timely preliminary hearing in California

2021Section 859b mandates a preliminary hearing be held within 60 days unless a defendant “personally waives” his or her right, just as it mandates a preliminary hearing within 10 court days for an in- custody defendant unless the defendant “personally waives” his or her right (or the prosecution shows good cause). “[W]ords or phrases given a particular meaning in one part of a statute must be given the same meaning in other parts of the statute . . . .” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979 ; accord, People v. Santa Ana (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1142 [“‘[I]t is . . . “generally pre

2020As one appellate court observed in concluding there had been no valid waiver, “[t]he fact that, based 28 upon the circumstances here, it may be a reasonable supposition that [defendant] would have waived that right is no substitute for the statute’s personal waiver requirement. [Citations.] Any contention that defendant impliedly waived his rights under section 859b must therefore be rejected.” (People v. Figueroa, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 , italics omitted.) At the September 23, 2019 hearing, Garcia’s counsel repeatedly asserted that Garcia did not wish to waive his rights under sectio

2020The decision in Davis v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1061 (Davis) also supports the conclusion that there can be more than one triggering event under section 859b.

2013Morrissey ascertained that there were two steps in a revocation decision: a factual determination as to whether the parole conditions have been violated, and a discretionary determination as to whether the violations warrant revocation of parole and return to prison. ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 479-480, 483-484.) Morrissey noted that there is typically a substantial time lag between the parolee's arrest and the eventual determination that parole should be revoked (as well as a possible geographic distance between the place of violation and the place of incarceration) and for this reaso

2013(Id. at pp. 484-489.) Morrissey stated the preliminary probable cause hearing should be conducted "as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available," and the probable cause determination should be made by an independent officer (judicial or administrative) rather than by the parole officer who made the initial decision. ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-486.) Morrissey delineated several basic due process requirements for the probable cause hearing, including the parolee should be given notice of the purpose of the hearing and the alleged violat

2010Thus, under this bill a case could not be dismissed as a sanction for failing to comply with the rules governing continuances if the statutory time for a speedy trial has not run.' The legislative materials again clearly state that Assembly Bill No. 1273 `codifies existing case law which provides that the courts may not dismiss a case due to a failure to meet the good cause requirements for a continuance, before the expiration of the 60-day statutory limit.'" ( People v. Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 935 , italics added, fns. omitted.) Henderson went on to apply the reasoning of the

1981Citing People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749 , which held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss an action "in the furtherance of justice" under section 1385 as it then read, [2] defendant argues that prior to the 1980 statutory revisions a magistrate similarly lacked authority to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the 10-day limit of section 859b. [3] *17 Defendant relies on Court of Appeal decisions which hold that a rearraignment following an invalid dismissal does not start the 10-day period of section 859b running anew. ( Carraway v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App.

1981Citing People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749 , which held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss an action "in the furtherance of justice" under section 1385 as it then read, [2] defendant argues that prior to the 1980 statutory revisions a magistrate similarly lacked authority to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the 10-day limit of section 859b. [3] *17 Defendant relies on Court of Appeal decisions which hold that a rearraignment following an invalid dismissal does not start the 10-day period of section 859b running anew. ( Carraway v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App.

1981Citing People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749 , which held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss an action "in the furtherance of justice" under section 1385 as it then read, [2] defendant argues that prior to the 1980 statutory revisions a magistrate similarly lacked authority to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the 10-day limit of section 859b. [3] *17 Defendant relies on Court of Appeal decisions which hold that a rearraignment following an invalid dismissal does not start the 10-day period of section 859b running anew. ( Carraway v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App.

1981Citing People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749 , which held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss an action "in the furtherance of justice" under section 1385 as it then read, [2] defendant argues that prior to the 1980 statutory revisions a magistrate similarly lacked authority to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the 10-day limit of section 859b. [3] *17 Defendant relies on Court of Appeal decisions which hold that a rearraignment following an invalid dismissal does not start the 10-day period of section 859b running anew. ( Carraway v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App.

1981Citing People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749 , which held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss an action "in the furtherance of justice" under section 1385 as it then read, [2] defendant argues that prior to the 1980 statutory revisions a magistrate similarly lacked authority to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the 10-day limit of section 859b. [3] *17 Defendant relies on Court of Appeal decisions which hold that a rearraignment following an invalid dismissal does not start the 10-day period of section 859b running anew. ( Carraway v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App.

1981Consequently, it is not necessary for us to overrule People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 581 P.2d 651 ] in order to reach the conclusion that defendant received a timely preliminary hearing and thus to sustain the superior court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss.

1981Consequently, it is not necessary for us to overrule People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 581 P.2d 651 ] in order to reach the conclusion that defendant received a timely preliminary hearing and thus to sustain the superior court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss.