Jackson-Denno hearing in Pennsylvania

1983Moreover, the jury may well have found appellant’s confessions to be voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589 , 319 A.2d 153 (1974), as did the suppression judge at the Jackson-Denno hearing, and yet have been unwilling to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of any corroborating evidence directly connecting appellant to the offenses against Barbara Coates. 2 Appellant also challenges the composition of his jury.

1983Moreover, the jury may well have found appellant’s confessions to be voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589 , 319 A.2d 153 (1974), as did the suppression judge at the Jackson-Denno hearing, and yet have been unwilling to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of any corroborating evidence directly connecting appellant to the offenses against Barbara Coates. 2 Appellant also challenges the composition of his jury.

1983Moreover, the jury may well have found appellant’s confessions to be voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589 , 319 A.2d 153 (1974), as did the suppression judge at the Jackson-Denno hearing, and yet have been unwilling to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of any corroborating evidence directly connecting appellant to the offenses against Barbara Coates. 2 Appellant also challenges the composition of his jury.

1983Moreover, the jury may well have found appellant’s confessions to be voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ewell, 456 Pa. 589 , 319 A.2d 153 (1974), as did the suppression judge at the Jackson-Denno hearing, and yet have been unwilling to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of any corroborating evidence directly connecting appellant to the offenses against Barbara Coates. 2 Appellant also challenges the composition of his jury.

1977As this court stated in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 449 Pa. 263 , 295 A.2d 596 (1972), “. . . to be ‘voluntary’ in the constitutional sense the statements must be the free choice of the maker.

1977As this court stated in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 449 Pa. 263 , 295 A.2d 596 (1972), “. . . to be ‘voluntary’ in the constitutional sense the statements must be the free choice of the maker.

1974The record of appellant’s murder trial had not been transcribed, however, and we again remanded the case, this time for a Jackson-Denno hearing on the voluntariness of appellant’s alleged confession. 2 Commonwealth v. Jones, 450 Pa. 372 , 301 A. 2d 631 (1973).

1974The record of appellant’s murder trial had not been transcribed, however, and we again remanded the case, this time for a Jackson-Denno hearing on the voluntariness of appellant’s alleged confession. 2 Commonwealth v. Jones, 450 Pa. 372 , 301 A. 2d 631 (1973).

1974Appellant next objects to the trial court’s failure to grant appellant’s motion for the withdrawal of a juror, when two Commonwealth witnesses testified that appellant had told the victim and the victim’s family that he wanted them to “Suffer like I suffered when I was in jail.” According to appellant, this testimony constituted inadmissible references to his previous criminal record, citing Commonwealth v. Chapasco, 436 Pa. 143 , 258 A. 2d 638 (1969).

1974Appellant next objects to the trial court’s failure to grant appellant’s motion for the withdrawal of a juror, when two Commonwealth witnesses testified that appellant had told the victim and the victim’s family that he wanted them to “Suffer like I suffered when I was in jail.” According to appellant, this testimony constituted inadmissible references to his previous criminal record, citing Commonwealth v. Chapasco, 436 Pa. 143 , 258 A. 2d 638 (1969).

1974Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141 , 239 A. 2d 426 (1968), the burden of proving that a confession was taken and used against a defendant is upon that defendant.

1974Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141 , 239 A. 2d 426 (1968), the burden of proving that a confession was taken and used against a defendant is upon that defendant.

1972See: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83 , 233 A. 2d 530 (1967); Commonwealth v. Nash, 436 Pa. 519 , 261 A. 2d 314 (1970). * Although the Commonwealth is correct in general, this appellant is not barred from raising his Jackson-Denno claim at this stage because (1) the trial judge was aware of the voluntariness issue, as evidenced by his instructions to the jury that they must disregard the appellant’s statement if they found that it was involuntary due to appellant’s intoxication (N.T. 75) (trial); and (2) I detect no reasonable basis for counsel’s failure to attempt to exclude the statement.

1972See: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83 , 233 A. 2d 530 (1967); Commonwealth v. Nash, 436 Pa. 519 , 261 A. 2d 314 (1970). * Although the Commonwealth is correct in general, this appellant is not barred from raising his Jackson-Denno claim at this stage because (1) the trial judge was aware of the voluntariness issue, as evidenced by his instructions to the jury that they must disregard the appellant’s statement if they found that it was involuntary due to appellant’s intoxication (N.T. 75) (trial); and (2) I detect no reasonable basis for counsel’s failure to attempt to exclude the statement.

1972Alexander v. Maroney, 426 Pa. 186 , 231 A. 2d 746 (1967), for the proposition that where there is evidence in the record that the voluntariness of the confession is being challenged, no formal objection is necessary in order to preserve appellant’s Jackson-Denno claim on collateral attack of the conviction.

1972Alexander v. Maroney, 426 Pa. 186 , 231 A. 2d 746 (1967), for the proposition that where there is evidence in the record that the voluntariness of the confession is being challenged, no formal objection is necessary in order to preserve appellant’s Jackson-Denno claim on collateral attack of the conviction.

1972See: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83 , 233 A. 2d 530 (1967); Commonwealth v. Nash, 436 Pa. 519 , 261 A. 2d 314 (1970). * Although the Commonwealth is correct in general, this appellant is not barred from raising his Jackson-Denno claim at this stage because (1) the trial judge was aware of the voluntariness issue, as evidenced by his instructions to the jury that they must disregard the appellant’s statement if they found that it was involuntary due to appellant’s intoxication (N.T. 75) (trial); and (2) I detect no reasonable basis for counsel’s failure to attempt to exclude the statement.

1972See: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83 , 233 A. 2d 530 (1967); Commonwealth v. Nash, 436 Pa. 519 , 261 A. 2d 314 (1970). * Although the Commonwealth is correct in general, this appellant is not barred from raising his Jackson-Denno claim at this stage because (1) the trial judge was aware of the voluntariness issue, as evidenced by his instructions to the jury that they must disregard the appellant’s statement if they found that it was involuntary due to appellant’s intoxication (N.T. 75) (trial); and (2) I detect no reasonable basis for counsel’s failure to attempt to exclude the statement.

1971Commonwealth v. Rhine, 440 Pa. 68 , 269 A. 2d 460 (1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 433 Pa. 88 , 249 A. 2d 536 (1969). (2) The appellant contests the admissibility into evidence of the revolver which was seized from his person when he was arrested and of the extra clip and bullets removed from the automobile.

1971Commonwealth v. Rhine, 440 Pa. 68 , 269 A. 2d 460 (1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 433 Pa. 88 , 249 A. 2d 536 (1969). (2) The appellant contests the admissibility into evidence of the revolver which was seized from his person when he was arrested and of the extra clip and bullets removed from the automobile.

1971Commonwealth v. Rhine, 440 Pa. 68 , 269 A. 2d 460 (1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 433 Pa. 88 , 249 A. 2d 536 (1969). (2) The appellant contests the admissibility into evidence of the revolver which was seized from his person when he was arrested and of the extra clip and bullets removed from the automobile.

1971Commonwealth v. Rhine, 440 Pa. 68 , 269 A. 2d 460 (1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 433 Pa. 88 , 249 A. 2d 536 (1969). (2) The appellant contests the admissibility into evidence of the revolver which was seized from his person when he was arrested and of the extra clip and bullets removed from the automobile.

1970We next consider appellant's claim to relief under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).

1970We next consider appellant's claim to relief under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).