Jackson-Denno hearing in Georgia

2025Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal.41 “An appellate court may consider all the evidence of record, and is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, in determining the admissibility of a confession.”42 The record here reflects that Cross was not in custody when he admitted to 40 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 41 (Punctuation omitted.) Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 726-727 (7) ( 873 SE2d 166 ) (2022). 42 Huffman v. State, 311 Ga. 891, 895

2025Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal.41 “An appellate court may consider all the evidence of record, and is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, in determining the admissibility of a confession.”42 The record here reflects that Cross was not in custody when he admitted to 40 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 41 (Punctuation omitted.) Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 726-727 (7) ( 873 SE2d 166 ) (2022). 42 Huffman v. State, 311 Ga. 891, 895

2017And “[ujnless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of the defendant’s statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal.” Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279-280 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

2017And “[ujnless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of the defendant’s statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal.” Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279-280 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

2009Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are “clearly erroneous,” the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.] Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258 (3) ( 271 SE2d 168 ) (1980).

2009Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are “clearly erroneous,” the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.] Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258 (3) ( 271 SE2d 168 ) (1980).

1990At a Jackson-Denno hearing the due process clause requires that “the state must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence [cits.], and in order to make this determination, the judge must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the statement. [Cits.] It is not merely an inquiry based solely on Miranda, although the presence of these warnings is significant in deciding the voluntariness question.” Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126, 129 ( 231 SE2d 744 ) (1977).

1990At a Jackson-Denno hearing the due process clause requires that “the state must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence [cits.], and in order to make this determination, the judge must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the statement. [Cits.] It is not merely an inquiry based solely on Miranda, although the presence of these warnings is significant in deciding the voluntariness question.” Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126, 129 ( 231 SE2d 744 ) (1977).

2010“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility *280 relating to the admissibility of the defendant’s statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]” Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 (2) ( 541 SE2d 369 ) (2001).

2010“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility *280 relating to the admissibility of the defendant’s statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]” Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 (2) ( 541 SE2d 369 ) (2001).

2001During the pretrial Jackson-Denno hearing, Franklin’s counsel argued that the trial court “has to look at the totality of the circumstances.” The court responded, “That is for a juvenile only.” The trial court was correct to the extent that the explicit nine-factor analysis set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 ( 226 SE2d 922 ) (1976), in considering the confession of a juvenile is not applicable to the confession of an adult.

2001During the pretrial Jackson-Denno hearing, Franklin’s counsel argued that the trial court “has to look at the totality of the circumstances.” The court responded, “That is for a juvenile only.” The trial court was correct to the extent that the explicit nine-factor analysis set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 ( 226 SE2d 922 ) (1976), in considering the confession of a juvenile is not applicable to the confession of an adult.

2013See also Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513, 516 (1) ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975).

2013See also Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513, 516 (1) ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975).

2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them).

2012See Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 437-438 (2) ( 651 SE2d 538 ) (2007) (trial court authorized to find that defendant freely and voluntarily gave statement after having knowingly waived rights, where no evidence of alleged threats to defendant was offered at Jackson-Denno hearing). 4.

2017It is difficult to discern from the video the precise words Benton spoke, but it seems clear that he did not initially understand the rights read to him. “[W]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 ( 738 SE2d 74 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017It is difficult to discern from the video the precise words Benton spoke, but it seems clear that he did not initially understand the rights read to him. “[W]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 ( 738 SE2d 74 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020And following a Jackson-Denno hearing, this Court “will not disturb the trial court’s factual and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 432 (2) ( 677 SE2d 82 ) (2009).

2020And following a Jackson-Denno hearing, this Court “will not disturb the trial court’s factual and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 432 (2) ( 677 SE2d 82 ) (2009).

2013See generally State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 104-105 ( 686 SE2d 244 ) (2009) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (noting that, while it might be preferable for trial court to reopen evidence in Jackson-Denno hearing where prosecutor’s performance left “much to be desired” and murder victim’s family could be left dissatisfied by decision not to reopen evidence, that decision remained within trial court’s discretion).

2013See generally State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 104-105 ( 686 SE2d 244 ) (2009) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (noting that, while it might be preferable for trial court to reopen evidence in Jackson-Denno hearing where prosecutor’s performance left “much to be desired” and murder victim’s family could be left dissatisfied by decision not to reopen evidence, that decision remained within trial court’s discretion).

2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them).

2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them).

