governmental entity challenge in Texas

2024Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 . “[I]n evaluating the parties’ evidence, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. 2022) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ). 16 After an adequate time for discovery, a governmental entity may also challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts through a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

2024Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 . “[I]n evaluating the parties’ evidence, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. 2022) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ). 16 After an adequate time for discovery, a governmental entity may also challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts through a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

2018Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26 ; Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Univ. of Texas at El Paso v. Ochoa, 410 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2013 , pet. denied).

2018Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004); 15 Univ. of Texas at El Paso v. Ochoa, 410 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2013 , pet. denied).

2008Lowell v. City of Baytown , No. 01-04-00548-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6292 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.); see Bell , 221 S.W.3d at 325 (to extent claimant does not seek money damages, declaratory judgment action and injunction not barred by governmental immunity).

2008Lowell v. City of Baytown , No. 01-04-00548-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6292 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.); see Bell , 221 S.W.3d at 325 (to extent claimant does not seek money damages, declaratory judgment action and injunction not barred by governmental immunity).

2015See LCRA's pleadings also fail to establish that section Ben Bolt v. Texas Political Subdivisions, 212 S.W.3d 320, 271 .152 of the Local Government Code applies to waive 324 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 , the City's immunity from suit: the LCRA expressly states 328 (Tex. 2006); Multi-County Water Supply Corp. v. it is not bringing a breach of contract claim for money City of Hamilton, 321 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Tex. damages.1 See Tex. Loc.

2009See Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 327 ; see also Temple, 189 S.W.3d at 821 (holding that selling insurance is proprietary function for which there is no immunity from suit for breach of contract claim); Gates, 704 S.W.2d at 738 (stating that “[contracts made by municipal corporations in their proprietary capacity have been held to be governed by the same rules as contracts between individuals” and that city that contracts in its proprietary role is “clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen”).

2013See City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 148-49 (Tex.1995) (stating that governmental entities have no power to commit acts contrary to the guarantees found in the Texas Constitution's Bill of Rights and that any act by a governmental entity in violation of this Bill of Rights is void). .

2013See Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148-49 ; Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). .

2024Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2011); Gen.

2023Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d at 390 .

2020Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26 ; Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

2018Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26 ; Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Univ. of Texas at El Paso v. Ochoa, 410 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2013 , pet. denied).

2009See Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325 , 332 (Tex. 2006) (explaining immunity from liability bars the enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity and immunity from suit bars a suit against the entity).

2009See Tooke v. City o/Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325,332 (Tex. 2006) (explaining immunity from liability bars the enforcement. of a judgment against a governmental entity and immunity from suit bars a suit against the entity).

2010See, e.g., Dodgen, 158 Tex. at 79 , 308 S.W.2d at 840-41 (holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its “contract” with the government); Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, 482-83 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (explaining that a governmental entity has immunity from suits seeking “to control government actions”).

2010See, e.g., Dodgen, 158 Tex. at 79 , 308 S.W.2d at 840-41 (holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its “contract” with the government); Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, 482-83 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (explaining that a governmental entity has immunity from suits seeking “to control government actions”).

2009Id. at 378; City of Irving v. Inform Const., Inc. , 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. 2006) (city did not have immunity from suit, as to contractor's compulsory counterclaim for breach of contract, for claims germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to city's for breach of contract, to extent contractor's claims acted as offset against city's recovery); Sweeny , 226 S.W.3d at 589 .

2009Id. at 378; City of Irving v. Inform Const., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex.2006) (city did not have im *697 munity from suit, as to contractor’s compulsory counterclaim for breach of contract, for claims germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to city’s for breach of contract, to extent contractor’s claims acted as offset against city’s recovery); Sweeny, 226 S.W.3d at 589 .

2009See Ben Bolt , 212 S.W.3d at 327 ; see also Temple , 189 S.W.3d at 821 (holding that selling insurance is proprietary function for which there is no immunity from suit for breach of contract claim); Gates , 704 S.W.2d at 738 (stating that "[c]ontracts made by municipal corporations in their proprietary capacity have been held to be governed by the same rules as contracts between individuals" and that city that contracts in its proprietary role is "clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen").

2009See Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 327 ; see also Temple, 189 S.W.3d at 821 (holding that selling insurance is proprietary function for which there is no immunity from suit for breach of contract claim); Gates, 704 S.W.2d at 738 (stating that “[contracts made by municipal corporations in their proprietary capacity have been held to be governed by the same rules as contracts between individuals” and that city that contracts in its proprietary role is “clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen”).

2009See Ben Bolt , 212 S.W.3d at 327 ; see also Temple , 189 S.W.3d at 821 (holding that selling insurance is proprietary function for which there is no immunity from suit for breach of contract claim); Gates , 704 S.W.2d at 738 (stating that "[c]ontracts made by municipal corporations in their proprietary capacity have been held to be governed by the same rules as contracts between individuals" and that city that contracts in its proprietary role is "clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen").

2009See Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 327 ; see also Temple, 189 S.W.3d at 821 (holding that selling insurance is proprietary function for which there is no immunity from suit for breach of contract claim); Gates, 704 S.W.2d at 738 (stating that “[contracts made by municipal corporations in their proprietary capacity have been held to be governed by the same rules as contracts between individuals” and that city that contracts in its proprietary role is “clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen”).

2001Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999).

2001Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999).

2010See, e.g., Dodgen, 158 Tex. at 79 , 308 S.W.2d at 840-41 (holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its “contract” with the government); Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, 482-83 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (explaining that a governmental entity has immunity from suits seeking “to control government actions”).

2010See, e.g. , Dodgen , 158 Tex. at 79 , 308 S.W.2d at 840–41 (holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its “contract” with the government); Anderson v. City of McKinney , 236 S.W.3d 481 , 482–83 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (explaining that a governmental entity has immunity from suits seeking “to control government actions”).

2025By concluding that §271.152-153 only allowed certain categories of damages to be subject to the waiver of immunity, including claims seeking amounts “due and owed/owing,” the court generally construed this to mean that either section 271.153 must expressly provide for the type of damages sought against the governmental entity for immunity to be waived or else the damages must be direct damages provided for under the contract.89 Of course, on the facts of Zachry, the court needed to look no further than the terms of the statute itself, which had been amended to expressly allow “any amount 87 Id

2025Physicians, a subsidiary entity of a governmental entity with immunity from suit: the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (“UTHSCH”). 491 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

2024If “the evidence supporting jurisdiction and the merits is . . . intertwined,” the governmental entity may also challenge jurisdiction “by a traditional or no-evidence motion for summary judgment.” Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 552; see Harris Cnty. v. Lopez, 665 S.W.3d 874 , 878 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (listing phrases courts have used to describe cases where “the jurisdictional inquiry is ‘inextricably linked to the merits,’ is ‘inextricably bound to the merits,’ or ‘implicates the mer

2023See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 (governmental entity may challenge jurisdictional facts by asserting 19 and supporting with evidence that trial court lacks jurisdiction); Leggett, 257 S.W.3d at 462 (plaintiff’s jurisdictional facts taken as true unless conclusively negated).

2015See LCRA's pleadings also fail to establish that section Ben Bolt v. Texas Political Subdivisions, 212 S.W.3d 320, 271 .152 of the Local Government Code applies to waive 324 (Tex. 2006); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 , the City's immunity from suit: the LCRA expressly states 328 (Tex. 2006); Multi-County Water Supply Corp. v. it is not bringing a breach of contract claim for money City of Hamilton, 321 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Tex. damages.1 See Tex. Loc.