Jackson legal sufficiency standard in Texas

2026Application As we have said, we will analyze Appellant’s sufficiency arguments only under the Jackson legal sufficiency standard.9 See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2010) (holding that the Jackson legal sufficiency standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply when reviewing evidentiary sufficiency). 8 requested by the defendant, to respond to the amended indictment or information.” Id.

2013ANALYSIS In her first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.2 2 We do not address appellant’s second issue challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence because “the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply 4 A. Standard of Review In a sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

2012Accordingly, in analyzing Appellant’s legal sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010)(holding that the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Ja

2015See Amanda Peters, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law After Medellin v. Texas: Article: The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 233, 255-56 note 3 (Spring 2009) (having two standards of sufficiency review promotes the " boilerplate" recitation of both standards and the rigorous application of neither). [26] See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 449 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (" reviewing courts must apply the Jackson legal sufficiency standard robustly, taking into account all of the evidence, although viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

2015See Amanda Peters, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law After Medellin v. Texas: Article: The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 233, 255-56 note 3 (Spring 2009) (having two standards of sufficiency review promotes the “boilerplate” recitation of both standards and the rigorous application of neither). 26 See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 449 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (“reviewing courts must apply the Jackson legal sufficiency standard robustly, taking into account all of the evidence, although viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

2009Torres v. State, 141 S.W.3d 645, 652-54 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2004, pet. ref’d).

2009Torres v. State, 141 S.W.3d 645, 652-54 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. ref'd).

2013See Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 684-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(“[A] reviewing court is permitted to consider all evidence in the trial-court record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making a legal-sufficiency determination.”); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 , 614 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 , 118 S.Ct. 125 , 139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997)(accomplice testimony need not be corroborated to be legally sufficient to show corpus delicti); see also Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462-63 (“The accomplice witness rule is

2008Utomi v. State, No. 243 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. filed) (citing Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.Crim.

2011Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

2011Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

2026Application As we have said, we will analyze Appellant’s sufficiency arguments only under the Jackson legal sufficiency standard.9 See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim.

2011The lead opinion in Brooks, in which four judges joined, stated that there is no meaningful distinction between the Jackson legal sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency standard first articulated by the court of criminal appeals in Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim.

2011However, in his second issue, appellant, alternatively, presents a question of fact to this Court, essentially arguing that although perhaps legally sufficient, the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction because it "is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust," and in support of his *66 argument he cites Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2011However, in his second issue, appellant, alternatively, presents a question of fact to this Court, essentially arguing that although perhaps legally sufficient, the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction because it “is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust,” and in support of his argument he cites Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2008Utomi v. State, No. 243 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. filed) (citing Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.Crim.

2007Utomi v. State , No. 01-05-00653-CR, 2007 WL 1953898, at *3 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] July 6, 2007, pet. filed) (citing Cathey v. State , 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex. Crim.

2015Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673 , 684–85 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 684-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(“[A] reviewing court is permitted to consider all evidence in the trial-court record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making a legal-sufficiency determination.”); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 , 614 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 , 118 S.Ct. 125 , 139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997)(accomplice testimony need not be corroborated to be legally sufficient to show corpus delicti); see also Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462-63 (“The accomplice witness rule is

2022Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Edwards, 497 S.W.3d at 156–57; Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104 , 109–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see also Rivera v. State, No. 48 01-17-00351-CR, 2018 WL 3352990 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tan v. State, No. 01-15-00511-CR, 2016 WL 3542255 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 28, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2013See Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 684-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(“[A] reviewing court is permitted to consider all evidence in the trial-court record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making a legal-sufficiency determination.”); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 , 614 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 , 118 S.Ct. 125 , 139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997)(accomplice testimony need not be corroborated to be legally sufficient to show corpus delicti); see also Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462-63 (“The accomplice witness rule is

2013Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.

2001Additionally, for the purpose of applying the Jackson legal sufficiency standard, the “essential elements” of the offense are those required by the “hypothetically correct jury charge.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2001The hypothetically correct jury charge is that which “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

1997King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154,155-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

1997King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154,155-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).