violation or threatened violation in California

2014Utility Dist. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 327, 342 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 572 P.2d 1128 ].) Its enabling statute, section 174, describes the Board’s function as “to provide for the orderly and efficient administration of the water resources of the state” and grants it the power to “exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water resources.” (Id., subd. (a).) In that role, the Board is granted “any powers . . . that may be necessary or convenient for the exercise of its duties authorized by law.” (§ 186, subd. (a).) The particular power exercised by the Board in this m

2014Utility Dist. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 327, 342 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 572 P.2d 1128 ].) Its enabling statute, section 174, describes the Board’s function as “to provide for the orderly and efficient administration of the water resources of the state” and grants it the power to “exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water resources.” (Id., subd. (a).) In that role, the Board is granted “any powers . . . that may be necessary or convenient for the exercise of its duties authorized by law.” (§ 186, subd. (a).) The particular power exercised by the Board in this m

1964(See Smith v. Smith, supra, 18 Cal.2d 462, 465 .) Although the denial of a writ of supersedeas on the ground that a statutory stay already exists “is a conclusive legal determination, just as effective in its warning to the respondent as the issuance of a writ” (see Within, Cal.Proeedure, § 60, p. 2213), the writ has issued, despite a statutory stay, “ ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay” (Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 402, 408 [ 232 P.2d 481 ]), or “to set the matter at rest” (Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 132 Cal.App.2d 250, 261 [ 281 P.

1964(See Smith v. Smith, supra, 18 Cal.2d 462, 465 .) Although the denial of a writ of supersedeas on the ground that a statutory stay already exists “is a conclusive legal determination, just as effective in its warning to the respondent as the issuance of a writ” (see Within, Cal.Proeedure, § 60, p. 2213), the writ has issued, despite a statutory stay, “ ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay” (Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 402, 408 [ 232 P.2d 481 ]), or “to set the matter at rest” (Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 132 Cal.App.2d 250, 261 [ 281 P.

2005Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ]), and the rule that “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction entered upon a stipulation of the parties has the same effect as if the action had been tried on the merits.” (Avery v. Avery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 195 ].) Neither rule solves the problem of justiciablity, or the problem presented by section 25249.6, which allows enforcement action where there is a violation or threatened violation, and not on the chance that there may one day be a violation.

2005Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ]), and the rule that “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction entered upon a stipulation of the parties has the same effect as if the action had been tried on the merits.” (Avery v. Avery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 195 ].) Neither rule solves the problem of justiciablity, or the problem presented by section 25249.6, which allows enforcement action where there is a violation or threatened violation, and not on the chance that there may one day be a violation.

2005Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ]), and the rule that “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction entered upon a stipulation of the parties has the same effect as if the action had been tried on the merits.” (Avery v. Avery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 195 ].) Neither rule solves the problem of justiciablity, or the problem presented by section 25249.6, which allows enforcement action where there is a violation or threatened violation, and not on the chance that there may one day be a violation.

2005Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ]), and the rule that “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction entered upon a stipulation of the parties has the same effect as if the action had been tried on the merits.” (Avery v. Avery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 195 ].) Neither rule solves the problem of justiciablity, or the problem presented by section 25249.6, which allows enforcement action where there is a violation or threatened violation, and not on the chance that there may one day be a violation.

1995Because an enforcement action to enjoin future sales by means of false or misleading statements is designed to protect the public, the court concluded that “[t]he relatively small civil penalty authorized implies that administrative enforcement of section 25401 was permissible regardless of whether a violation or threatened violation of that section was a knowing violation.” (People v. Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 516.) Second, section 25501 provides recovery of actual losses in a civil action by an injured investor but only if the offeror knew, or with reasonable care would have known, of th

1995Because an enforcement action to enjoin future sales by means of false or misleading statements is designed to protect the public, the court concluded that “[t]he relatively small civil penalty authorized implies that administrative enforcement of section 25401 was permissible regardless of whether a violation or threatened violation of that section was a knowing violation.” (People v. Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 516.) Second, section 25501 provides recovery of actual losses in a civil action by an injured investor but only if the offeror knew, or with reasonable care would have known, of th

1964(See Smith v. Smith, supra, 18 Cal.2d 462, 465 .) Although the denial of a writ of supersedeas on the ground that a statutory stay already exists “is a conclusive legal determination, just as effective in its warning to the respondent as the issuance of a writ” (see Within, Cal.Proeedure, § 60, p. 2213), the writ has issued, despite a statutory stay, “ ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay” (Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 402, 408 [ 232 P.2d 481 ]), or “to set the matter at rest” (Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 132 Cal.App.2d 250, 261 [ 281 P.

1964(See Smith v. Smith, supra, 18 Cal.2d 462, 465 .) Although the denial of a writ of supersedeas on the ground that a statutory stay already exists “is a conclusive legal determination, just as effective in its warning to the respondent as the issuance of a writ” (see Within, Cal.Proeedure, § 60, p. 2213), the writ has issued, despite a statutory stay, “ ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay” (Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 402, 408 [ 232 P.2d 481 ]), or “to set the matter at rest” (Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 132 Cal.App.2d 250, 261 [ 281 P.

1963First, “. . . that even where an appeal effects a statutory stay, the writ of supersedeas will issue ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay.” Secondly, “. . . since the appeal operates to set up an automatic statutory stay, this court will not ‘balance or weigh the arguments with reference to the possible irreparable injury to appellants or respondents as would be necessary if the question of the issuance of the writ was solely a matter of our discretion.’ (Feinberg v. One Doe Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 92 P.2d 640 ].)” The writ in this situat

1963First, “. . . that even where an appeal effects a statutory stay, the writ of supersedeas will issue ‘in a corrective capacity’ in case of a violation or threatened violation of such stay.” Secondly, “. . . since the appeal operates to set up an automatic statutory stay, this court will not ‘balance or weigh the arguments with reference to the possible irreparable injury to appellants or respondents as would be necessary if the question of the issuance of the writ was solely a matter of our discretion.’ (Feinberg v. One Doe Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 24, 29 [ 92 P.2d 640 ].)” The writ in this situat