall be disbursed by Bank into the Account to fund monthly interest payments due upon the Loan upon the earlier to occur of completion of the Infrastructure and six (6) months from the date of Loan closing.” South Causeway asserts that this subsection “clearly requires that only one of the two conditions had to occur before the interest reserve funds were due for deposit.” “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b),

2015South Causeway bases these arguments on the following language from subsection F of the Commitment: “An additional $550,000.00 of the proceeds of the Loan shall be disbursed by Bank into the Account to fund monthly interest payments due upon the Loan upon the earlier to occur of completion of the Infrastructure and six (6) months from the date of Loan closing.” South Causeway asserts that this subsection “clearly requires that only one of the two conditions had to occur before the interest reserve funds were due for deposit.” “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b),

2015As to the punitive damages award: Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 383, 393-94 , 714 S.E.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the [trial] court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 394 , 714 S.E.2d at 910 (providing this court applies the same standard when reviewing the denial of such a motion); Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 207 , 608 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2005) (holding this court "must affirm

2015As to the punitive damages award: Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 383, 393-94 , 714 S.E.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the [trial] court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 394 , 714 S.E.2d at 910 (providing this court applies the same standard when reviewing the denial of such a motion); Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 207 , 608 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2005) (holding this court "must affirm

2015As to the punitive damages award: Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 383, 393-94 , 714 S.E.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the [trial] court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 394 , 714 S.E.2d at 910 (providing this court applies the same standard when reviewing the denial of such a motion); Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 207 , 608 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2005) (holding this court "must affirm

2015As to the punitive damages award: Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 383, 393-94 , 714 S.E.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the [trial] court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 394 , 714 S.E.2d at 910 (providing this court applies the same standard when reviewing the denial of such a motion); Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 207 , 608 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2005) (holding this court "must affirm

2014Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 299 , 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for . . .

2014Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 299 , 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for . . .

2012Id. at 633 , 578 S.E.2d at 748 (citing Russell v. Pilger, 113 Vt. 537 , 37 A.2d 403, 414 (1944)).

2012Id. at 633 , 578 S.E.2d at 748 (citing Russell v. Pilger, 113 Vt. 537 , 37 A.2d 403, 414 (1944)).

2012See Pikaart, 393 S.C. at 324 , 713 S.E.2d at 273 .

2012See Pikaart, 393 S.C. at 324 , 713 S.E.2d at 273 .