2012The evidence showed that by the time of the “coercive environment” of which Thomas complains she had already made her statement.10 There was no evidence that Thomas’s custodial statement was induced by fear that her daughter would be arrested or that her grandchildren would be placed in the custody of DFCS.11 The trial court was authorized to find that Thomas freely and voluntarily gave a statement after she knowingly waived her Miranda rights.12 10 See Mungin, supra. 11 See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial

2012The evidence showed that by the time of the “coercive environment” of which Thomas complains she had already made her statement.10 There was no evidence that Thomas’s custodial statement was induced by fear that her daughter would be arrested or that her grandchildren would be placed in the custody of DFCS.11 The trial court was authorized to find that Thomas freely and voluntarily gave a statement after she knowingly waived her Miranda rights.12 10 See Mungin, supra. 11 See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial

2000His motion to suppress the statement he then gave was denied by the trial court after a Jackson-Denno hearing, and he asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in doing so. “ ‘Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.’ [Cit.]” Lawton v. State, 263 Ga. 168, 171 ( 429 SE2d 921 ) (1993).

2000His motion to suppress the statement he then gave was denied by the trial court after a Jackson-Denno hearing, and he asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in doing so. “ ‘Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.’ [Cit.]” Lawton v. State, 263 Ga. 168, 171 ( 429 SE2d 921 ) (1993).

2006Unless clearly erroneous, factual and credibility determinations made at a Jackson-Denno hearing must be acceptedby appellate courts.” (Citations omitted.) Wallace v. State, 267 Ga. App. 801, 807 (6) ( 600 SE2d 808 ) (2004).

2006Unless clearly erroneous, factual and credibility determinations made at a Jackson-Denno hearing must be acceptedby appellate courts.” (Citations omitted.) Wallace v. State, 267 Ga. App. 801, 807 (6) ( 600 SE2d 808 ) (2004).

2002“The trial court sits as the factfinder in a Jackson-Denno hearing, and its resolution of factual issues will be upheld by the appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 292 (6) ( 528 SE2d 823 ) (2000).

2002“The trial court sits as the factfinder in a Jackson-Denno hearing, and its resolution of factual issues will be upheld by the appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 292 (6) ( 528 SE2d 823 ) (2000).

2017See 7 “[W]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 ( 738 SE2d 74 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Miranda, 384 U. S. at 479 (III); United States v. Street, 472 F3d 1298, 1311 (IV) (B) (11th Cir. 2006) (officer’s Miranda warning was defective because it “omitted the advice that anything [defendant] said could be used

2017See 7 “[W]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 ( 738 SE2d 74 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Miranda, 384 U. S. at 479 (III); United States v. Street, 472 F3d 1298, 1311 (IV) (B) (11th Cir. 2006) (officer’s Miranda warning was defective because it “omitted the advice that anything [defendant] said could be used

1982Appellant, citing Porter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 640 ( 239 SE2d 694 ), asserts that the state did not place the “totality of *400 the circumstances” of the confession (see Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237 (3) ( 219 SE2d 158 )) before the judge since the state did not have all of the witnesses to the confession testify at the Jackson-Denno hearing.

1982Appellant, citing Porter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 640 ( 239 SE2d 694 ), asserts that the state did not place the “totality of *400 the circumstances” of the confession (see Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237 (3) ( 219 SE2d 158 )) before the judge since the state did not have all of the witnesses to the confession testify at the Jackson-Denno hearing.

2014Freeman points to his trial counsel’s decision, at the conclusion of the testimony adduced at the Jackson-Denno hearing, to rest on the evidence “in this specific 27 See id. at 687-688, 694 (III) (A)-(B). 28 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 857 (6) ( 596 SE2d 597 ) (2004). 29 See Strickland, supra, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 507 (3) ( 591 SE2d 782 ) (2004). 30 (Punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). 14 situation,” and not present argument.

2014Freeman points to his trial counsel’s decision, at the conclusion of the testimony adduced at the Jackson-Denno hearing, to rest on the evidence “in this specific 27 See id. at 687-688, 694 (III) (A)-(B). 28 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 857 (6) ( 596 SE2d 597 ) (2004). 29 See Strickland, supra, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 507 (3) ( 591 SE2d 782 ) (2004). 30 (Punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). 14 situation,” and not present argument.

