second level analysis in California

2009“To demonstrate a denial of equal protection, it must first be shown that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 276 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “If it is determined that the law treats similarly situated groups differently, a second level of analysis is required.

2009“To demonstrate a denial of equal protection, it must first be shown that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 276 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “If it is determined that the law treats similarly situated groups differently, a second level of analysis is required.

2006“In order to establish a meritorious claim under the equal protection provisions of our state and federal Constitutions [an] appellant must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (People v. Green (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 921, 924 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 ] (Green).) “If it is determined that the law treats similarly situated groups differently, a second level of analysis is required.

2006“In order to establish a meritorious claim under the equal protection provisions of our state and federal Constitutions [an] appellant must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (People v. Green (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 921, 924 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 ] (Green).) “If it is determined that the law treats similarly situated groups differently, a second level of analysis is required.

2000Because I find there to be some doubt I reach the second level of inquiry—whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was intended to be a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. ( People v. Hanson, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 361 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 ; Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 93, 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 .) The punitive purpose of restitution was made express by the legislative findings cited above which characterize it as operating as a deterrent and as having a "rehabilitative effect." Moreover, victim resti

2000Because I find there to be some doubt I reach the second level of inquiry—whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was intended to be a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. ( People v. Hanson, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 361 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 ; Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 93, 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 .) The punitive purpose of restitution was made express by the legislative findings cited above which characterize it as operating as a deterrent and as having a "rehabilitative effect." Moreover, victim resti

2012(People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “The concept [of equal protection] recognizes that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment, but it does not . . . require absolute equality. [Citations.] Accordingly, a state may provide for differences as long as the result does not amount to invidious discrimination. [Citations.]” (People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 111 , 534 P.2d 1015 ].) “Equal protection . . . requirefs] that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for wh

2012(People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “The concept [of equal protection] recognizes that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment, but it does not . . . require absolute equality. [Citations.] Accordingly, a state may provide for differences as long as the result does not amount to invidious discrimination. [Citations.]” (People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 111 , 534 P.2d 1015 ].) “Equal protection . . . requirefs] that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for wh

2012(People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “The concept [of equal protection] recognizes that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment, but it does not . . . require absolute equality. [Citations.] Accordingly, a state may provide for differences as long as the result does not amount to invidious discrimination. [Citations.]” (People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 111 , 534 P.2d 1015 ].) “Equal protection . . . requirefs] that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for wh

2012(People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 ].) “The concept [of equal protection] recognizes that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment, but it does not . . . require absolute equality. [Citations.] Accordingly, a state may provide for differences as long as the result does not amount to invidious discrimination. [Citations.]” (People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 111 , 534 P.2d 1015 ].) “Equal protection . . . requirefs] that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for wh

2009(See People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 , 9 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ] ["`[i]n interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . .'"]; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985 , 993 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 953 P.2d 858 ] [actual words of a statute cannot be ignored].) The CODIS unit performed the first level of analysis; the casework unit, with more complete data for the forensic unknown profile, performed the second level of analysis. 15 The technical and administrative reviews by tra

2009(See People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 , 9 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ] ["`[i]n interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . .'"]; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985 , 993 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 953 P.2d 858 ] [actual words of a statute cannot be ignored].) The CODIS unit performed the first level of analysis; the casework unit, with more complete data for the forensic unknown profile, performed the second level of analysis. 15 The technical and administrative reviews by tra

2009(See People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 , 9 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ] ["`[i]n interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . .'"]; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985 , 993 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 953 P.2d 858 ] [actual words of a statute cannot be ignored].) The CODIS unit performed the first level of analysis; the casework unit, with more complete data for the forensic unknown profile, performed the second level of analysis. 15 The technical and administrative reviews by tra

2009(See People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 , 9 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ] ["`[i]n interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . .'"]; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985 , 993 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 953 P.2d 858 ] [actual words of a statute cannot be ignored].) The CODIS unit performed the first level of analysis; the casework unit, with more complete data for the forensic unknown profile, performed the second level of analysis. 15 The technical and administrative reviews by tra

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19

2005The censure in Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ], is equally inapposite, involving an effort to admix court-administered arbitration and contractual arbitration, which are often confused (e.g., Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794, fn. 2 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ]). 10 To give summary responses again, these include: her claimed inability to appreciate the meaning of the second-level standard of review to which she agreed, which is not a basis for avoiding the agreement (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (19