9 California opinions name it 3 courts 1959–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re PCgreen2 sentences2012(See, e.g., In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373, fn. 8 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ].) In its entirety section 1202.05 provides, “(a) Whenever a person is sentenced to the state prison on or after January 1, 1993, for violating Section 261, 264.1, 266c, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, or 289, and the victim of one or more of those offenses is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim. 2012(See, e.g., In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373, fn. 8 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ].) In its entirety section 1202.05 provides, “(a) Whenever a person is sentenced to the state prison on or after January 1, 1993, for violating Section 261, 264.1, 266c, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, or 289, and the victim of one or more of those offenses is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Noreen G.green2 sentences2012(See, e.g., In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373, fn. 8 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ].) In its entirety section 1202.05 provides, “(a) Whenever a person is sentenced to the state prison on or after January 1, 1993, for violating Section 261, 264.1, 266c, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, or 289, and the victim of one or more of those offenses is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim. 2012(See, e.g., In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373, fn. 8 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ].) In its entirety section 1202.05 provides, “(a) Whenever a person is sentenced to the state prison on or after January 1, 1993, for violating Section 261, 264.1, 266c, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, or 289, and the victim of one or more of those offenses is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McCraygreen2 sentences2012In People v. McCray (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 258, 263 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 343 ], the court relied on Stowell to hold that an order requiring a defendant to furnish a DNA sample could not be viewed as an unauthorized sentence for purposes of a claim of facial unconstitutionality because the sample requirement “was not intended as punishment” but instead “was enacted as a law enforcement tool . . . .” But if the facial challenge there fell outside the Scott regime, it fitted squarely within the rule that a constitutional or other objection to a statute can be raised for the first time on appeal if it 2012In People v. McCray (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 258, 263 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 343 ], the court relied on Stowell to hold that an order requiring a defendant to furnish a DNA sample could not be viewed as an unauthorized sentence for purposes of a claim of facial unconstitutionality because the sample requirement “was not intended as punishment” but instead “was enacted as a law enforcement tool . . . .” But if the facial challenge there fell outside the Scott regime, it fitted squarely within the rule that a constitutional or other objection to a statute can be raised for the first time on appeal if it | 1 | 1 |
People v. Combesgreen2 sentences1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection 1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection | 1 | 1 |
People v. Duttongreen2 sentences1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection 1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection | 1 | 1 |
People v. Westgreen2 sentences1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection 1968Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [ 145 P.2d 676 ]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [ 39 P. 207 ]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 4 , 363 P.2d 4 ]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. King
green
2 sentences2021(Id. at p. 1101, citing King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 464 & Buza, at p. 673.) The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the time lapse between taking the sample and analysis means the two should not be paired together. 2021(Id. at p. 1101, citing King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 464 & Buza, at p. 673.) The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the time lapse between taking the sample and analysis means the two should not be paired together. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Haskell v. Brown
green
2 sentences2021Looking to the future, the court reasoned that it is indisputable that “the time between the two steps is shrinking” and “it is not difficult to imagine that what once took months will soon take minutes.” (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1102 .) In any event, as the district court noted, the King and Buza courts had already rejected the argument. 2021Looking to the future, the court reasoned that it is indisputable that “the time between the two steps is shrinking” and “it is not difficult to imagine that what once took months will soon take minutes.” (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1102 .) In any event, as the district court noted, the King and Buza courts had already rejected the argument. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Duroncelay
green
2 sentences1960Chief Justice Gibson, speaking for the court in People v. Duroncelay, supra (1957), 48 Cal.2d 766 , at page 772 [ 312 P.2d 690 ] states . . . ‘the taking of a sample for such a test without consent cannot be regarded as an unreasonable search and seizure where, as here, the extraction is made in a medically approved manner and is incident to the lawful arrest of one who is reasonably believed to have violated section 501 of the Vehicle Code’ . . . .” We are not called upon to decide whether the police may use force in making such a blood test, but the law is clear that if the defendant refuses 1960Chief Justice Gibson, speaking for the court in People v. Duroncelay, supra (1957), 48 Cal.2d 766 , at page 772 [ 312 P.2d 690 ] states . . . ‘the taking of a sample for such a test without consent cannot be regarded as an unreasonable search and seizure where, as here, the extraction is made in a medically approved manner and is incident to the lawful arrest of one who is reasonably believed to have violated section 501 of the Vehicle Code’ . . . .” We are not called upon to decide whether the police may use force in making such a blood test, but the law is clear that if the defendant refuses | 2 | 1960–1966 |
People v. Young
green
1 sentence2022Defendant now argues the trial court’s admission of the sperm cell evidence was erroneous because the evidence lacked relevance, and its prejudicial impact “far outweighed” its probative value. “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in determining the relevance of evidence. [Citation.] Similarly, the court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial effects.’ ” (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 587 .) Evidence is relevant when it “ ‘ “tend | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Miles
green
1 sentence2022Defendant now argues the trial court’s admission of the sperm cell evidence was erroneous because the evidence lacked relevance, and its prejudicial impact “far outweighed” its probative value. “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in determining the relevance of evidence. [Citation.] Similarly, the court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial effects.’ ” (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 587 .) Evidence is relevant when it “ ‘ “tend | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Roberts
green
1 sentence2011(Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127 .) The instant case is arguably distinguishable from Roberts because the Florida court accepted Sample’s plea, provided him and his counsel an opportunity to speak, then accepted Sample’s plea again and formally adjudicated him guilty. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Breithaupt v. Abram
green
1 sentence1966“We conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s rights and that the results of the alcohol test were properly admitted in evidence.” The defendant urges that by reason of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 ], the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution are obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, he contends, Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, 352 U.S. 432 , and People v. Duroncelay, supra, 48 Cal.2d 7 | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1966“We conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s rights and that the results of the alcohol test were properly admitted in evidence.” The defendant urges that by reason of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 ], the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution are obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, he contends, Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, 352 U.S. 432 , and People v. Duroncelay, supra, 48 Cal.2d 7 1966“We conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s rights and that the results of the alcohol test were properly admitted in evidence.” The defendant urges that by reason of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 ], the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution are obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, he contends, Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, 352 U.S. 432 , and People v. Duroncelay, supra, 48 Cal.2d 7 | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences1966“We conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s rights and that the results of the alcohol test were properly admitted in evidence.” The defendant urges that by reason of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 ], the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution are obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, he contends, Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, 352 U.S. 432 , and People v. Duroncelay, supra, 48 Cal.2d 7 1966“We conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s rights and that the results of the alcohol test were properly admitted in evidence.” The defendant urges that by reason of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 ], the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution are obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, he contends, Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, 352 U.S. 432 , and People v. Duroncelay, supra, 48 Cal.2d 7 | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1959(Cf. State of Delaware v. Smith (1952), 47 Del. 334 [ 91 A.2d 188, 193 ], as to intoximeter; cf. People v. Morgan (1956), 146 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 304 P.2d 138 ]). 1959(Cf. State of Delaware v. Smith (1952), 47 Del. 334 [ 91 A.2d 188, 193 ], as to intoximeter; cf. People v. Morgan (1956), 146 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 304 P.2d 138 ]). | 1 | 1959–1959 |
People v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1959(Cf. State of Delaware v. Smith (1952), 47 Del. 334 [ 91 A.2d 188, 193 ], as to intoximeter; cf. People v. Morgan (1956), 146 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 304 P.2d 138 ]). 1959(Cf. State of Delaware v. Smith (1952), 47 Del. 334 [ 91 A.2d 188, 193 ], as to intoximeter; cf. People v. Morgan (1956), 146 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 304 P.2d 138 ]). | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.