1978The Supreme Court in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978), citing two Court of Appeals cases that "the `clearly erroneous' standard of the Administrative Procedure Act [is] the same as the `any evidence rule'" again emphasizes that the court " shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence." Since in criminal cases we adopt the any evidence rule in the appellate court, although the fact arbiter in the trial court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, where a Jackson-Denno hearing requires a finding based only on a preponderance of e

1978The Supreme Court in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978), citing two Court of Appeals cases that "the `clearly erroneous' standard of the Administrative Procedure Act [is] the same as the `any evidence rule'" again emphasizes that the court " shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence." Since in criminal cases we adopt the any evidence rule in the appellate court, although the fact arbiter in the trial court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, where a Jackson-Denno hearing requires a finding based only on a preponderance of e

2019The record does not reflect any Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the voluntariness of Reid’s statements given to the DFCS investigator at the detective bureau or any request that the trial court conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing. 12 As this Court discussed in Watson v. State, 227 Ga. 698, 699 (1) ( 182 SE2d 446 ) (1971), where a defendant objects to the use of a confession only on the “ground of the alleged failure to apprise the defendant of his constitutional rights prior to taking his statement,” such objection “did not reach the issue of [the statement’s] voluntariness.” As we have more rec

2019The record does not reflect any Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the voluntariness of Reid’s statements given to the DFCS investigator at the detective bureau or any request that the trial court conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing. 12 As this Court discussed in Watson v. State, 227 Ga. 698, 699 (1) ( 182 SE2d 446 ) (1971), where a defendant objects to the use of a confession only on the “ground of the alleged failure to apprise the defendant of his constitutional rights prior to taking his statement,” such objection “did not reach the issue of [the statement’s] voluntariness.” As we have more rec

2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them).

2012The evidence showed that by the time of the “coercive environment” of which Thomas complains she had already made her statement.10 There was no evidence that Thomas’s custodial statement was induced by fear that her daughter would be arrested or that her grandchildren would be placed in the custody of DFCS.11 The trial court was authorized to find that Thomas freely and voluntarily gave a statement after she knowingly waived her Miranda rights.12 10 See Mungin, supra. 11 See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial

2010See Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 357 ( 589 SE2d 90 ) (2003).

2010See Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 357 ( 589 SE2d 90 ) (2003).

2004It does not appear that the robbery-involved use of a car. 6 (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) McNair v. State, 190 Ga. App. 412, 413 (2) ( 379 SE2d 424 ) (1989). 7 See Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 485 (6) ( 299 SE2d 531 ) (1983); McNair, supra. 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 783 (5) (510 SE2d 69 ) (1998). 9 See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 46 (6) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (indicating that Jackson-Denno hearing is only required when a defendant makes an incriminating statement or a confession). 10 See McNair, supra; see also Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 349

2004It does not appear that the robbery-involved use of a car. 6 (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) McNair v. State, 190 Ga. App. 412, 413 (2) ( 379 SE2d 424 ) (1989). 7 See Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 485 (6) ( 299 SE2d 531 ) (1983); McNair, supra. 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 783 (5) (510 SE2d 69 ) (1998). 9 See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 46 (6) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (indicating that Jackson-Denno hearing is only required when a defendant makes an incriminating statement or a confession). 10 See McNair, supra; see also Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 349

2004It does not appear that the robbery-involved use of a car. 6 (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) McNair v. State, 190 Ga. App. 412, 413 (2) ( 379 SE2d 424 ) (1989). 7 See Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 485 (6) ( 299 SE2d 531 ) (1983); McNair, supra. 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 783 (5) (510 SE2d 69 ) (1998). 9 See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 46 (6) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (indicating that Jackson-Denno hearing is only required when a defendant makes an incriminating statement or a confession). 10 See McNair, supra; see also Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 349

2004It does not appear that the robbery-involved use of a car. 6 (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) McNair v. State, 190 Ga. App. 412, 413 (2) ( 379 SE2d 424 ) (1989). 7 See Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 485 (6) ( 299 SE2d 531 ) (1983); McNair, supra. 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 783 (5) (510 SE2d 69 ) (1998). 9 See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 46 (6) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (indicating that Jackson-Denno hearing is only required when a defendant makes an incriminating statement or a confession). 10 See McNair, supra; see also Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 349

1992“Findings by the trial court, as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession, will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. [Cit.] Existence of conflicting evidence at a Jackson-Denno hearing . . . does not automatically cause the trial court’s findings to be clearly erroneous that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. [Cit.] In determining whether the trial court’s ruling . . . was clearly erroneous, an appellate court may look to all the evidence contained in the record. [Cit.]” Gadson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 315, 316 (1) ( 398 SE2d

1992“Findings by the trial court, as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession, will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. [Cit.] Existence of conflicting evidence at a Jackson-Denno hearing . . . does not automatically cause the trial court’s findings to be clearly erroneous that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. [Cit.] In determining whether the trial court’s ruling . . . was clearly erroneous, an appellate court may look to all the evidence contained in the record. [Cit.]” Gadson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 315, 316 (1) ( 398 SE2d

2000Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615, 617 (4) ( 469 SE2d 158 ) (1996).

2000Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615, 617 (4) ( 469 SE2d 158 ) (1996).